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—  1 —
Chapter I
Prelude: the Estates of Utrecht 1528-1577
The province of Utrecht lies in the centre of the northern 
Netherlands, between two much larger neighbours, Holland and 
Gelderland. In the sixteenth century, it also shared borders with a 
number of independent lordships, such as Ysselstein, Buren, Culemborg, 
Langerak and Vianen.(l) Until 1528, it was ruled by the bishops of 
Utrecht with the province of Overijssel, to the north-east; together, 
they formed what was known as the Sticht: Utrecht was the lower or
Nedersticht, and Overijssel the upper, or Oversticht. By the later 
sixteenth century, however, the ndme "Sticht" was applied only to 
Utrecht. It was a small province, both in geographical area and in 
population. No reliable population figures exist for the 1570s and 
1580s, but some estimates based on the available sources can be made. 
The total population seems to have been in the region of 70,000 to 
75,000 people, of whom perhaps almost half lived in the city itself, 
and perhaps 8,000 or 9,000 more in the small towns.(2) Needless to 
say, the vast majority of these people had no say in the province"s 
political life: the following chapters are concerned with the minority 
who formed the political community in the Sticht.
Caught between the Habsburgs and the Dukes of Gelderland in the 
bitter and destructive wars of the early sixteenth century, the bishop
of Utrecht was forced in 1528 to transfer the temporal authority over
\
Utrecht and Overijssel to the Emperor Charles V, as security for 
Imperial loans he had no hope of repaying. By that time, the Sticht
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was so war-weary and impoverished that the "transfer of the 
temporality" met with no resistance. All the same, it represented a 
turning point in the province's history.(3) The bishop's political 
power, already severely limited, disappeared entirely, and was 
replaced by Habsburg authority, which paid little heed to any
restrictions. The new regime was symbolised by the citadel of 
Vredenburg, which Charles V built and garrisoned to dominate the city 
of Utrecht.
Habsburg rule introduced changes in all branches of government: 
in 1529 the five collegiate churches in the city yielded to the 
Emperor the right to appoint the bishop, and thenceforward merely 
endorsed his choice.(4) Likewise, the appointment of the Utrecht city 
council was now firmly in the hands of the Emperor or his
representative, the Stadholder, whereas, before 1528, the city's 
powerful guilds had had considerable influence over the choice of 
magistrates. Thereafter the elders of the guilds were permitted to 
concern themselves only with guild business, and a member of the 
magistracy had to attend all their meetings. The magistracy in its
turn was subject to supervision by the Emperor's appointee, the Schout
or sheriff.(5) At a provincial level, Utrecht's financial affairs were 
henceforward dealt with by the Chamber of Accounts in Holland; and, 
most important of all, the independence of the provincial Estates was 
severely curtailed.
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The Estates had originated in the medieval bishops' "great 
council" or "chapter general", in which sat prominent clergy and 
nobles, and occasionally representatives of the city. This assembly 
was consulted by the bishops long before the Stichtse Landbrief, which 
is regarded as the Estates' founding charter, was issued by Bishop 
Arnold van Hoorne in 1375: indeed, 20 years earlier, Bishop Jan van
Arkel had even promised not to conclude peace with Holland without the 
consent of what were to become the three Estates.(6) In the century 
and a half following the Landbrief, the Estates achieved considerable 
power and independence, culminating in the early sixteenth century, 
when they, rather than the bishop, conducted the policies undertaken 
to pay off debts incurred in Utrecht's war with Ysselstein in 1511.(7) 
The extent of the Estates' self-confidence is indicated by one of 
their most prized privileges: the right to assemble without a summons
from the bishop.
Much of this independence was lost after 1528. Within two years, 
the Emperor had set up a provincial Hof, or Council, officially headed 
by the Stadholder, and consisting of a President, three extraordinary 
and four ordinary councillors.(8) As in the other Habsburg provinces, 
the Hof combined considerable governing powers with its judicial 
functions: indeed, it acted as the instrument of Habsburg government
in the Sticht. After 1528, the Estates were subject to convocation by 
the Stadholder and Hof, who also had the right to approve their 
decisions. To reinforce this control, the Estates' meeting-place was 
moved from the cathedral chapter-house to the chancellery of the Hof.
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Politically, the Habsburg hold on the Sticht was strengthened in 
1534, by the Union of Toledo, in which Charles V laid down that "we 
hereby unite, annexe and join our land and county of Holland, and our 
city, towns and land of Utrecht...with the five churches, gentry and 
citizens of the same towns and lands...so that they from this 
henceforth shall be governed by one Governor and Stadholder on behalf 
of us and our heirs."(10) In the years which followed, it became clear 
that the town of Amersfoort, traditionally at odds with the bishops 
and the city, had not altogether severed its connection with 
Gelderland, which dated from the late fifteenth century. After 
Charles V's- final victory over the Duke of Gelderland in 1543, 
however, the Emperor withdrew all Amersfoort's distinctive privileges, 
took over the appointment to all municipal offices, and threatened 
death or confiscation of property to anyone who accepted a pension 
from a foreign power.(11)
Despite the Union of Toledo, Utrecht was still not fully 
integrated into the Habsburg Netherlands. Like Friesland, Groningen, 
Overijssel and Gelderland, the Sticht was not among the 'patrimonial 
provinces' which Charles V had inherited, such as Brabant, Holland and 
Flanders. These so-called 'newly-acquired' provinces were not 
summoned to the Estates-General at all before 1549, and even after 
that, attended only on special occasions like the Emperor's abdication 
in 1555. Moreover, unlike the patrimonial provinces, they were not 
'accustomed to contribute together' to the financial aids voted by the 
Estates-General to the prince. Utrecht's ambiguous political and 
fiscal status is clearly illustrated by the meeting of the
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Estates-General which debated the Nine Years' Aid in 1558: the
Sticht's deputies arrived in Brussels three weeks after the first 
session, prepared to grant much less than was demanded of them.(12)
Within Utrecht itself, the Estates continued fairly submissively 
under Habsburg rule, but the Church retained enough determination to 
put up a spirited resistance to the introduction in the 1560s of the 
Tridentine decrees, which would have greatly limited the freedoms 
enjoyed by the five collegiate churches in the city. At the same 
time, the chapters objected to Philip XT's new bishoprics scheme, 
which threatened their incomes and wide archidiaconal powers. 
Although the chapters yielded on this point, after some concessions by 
the government, and installed Frederick Schenck van Toutenberg as the 
new Archbishop, the question of the Tridentine decrees had still not 
been settled when the troubles broke out in 1566.(13)
In June of that year, citizens of Utrecht began to attend 
open-air Calvinist services in Culemborg, an independent lordship 
south of the River Lek, whose Count was a noted Calvinist. The first 
Reformed services in the province itself were held in the middle of 
August ; by the end of the month several parish churches in the city 
had been sacked. The Reformed obtained various concessions from the 
frightened civic authorities, including permission to worship in one 
city church, but soon lost these under the terms of the Accord between 
the Confederate nobles and the Regent, Margaret of Parma. In the 
autumn of 1566, attempts by the Stadholder, Prince William of Orange, 
to grant certain rights of worship to the Protestants were not 
approved by the Hof, and lasted only a few months : in February 1567,
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Margaret sent troops to Utrecht, to guard against attack from 
Protestant Vianen. There was no more Calvinist preaching.(14) Shortly 
afterwards. Orange was replaced as Stadholder by the Count of 
Bossu.(15)
The king's new governor general, the Duke of Alva, received a 
suitably ceremonial welcome to Utrecht in August, 1568, from the deans 
and chapters of the five churches.(16) Nevertheless, like the other 
provinces which had been involved in the iconoclasm, Utrecht suffered 
retribution at the hands of Alva and the commission he set up to
inquire into the events of 1566-67, the Council of Troubles: 103
Stichtenaars were sentenced to banishment and confiscation between 
1568 and 1570, and at least three were executed.(17) But it was the 
new taxes proposed by Alva in 1569 which brought him into direct 
political conflict with the Estates. These were the notorious 
Hundredth, Twentieth and Tenth Penny taxes, of which the first (a 
single 1 percent tax on all capital) was the only one to be granted by 
the Estates-General. The others — a permanent 5 percent levy on sales 
of landed property, and a 10 percent tax on all other sales - were 
rejected, because the provincial Estates would have no control over 
them.(18) Although it, appears that only the patrimonial provinces took 
an active part in the March 1569 session of the Estates-General,
Utrecht sent two deputies to Brussels and acted on their report. From
April onwards, the Estates protested vigorously against these 
impositions, on the grounds of the Sticht's smallness and poverty. In 
June 1569, they offered a lump sum - 100,000 guilders - in lieu of the 
taxes over a number of years, and in July they moved from economic to 
constitutional objections, arguing that Utrecht, as a non-patrimonial
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province (unlike all the others where the Tenth Penny was to be 
levied) was not liable for these taxes at all. The clergy even 
pointed out that all who consented to the secular taxation of 
ecclesiastical property could be excommunicated.(19)
Alva's response to this opposition was, first, to quarter the 
tercio of Lombardy in Utrecht in August 1569; for three years, 
according to a perhaps prejudiced commentator, the soldiers terrorised 
the province, committing rape, murder and extortion, unchecked by the 
Duke.(20) Secondly, in December, the Estates were summoned to appear 
before the Council of Troubles in Brussels, ostensibly to answer for 
their conduct of the 1566 crisis. Despite their protests, in July 
1570 the Estates and the city were declared guilty of lèse-majestê for 
their 'abominable' agreement with the Reformed: the five colleges were 
deprived of their position as First Estate, and lost their vote in the 
Estates, as did the gentry; the city lost all its privileges, and it, 
Amersfoort, Rhenen and Wijk-bij-Duurstede lost their place in the 
Estates. The clergy led the resistance to this sentence, sending the 
dean of St. Pieter, Willem Veusels, to Madrid to join the chorus of 
protest to Philip II. Though he stayed in Spain for six years, his 
mission failed. The city's delaying tactics were rather more 
successful: for months the council refused to hand over to the Hof the 
originals of all municipal charters and privileges, until forced to 
deliver them to Vredenburg in February 1572.(21)
The Duke's victory was short-lived, however. In fact the city 
government was left to function much as usual, and the revival of war 
against Orange and his followers, after April 1572, meant that Alva 
had to concentrate on the military situation. The tercio of Lombardy 
was withdrawn; the armies of both sides marched back and forward 
across the Sticht; Amersfoort was held briefly by the Beggars in 1572; 
and in the following year Alva was succeeded by Don Luis de 
Requesens. In March 1574, 46 companies of Spanish, Walloon and German 
infantry, as well as six companies of cavalry, were quartered in the
province, 'robbing the churches, abbeys and monasteries and all the
farmers even worse than if they had been enemies or Turks'. The Count 
of La Roche, Utrecht's third Stadholder within a year, could not keep 
these men under control, and, moreover, imposed heavy financial 
burdens on the countryside to feed them.(22) Thus when Requesens, in 
his increasingly desperate quest for funds, provisionally cancelled 
the sentence against the Estates of Utrecht in April 1574, this was 
the background to their first action: a bitter complaint to La Roche
about the depredations of royal troops on their way through Utrecht
from the siege of Leiden to the battle of Mo ok. By the beginning of 
May, the Estates were even more bitter, as the same troops, unpaid for 
eighteen months and now mutinous, set fire to the outskirts of the 
city on their way back to Holland, after missing the battle.(23)
The cancellation of the sentence restored the Estates to 'such a 
state as they had previously been' (that is, before Alva's
arrival).(24) Shortly afterwards, recognising that Utrecht had to be 
treated differently from the patrimonial provinces, Requesens asked
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the Estates to send a special deputation to join his negotiations with 
the Estates-General for an extraordinary aid of two million guilders. 
These negotiations opened the way for a flood of demands for the
redress of grievances from all the provinces, especially from Brabant
and Utrecht.(25) Requesens wanted 200,000 guilders from the Sticht; in 
return, the Estates wanted Alva's sentence to be formally quashed, all
troops to be withdrawn from Vredenburg and the province, and a return
to the pre-1528 customs of the Estates. There followed two years of
virtual deadlock: with his troops in a state of mutiny and the king
about to declare himself bankrupt, Requesens needed money more than 
ever, especially after the breakdown of the peace talks at Breda, in 
July 1575, but as that year wore on, the Estates demanded more
concessions for less cash. By the summer of 1575, Requesens was
willing to agree to some of the Estates' conditions (though he thought 
them 'impertinent') if they would grant him 50,000 guilders, but he 
would not give way on the Estates' ancient privileges, which, he said, 
had no bearing on the present negotiations.(26) Requesens' threat to 
increase the number of troops quartered in the Sticht brought the 
Estates to 'understand from various letters that his Excellency does 
not take kindly to this long delay' and to placate him, they agreed to 
advance the 50,000 guilders, less some 22,000 they had already paid to 
Baron Hierges, the then Stadholder. Yet they continued to 
procrastinate, to urge the king to make full restitution of Utrecht's 
privileges, and to maintain that the Sticht could not afford to pay 
such large sums.(27)
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This impasse lasted till Requesens died in March 1576. The 
Council of State, which took over the government, was in no position 
to bargain, and in June accepted the Estates' offer of an equivalent 
sum for the aid (i.e. a total of 200,000 guilders to buy off all the 
Hundredth, Twentieth and Tenth Penny demands) in return for 
substantial concessions, allowing the Estates to administer the aid 
for themselves and to assemble independently of the Hof.(28) Although 
this document remained a dead letter - the Estates could not begin to 
raise the money until 1577, and they were still convened by the 
President of the Hof - it undoubtedly represented a significant 
psychological victory for the Estates, and gave them useful experience 
which helped to prepare them for their part in the events of the 
autumn of 1576.
Throughout the negotiations about the aid, Utrecht had 
continually protested against the presence of royal troops in the 
province. In June 1576, the Estates asserted that the citizen militia 
companies and the garrison of Vredenburg were sufficient protection 
for a city as loyal as Utrecht had always been.(29) Certainly, in 
September, the rural areas of the Sticht were more or less drained of 
troops to deal with the mutineers at Aalst, but Hierges was still 
afraid of an attack from Holland or the loss of his Spanish troops to 
the mutineers, and on 12 September he brought into the city three 
companies of German infantry, whom he considered loyal, and installed 
artillery in Vredenburg, because he knew 'that the Estates of Brabant
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were pressing the Estates of Utrecht to join their confederation'.(30)
He was right. On 6 September 1576, the Estates of Brabant wrote 
to Utrecht's deputies, in Brussels for the aid negotiations, inviting 
them to attend the meeting of the Estates-General which was about to 
take place. Hendrik van Essesteyn, the gentry's representative, was 
entrusted with this letter for the Estates of Utrecht, and managed to 
have it delivered to the Domdeken (the dean of the cathedral chapter) 
despite being arrested by Hierges on the way. The letter was 
intercepted by the President of the Hof, however, and it was not until 
28 September that he permitted the Estates to send delegates to 
Brussels. After a further summons from the Council of State, the 
Estates were finally convened for 16 October.(31) When Utrecht's 
deputies, already in Brussels, were received by the Estates-General on 
19 October, they found that their powers, like those of Namur, Artois, 
Lille-Douai-Orchies, Mechlin, Tournai and Valenciennes, were too 
limited to allow them to resolve on the terms of the Pacification. 
They therefore sent back to their principals a copy of the powers 
later granted to the Namur delegation, which the Estates debated and 
approved on 31 October, authorising the self-same deputies to take the 
final decision. Thus when the Pacification of Ghent was proclaimed on 
8 November, Utrecht was the only province north of the Maas to be 
officially a party to the peace treaty with Holland and Zeeland.(32) 
Ironically, just a few days before, on 30 October, Philip II had 
eventually rescinded the Council of Troubles' sentence against the 
Sticht - too late.(33)
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The signing of the Pacification was by no means the end of the 
Estates' problems. The principal object of the Pacification - and 
undoubtedly the Estates' principal motive in signing it - was the 
removal of all foreign troops from the Netherlands. To Utrecht, that 
meant Hierges' three German companies, and, more particularly, 
Vredenburg's garrison of 170 Spaniards, commanded by Fernando de 
Avila. Worried by Utrecht's rapprochement with the Estates-General, 
de Avila stocked and strengthened the citadel, while disclaiming any 
intention of harm to the city. Towards the beginning of November, the 
troops began to clamour for their back pay, and the townspeople, 
fearing a repetition of the sacks of Antwerp and Maastricht by 
mutinous Spanish soldiers, became increasingly restive, and threatened
to take matters into their own hands if no money was forthcoming from 
the government for the troops.(34) But there was no money to pay 
either the companies in the city, or the regiments of Bossu, Hierges 
and his brother Meghen, which were still billeted in the Sticht. Nor 
was there any artillery which could be used against Vredenburg if de 
Avila should fire on the city, and he refused to leave the castle 
until he received orders to that effect from Don John of Austria, the 
new Governor-General, who was then on his way to the Netherlands.
Early in November, therefore, Floris Thin, the Estates' advocate, 
went to Brussels to ask the Estates-General for help.(35) Although 
some members - the deputies of Artois, for example - appreciated the 
urgent need for payment to the troops in Utrecht and neighbouring 
provinces, the 200,000 guilders which the Estates-General promised, 
out of the expected contribution from Flanders, never materialised.
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and the Council of State suggested that the city should storm
Vredenburg with women and children if there was no other force
available.(36) At the end of November, Hierges begged the Council of
State to send money to Utrecht, pointing out how important it was to 
safeguard the city against seizure or sack by mutinous soldiers; a few 
days later, Thin and his fellow deputies finally secured official 
sanction for a siege of the castle, by mentioning a rumour that 
William of Orange's men had been admitted to the city.(37) Fears that 
Utrecht would share Antwerp's fate were reawakened when the garrison 
made a sally from Vredenburg on 21 December, and was driven back by 
the armed citizenry and the German companies. Hierges and Bossu, 
released from captivity after the Pacification, arrived in Utrecht 
shortly afterwards, and began a proper military siege of the citadel 
with artillery lent by Gelderland and Overijssel, Delft and Gouda,
and, in the end, by the Estates of Holland themselves. (Powder and
shot were still in short supply, however.)(38) In January 1577, de
Avila disobeyed Don John's orders to hand the castle over to Hierges,
but by 8 February he was discussing surrender terms, and three days
later, the Spaniards evacuated Vredenburg, which was promptly occupied 
by 100 members of the militia. The city's secretary recorded the 
general feeling of relief when he wrote, on 11 February, 'Praise be to 
God who has delivered us out of the hand of the Lion'.(39)
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The resolution of the immediate military crisis on their doorstep 
left the Estates more time to consider the problem of a Stadholder for 
the province. In December 1576, there seemed to be three candidates 
for the position, but appearances were deceptive. Hierges' claims to 
the office had lapsed when Bossu was released in November 1576, and,
in any case, he had told the Council of State as early as May that he
wished to be relieved of a thankless and expensive responsibility to 
devote himself to his other duties (he was also Stadholder of 
Gelderland).(40) Though Bossu was - to some - the obvious man for the 
job, and in the dark days of December 1576 the Estates were eager for 
his leadership, he found the government of Utrecht unattractive 
without Holland and Zeeland, which were to remain under Orange by the 
terms of the Pacification. Bossu therefore offered himself for the 
Stadholdership of Friesland, Groningen and Overijssel instead.(41) The 
third possibility was Prince William of Orange, who had been 
Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht from 1559 to 1567, and de 
facto governor of Holland and Zeeland since 1572.
The position with regard to Orange was complicated by the 
ambiguity of Article VII of the Pacification, which referred to 'the 
towns and places included in [Orange's] commission from His Royal 
Majesty which are at present not under the authority of His Excellency 
[Orange]', and provided for him to give them 'satisfaction on those 
matters which are of importance to them when they come under his
government, either with regard to the exercise of religion or
otherwise'.(42) Between January and April 1577, Haarlem, Weesp, 
Schoonhoven, Goes and Tnolen concluded satisfactions with Orange in
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accordance with this article. Utrecht had to decide whether the 
obligation as expressed in Article VII applied to an entire province.
Opinions, then and later, differed profoundly on this point, and 
the Estates received contradictory guidance from the Council of State 
and the Estates-General, to which they applied for a definitive 
declaration on the meaning of Article VII. The Council of State put 
forward an interpretation unfavourable to Orange, after first seeming 
to support the need for a Satisfaction; the Grote Raad in Mechlin 
backed the Council of State with powerful legal arguments; and after 
the failure of his negotiations with Orange at St. Geertruidenberg, 
Don John naturally opposed any extension of William's sphere of
influence. The Estates-General wavered for months, finally declaring 
in Orange's favour only after Don John seized Namur and attacked 
Antwerp in July/August 1577.(43)
Meanwhile, in Utrecht itself, opinions were deeply divided. In 
February 1577, a considerable group in the Estates supported Bossu, on 
the grounds that he was a Catholic, and could keep the troops quiet 
better than anyone else. Indeed, on 24 February, the Estates wrote to 
Floris Thin and Floris Heermale, their deputies at the
Estates-General, with instructions to apply to the Council of State 
for a commission for Bossu as Stadholder. This desire was by no means 
unanimous, however, and the majority of the city council dissociated 
themselves from these instructions a few days later, as they believed 
that both Hierges and Bossu had abandoned the city to the unpaid 
soldiery (Bossu intended to go to Brussels in person to raise money 
for the ever-present problem of demobilisation pay).(44) The city
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council clearly preferred Orange as Stadholder, and it was not alone: 
by March, William could count on three of the five chapter churches 
which formed the First Estate, particularly on the chapter of St. 
Jan, which resolved in mid-March that the disputed Article VII was 
self-explanatory, and that the Sticht should negotiate the terms of a 
Satisfaction with Paulus Buys, Orange's emissary. Buys assured the 
Estates that the Prince would do nothing to change the religious
situation, and supported his case for a Satisfaction with the Union of 
Toledo, which required Utrecht to have the same Governor as Holland 
and Zeeland. On 16 March, Buys reported optimistically to his master
that the three Orangist chapters had overruled the other two, and that
the Estates had agreed in principle to accept William as their
Stadholder. Moreover, 'the people here all show happy faces and are
very pleased at the idea of once again coming under your Grace's
government'.(45)
Yet all this was not sufficient to outweigh the opposition of the 
Council of State, which still looked on Bossu as the rightful
Stadholder, by virtue of his 1567 commission from Margaret of Parma. 
Orange sent another deputation to plead his cause in Utrecht at the 
beginning of May, but the Estates still wanted the Council of State 
and the Estates-General to take the responsibility♦(46) In the end, 
the matter was decided by two violent events, one in Utrecht, and one 
apparently unconnected with it.
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The first of these events was the climax of the Estates" most 
pressing difficulty; the payment of the troops. Bossu"s threat to 
leave the city to the mercy of his men drove the Estates into 
promising an immediate payment of 10,000 guilders, with 9,000 more to 
follow after the soldiers" departure. By the beginning of April, 
however, it was clear that this was far from sufficient, and the 
Estates voted a further payment of 600 guilders to each of the nine 
companies still inside the city and the six outside it. But the city 
council refused to increase any taxes to raise this money until the 
troops had actually left.(47) On 27 April, therefore, the German 
companies tried to hold the city to ransom for their arrears, but were 
beaten off by the citizen militia, without bloodshed. Three days 
later, there was another, more serious, "commotion", during which some 
houses outside the walls were set on fire, several lives were lost on 
both sides, and the officers of the companies were imprisoned.(48)
With the city at long last free of Habsburg soldiers, the 
citizens embarked on the demolition of the Habsburg citadel, to 
demonstrate that they could hold the city without a garrison of any 
kind, even one installed by Orange, which might introduce 
"novelties". The demolition was seen as a recognition of the 
townspeople"s contribution to the siege and capture of Vredenburg, and 
despite objections from the Hof and the city council, the citizens had 
soon knocked enough of it down to render it useless as a fortress.(49)
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The troops in the countryside had still not received their 
arrears, however. In June 1577, the money to pay them came from 
Holland (which was always concerned about Utrecht"s military 
establishment) on condition that the Sticht placed itself safely under 
Orange's authority. Even the Estates-General were swayed towards a 
Satisfaction by the dangers to Utrecht from unpaid troops, and the 
opportunity to dictate his own terms which Orange would gain if he 
arranged for them to be paid.(50)
The final decision on the Satisfaction was precipitated by the 
news of Don John's coup at Namur. This presented Utrecht, and the 
other provinces in the Estates-General, with a stark choice between a 
war in alliance with Don John against Holland and Zeeland, and a war 
against Don John as the allies of Holland and Zeeland. In Utrecht, as 
in Brussels, Antwerp and Ghent, the citizens made their views 
unequivocally clear to the authorities.(51) On 30 July, the eight 
militia captains appeared in the city council's meeting to demand a 
speedy conclusion to the Satisfaction negotiations. For once, the 
Estates acted quickly; four days later a deputation was on its way to 
Brussels with instructions which reflect the Estates' fear of being 
forced to accept Orange unconditionally as their Stadholder, in which 
case he might alter the province's religion. It would be far better 
to exact a favourable set of conditions from the future governor than 
risk a possible war with him and Holland and Zeeland.(52) Two months 
later, after a state visit by Orange and his wife to Utrecht which did 
much to increase his popularity there, the Satisfaction was signed on 
9 October 1577. The Estates (except for Amersfoort and Rhenen, who
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saw it as another attempt by the city to dictate to them) thereby 
recognised Orange as their Stadholder and revived the personal union 
with Holland and Zeeland.(53) At the same time, they asserted their 
own autonomy by moving out of the chancellery of the Hof and into the 
cathedral chapter-house. Although the Estates tried to stress the 
continuity between the Satisfaction and the Pacification of Ghent - 
which they had signed in desperation to rid the Sticht of the 
occupying forces - the Satisfaction nevertheless marked another 
turning-point in Utrecht's history, almost 50 years after the transfer 
of the temporality to Charles V.
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Chapter II 
The Structure of the Estates
The meeting of the Estates which took place on 17 February 1577 
provides a good starting-point for an examination of their
institutional structure as it emerged from the Habsburg era, and as it 
developed over the next fifteen years, until it reached a fairly 
stable form by the end of the century. This meeting is significant 
for several reasons: it was the first to take place after the
Pacification of Ghent for which formal records are available, and it 
represented a high point in the Estates' history. The threat from the 
citadel of Vredenburg was past, 'by the grace of Almighty God', and 
the Estates were looking to the future. Hoping to build on the unity 
established at Ghent, and in words which sometimes echo the first 
Union of Brussels, all those present promised 'on our oath and 
Christian word, to live and die as true countrymen, patriots and 
members of one body, together in close cooperation, association and 
unanimity'.(1)
Those present were the Stadholder of the province, the Count of 
Bossu; President Rataller and other members of the Hof of Utrecht, who 
formally gave their approval to the union which the Estates had sworn 
to uphold; nineteen deputies from the three Estates: the clergy, who
were the first to take the oath, the gentry, and the city of Utrecht. 
(No deputies were present from the four small towns, however.) In 
addition, the meeting was attended by a number of burgerhoplieden, or 
militia captains, 'representing the corpus and all inhabitants of the
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city of Utrecht'.(2) This chapter will analyse the role of Stadholder, 
Estates and burgerhoplieden in the institutional developments of 
1576-1590.
The Stadholder, Bossu, had urged this expression of unity on the 
Estates at a time when his own position was uncertain. Indeed, until 
the conclusion of the Satisfaction in October 1577, the province was 
effectively without a Stadholder to act as the representative of the 
king's authority. The problem of who was to fill t^e office was
solved by the Satisfaction which was, in fact, the only commission or 
instruction William of Orange ever received from the Estates as
Stadholder, and as time went by, he found it increasingly difficult to 
uphold several of its provisions, even if he wished to.(3) The 
religious terms in particular were rendered obsolete by developments 
in 1579, and the ordinances which permitted Protestant worship in the 
city. Protests by the Catholic clergy that this contravened the
Satisfaction were fruitless, and Orange had to give his approval to 
the city's religious measures.(4)
Orange held so many other offices that his dealings with Utrecht 
were conducted for the most part by correspondence, or through 
intermediaries. (Apart from his visit in August 1577 mentioned on 
page 18 above, it appears that he came to Utrecht only briefly
sometime in 1580: at least, he is said to have admired a sermon by
Duifhuis.)(5) What survives of this correspondence largely consists of 
requests for money and exhortations to send deputies to the various 
bodies of central government. Nevertheless, Utrecht did take part, if
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somewhat reluctantly, in the project to make Orange the 'High 
Authority' (Hoge Overheid) over Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, in 
1582-84. The Estates had never had a very high opinion of the Duke of 
Anjou's ability to defend the Netherlands, even before the shock of 
the French Fury in Antwerp in January 1583, and had indicated their 
preference for Orange as early as February 1580.(6) The reluctance 
about the High Authority question stemmed from the Sticht's age-old 
distrust of Holland, and from a fear that Utrecht's eastern 
neighbours, Gelderland and Overijssel, would be offended at a closer 
connection inside the Union of Utrecht.(7) Indeed it was partly 
Utrecht's tardiness which delayed the offer of sovereignty to Orange 
so long that nothing could come of it before his death in July 1584.
The Sticht's fears of Holland revived immediately. Within three 
weeks of Orange's assassination, the Estates were considering 'a 
separate governor'.(8) (Indeed, even before Orange's death, Utrecht 
had maintained the right of every province to choose its own 
Stadholder.[9]) A month later, the name of the only candidate was put 
forward: Joost de Zoete, lord of Villers, 'Fieldmarshal of the Army'.
His advantages were that he was near at hand, and that by virtue of 
his military command, he was expected to free the Sticht from the 
oppressive quartering of government troops.(10) This, however, he 
failed to do before he was captured at the battle of Amerongen 
(23 June 1585), leaving Utrecht once more without a Stadholder.
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It is difficult to evaluate Villers's term in office, since it 
was so brief. Its two most notable features were the introduction of 
the shortlived Erfraad, or hereditary council, in the city (see below, 
p. 49), and the purge of April 1585, when 16 men, considered by the 
city council and the burgerhoplieden to be a potential fifth column, 
were told to leave by sunset of the following day. This was not as 
radical a measure at it appears, however, as most of them were 
readmitted to the city within a few months.(11) Whereas Orange had 
been preoccupied with events all over the Netherlands, Villers was the 
Stadholder of Utrecht alone, and actually attended several meetings of 
the Estates, in an effort to intervene personally in the dispute 
between the Estates and the towns over the imposts (12)(see chapter 
IV, p. 91).
When Villers was captured, Utrecht was still not prepared to 
rejoin Holland and Zeeland, and renew the Union of Toledo by adopting 
Orange's son Maurice of Nassau as Stadholder. Perhaps because of 
common defence problems, or in order to create a counter-weight to the 
maritime provinces, the Sticht tended more towards its eastern 
neighbour, Gelderland, whose German Stadholder, the Count of 
Nieuwehaar, was known to be an ardent Calvinist, whereas Villers is 
said to have been a member of the 'libertine' congregation of the 
church of St. Jacob.(13) It was probably this that made the 
burgerhoplieden so eager to have Nieuwenaar installed as Stadholder; 
he took the oath of office less than a year after Villers had done the 
same, and his appointment was confirmed in January 1586, as there 
seemed to be no likelihood of Villers' release.(14) The
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burgerhoplieden stipulated that Nieuwenaar should accept the 
Stadholdership on the same terms as Orange, as regards the appointment 
of the city council.(15)
The instruction drawn up for Villers and Nieuwenaar shows how 
much the task of the Stadholder had changed since the Satisfaction, 
especially in the emphasis on his duty to uphold the exercise of the 
true Evangelical Religion (now the only officially permitted worship 
in the province). Indeed, Nieuwenaar's instruction was more 
Protestant in tone than that of Villers, although even he was 
prepared, in 1585 at least, to tolerate the existence of the 
congregation of St. Jacob.(16)
The enthusiasm of the burgerhoplieden and the townspeople for 
Nieuwenaar had waned by February 1588, since he had changed sides in 
the party struggle, and seemed to be becoming more sympathetic to the 
exiled 'aristocrats'.(17) His new instruction, drawn up at that time,
was much more rigorously Protestant and restrictive of the
Stadholder's powers.(18) These restrictions undoubtedly rankled with 
Nieuwenaar, whom Bor describes as 'jealous of his authority'; in any 
case, he was already resentful at the usurpation of his rights in 
October 1586, when the Count of Culemborg and Lord North renewed the 
Utrecht magistracy, acting on a commission from Leicester.(19) One 
observer commented that Nieuwenaar was 'discontent not a little, with 
fear to be thrust out of his government of Utrecht and those provinces 
[Gelderland and Overijssel]. He hath protested... that were it not 
for Her Majesty, he would depart, for their ingratitude, to some other
country'.(20) In the end, he took steps, in September 1588, to restore
—  25 —
his authority, and received his reward in the shape of an advance of 
9000 guilders towards his salary from the Estates of Holland.(21)
In October 1589, Nieuwenaar was killed by an explosion in Arnhem, 
and Utrecht was once again Stadholder-less. Shaken by their 
experience of 'going it alone', the Estates drew nearer to Holland, 
urged on by Oldenbarnevelt, who did his utmost to ensure the reunion 
of the two provinces, having seen the dangers of separation.(22) The 
instruction for Maurice of Nassau, who was elected Stadholder without 
much opposition, echoed his father's Satisfaction in several respects, 
but retained enough of the old dislike of Holland to stipulate that 
the prince would 'govern the city, towns and province of Utrecht 
separately, and by themselves, as they have been governed up till
now'. Several of the more Reformed Protestant provisions were 
removed, while the Stadholder's influence on the appointment of the
city council was also reduced, enabling the Estates to secure the 
appointment of their nominees, particularly in the small towns, where 
Maurice would merely approve the names sent to him.(23)
In the years after 1577, the role of the Stadholder had changed 
since the reign of Charles V, when the Stadholders were great 
Netherlands nobles, often resident (at least partly) in the province, 
doing their best to increase their personal authority as far as the 
central government would allow them.(24) In fact, with the Abjuration 
of Philip II in 1581, the office had strictly speaking lost its 
meaning, as there was no longer any need for a representative of the 
sovereign. The emphasis shifted to the Stadholder's role as 
'captain-general' of the province's forces. As Stadholders of several
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provinces - Nieuwenaar held office in three, Maurice in five - and 
active military commanders, it was impossible for them to be resident, 
administer justice and uphold the privileges as they had sworn to do. 
(Nieuwenaar did spend a considerable amount of time in Utrecht, 
however.) Nor could it be said that Villers was a 'great Netherlands 
noble', although he did have a distinguished record of service to the 
Revolt. It was perhaps his comparative insignificance that enabled 
the city to pressurise him into abdicating a considerable part of his 
power over appointments (though without the approval of the 
Estates).(25) His successor, Nieuwenaar, struggled against becoming a 
tool, whether in the hands of the 'democrats', or in those of the 
English governor-general, with whom he had been on good terms at 
first. Nieuwenaar reacted violently to opposition: in February 1589,
for example, Amersfoort refused, on grounds of poverty, to accept 80 
of his cavalry, whereupon the Stadholder threatened to set fire to all 
the farms round the walls of the town, 'as he would by no means be 
humiliated and scorned like this'.(26)
Yet some aspects of the Stadholdership had not altered. 
Opportunities for patronage, for instance, were still plentiful: in
1565, Orange had tried to obtain the proostdij of Oudmunster for his 
younger brother Henry, while in 1580 he secured the confiscated 
cathedral prebend of Bucho Aytta, Viglius's nephew, for his protégé 
Jean Theron.(27) Both Nieuwenaar and Maurice similarly took advantage 
of the chance to reward their friends, often with ecclesiastical 
benefices, though these were not an unlimited source of patronage, 
even in Utrecht.(28)
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The importance of the clergy as the First Estate distinguished 
Utrecht from the neighbouring provinces, where clergy had long since 
ceased to play a significant part in politics, (Even in Overijssel, 
the 'upper' Sticht, which had also been part of the bishop's temporal 
possessions, there was no ecclesiastical Estate.[29]) The eminence of 
this clerical body naturally derived from Utrecht's history as an 
ecclesiastical principality, where the Estates developed from the 
bishop's chapter general (kapittel-generaal). The first Estate did 
not, however, represent the entire clergy of the province, but only 
the five chapter-churches, or colleges, in the city: the Dorn (the
cathedral church of St. Maarten), Oudmunster (St. Salvator), St. 
Pieter, St. Jan, and Ste. Marie. The 'secondary clergy' (tweede
clergie, that is all priests, monks, nuns and canons without a prebend 
in one of these five chapters) were without a voice in the Estates 
unless the chapters chose to give them one.
At the beginning of the period under consideration, the
representatives of the chapters were the most numerous element in the
Estates. The five churches disposed of a total of 140 prebends, some 
of which were not in the possession of a canon, but were used, for
example, for the repair and maintenance of the buildings. At no time
were all the canons resident in Utrecht: many held other benefices;
some were sent on diplomatic missions, like Willem Veusels, dean of 
St. Pieter, who was in Spain from 1570 to 1576, protesting against 
Alva's sentence.(30) Thus perhaps only half of the canons were on call 
at any one time. Of these, a fairly high proportion attended the 
Estates' meetings: on 20 May 1575, for example, four canons were
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present from the Dom, three from Oudmunster, four from St. Pieter and 
five each from St. Jan and Ste. Marie; this included all the 
available deans.(31)
This pattern continued in the years immediately following the 
Pacification of Ghent, when at least two canons from every chapter 
commonly attended the Estates' meetings. Twelve canons, for example, 
swore to uphold the union of 17 February 1577, on behalf of their 
chapters.(32) But there does not seem to have been much continuity of 
representation: between February 1577 and April 1582, when the
chapters as such stopped attending the Estates, a total of fifty-four 
canons are recorded as having been present at least once. Nineteen of 
these were members of the Dora, a figure which reflects the leading 
role of the cathedral chapter. Its secretary was at the same time the 
secretary of the Estates (until January 1582) and the chapterhouse of 
the Dom was the site of the joint meetings of all five chapters to 
deliberate on Estates' business. From October 1577 until July 1581, 
moreover, it was the meeting place of the Estates themselves.(33)
Until 1528, the Domdeken had the right to convene the Estates' 
assemblies, and he continued to preside over them when this right had 
passed to the Stadholder and the Hof, striving to regain it all the 
while.(34) The meeting of 17 February 1577 was the last over which 
dean Johan van Bruhesen presided: in March, he fled the city 'to
protect himself against the rage of the furious people', who held him 
responsible for the opposition of some members of the first two 
Estates to Orange as Stadholder.(35) His flight left a gap at the head 
of affairs which, it would appear, did not seriously interfere with 
the Estates' business for four and a half years, during which time the
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Domdeken's place was taken by the senior canon of the chapter, 
Ausonius van Galama. In September 1581, the chapter finally elected a 
new dean, because of the 'continual absence abroad of Mr. Jan van 
Bruhesen', and Galama's advancing years.(36)
Even the alteration of the First Estate in 1582 did not 
immediately rob the Domdeken of his importance: the new dean, Johan
van Duvenvoorde, was one of the seven Geeligeerden, and continued to 
preside over the Estates' meetings as the most senior of their number, 
although from February 1587, summonses were being sent out in the name 
of the Standing Committee.(37) Furthermore, the Domdeken acted as a 
mouthpiece of the chapters' grievances when they could no longer speak 
for themselves in the Estates.(38) The Dorn's pretensions were resented 
from time to time by the other chapters, especially in connection with 
the rotation of appointments.(39)
In this and in other ways, the impression of unity given in 
February 1577 was contradicted by the true state of affairs: there
were divisions between chapter and chapter as well as internal
divisions within the individual colleges, so that it can be misleading 
to speak of 'the chapters' or 'the clergy' as a homogeneous body. The
most obvious example of these divisions is the attempt by some canons, 
led by Jacob Cuynretorff, scholaster of Oudmunster, to keep Utrecht 
out of the Closer Union towards the end of 1578.(40) The Union would 
lead, claimed these 'conspirators', to a takeover by the Calvinist 
provinces of Holland and Zeeland, who 'have always had quarrels and 
wars against [Utrecht] and have desired to bring [it] under their 
yoke...'(41) and this at a time when Reformed Protestantism was
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gaining ground in the city and to a certain extent in the province. 
They believed that religious differences would lead to political 
discord; Cuynretorff had already declared against the Religious Peace, 
proposed by Orange and the Archduke Mathias, on much the same 
grounds.(42) In order to quash this opposition to the Union, which had 
led to some unrest in the city, the Utrecht magistrates arrested 
Cuynretorff (illegally, since he was subject only to ecclesiastical
jurisdiction) and detained him until the Union was safely signed and 
sealed.(43) Nevertheless, Oudmunster, St. Pieter and Ste. Marie put
up stiff resistance to the signing of the Union in January 1579; 
indeed, the dean of Oudmunster, Willem Taets van Amerongen, left the 
city in order to avoid signing, while his colleague of Ste. Marie, 
Lambert van der Burch, was forced to sign only by the threat of 
banishment and confiscation of his property.(44) Apart from these 
leading ecclesiastical figures, and a few others who were part of 
Cuynretorff's "conspiracy", it appears that there were many canons who 
preferred to swim with the pro-Union tide and salvage what they could 
out of an unfavourable situation.(45) The attitude of the majority of 
canons is perhaps best summed up by an anonymous note on a 
contemporary copy of the Union in the cathedral's archive: 'It is true 
that a forced consent is still a consent, but it is commonly said that 
he who is forced to sing seldom sings a good song'.(46)
As well as those who opposed the Union, and those who were 
indifferent to it, there seem to have been some ardent 'patriots' in 
most of the chapters, who worked to promote the Union and who later 
served it for many years. Such a man was Adriaan van Zuylen, dean of 
St. Jan from 1565 to his death in 1599, and a well-known adherent of
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Orange.(47) Yet even St. Jan, which is always regarded as the
strongest supporter of the Revolt among the five colleges, harboured 
dedicated Catholics like Johan van Renesse, who was arrested with 
Cuynretorff, and who openly stated his absolute opposition to any 
measure harmful to the true Catholic religion, as he later considered 
the Union to be.(48) The records of St. Jan, which are perhaps the 
most easily accessible of all the chapters, clearly reveal the 
extremes of opinion present within this one small body.(49) The vote 
in favour of the Union of Utrecht, for example, was passed at a 
meeting of the chapter attended by only four canons, including the 
dean, all of whom had previously shown themselves to be supporters of 
the Union, whereas an earlier meeting, attended by seven canons, had 
voted unequivocally against it.(50)
The defeat of conservative opinion in the chapters over the Union 
of Utrecht signalled another stage in the decline of the political 
role of the clergy in the Estates. From January 1579 onwards, despite 
repeated protests and appeals to higher authority, the clergy were 
fighting a losing battle against Calvinism and secularisation. In 
January and June of 1579 the city council provided for legitimate 
Protestant worship in first two, then all four, of Utrecht's parish 
churches; within a few years the chapter churches themselves had to 
permit Reformed services within their walls.(51) Moreover, the 
chapters even had to pay the salaries of the ministers who conducted 
these services, from the funds formerly used for the wax, oil and wine
required by the Mass.(52) The chapters had to submit to having their
new members nominated by secular bodies, the Ridderschap and the city
council in turn. New canons were to be adherents of Reformed
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Protestantism, and acceptable to the Estates.(53) Nevertheless, it was 
not until 1622 that all Catholics were eliminated from the 
chapters.(54) Nor could the chapters do anything to prevent the 
Estates' secularising Church property, however much they tried, 
although their politically privileged position helped to protect their 
own extensive land-holdings from the fate of property held by other 
ecclesiastical institutions.
As the next stage of the process, in 1580 the clergy lost their 
monopoly of the chairmanship of the Standing Committee; the following 
year the number of clerical deputies in the Committee was reduced from 
five (one from each college) to two for the First Estate as a 
whole.(55) Once again the clergy did not present a united front in 
opposition to this latter measure: St. Jan was quite willing to
supply two of its canons as deputies until the other chapters could be 
brought into line. Four months later, in July 1581, the rest of the 
clergy gave way.(56)
The chapters' political eminence had never been popular with the 
Third Estate, especially with the townspeople of Utrecht, led by their 
burgerhoplieden, who had already made one unsuccessful attempt to have 
the First Estate abolished, in March 1580.(57) Not even the chapters' 
past record of opposition to Alva - 'in resisting the hundredth, 
twentieth and tenth penny taxes demanded by the Duke of Alva, as well 
as in the law-suit brought by the clergy against the Duke's 
sentence... and in the maintenance of a commissioner in Spain through 
whom the sentence was suspended and not carried out' — could outweigh 
the arguments against their involvement in government, in the eyes of
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the city council.(58) The latter body feared popular unrest if 
recognised Catholics, under oath to the Pope, were to share in 
government; it argued that no other province - not even Brabant - 
contained an ecclesiastical Estate; and it pointed to the canons' 
anti-Union sentiments and connections with enemy sympathisers.(59) 
Under pressure from the burgerhoplieden, the city council declared the 
First Estate 'abolished' on 28 March 1582, but this was too radical a 
step for the Ridderschap and the small towns, who put forward 
alternative proposals for a new format for the Estates.(60) When these 
ideas were to a large extent incorporated in the settlement laid down 
by the Landraad, the city had to agree.(61)
From then on, the First Estate, 'which used to be called the 
clergy' was formed by seven Geeligeerden: members of the chapters
'elected' by the Ridderschap and the small towns from a list of ten or 
twelve put forward by the city. These seven had to be well-trusted 
patriots, belonging to, or adherents of, the Reformed religion. They 
were not permitted to discuss, with their chapters any questions of 
defence or government, conduct of the war, or law and order.(62) The
seven canons 'elected' did in fact come from all five colleges: three
who had voted for the Union of Utrecht from St. Jan (which was, with
Oudmunster, the smallest, with twenty canons) and one from each of the 
others. St. Jan was once again split on this issue: the three canons 
nominated as Geeligeerden dissented from the majority, who refused at 
first to accept the Landraad's ruling.(63)
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The arrangemnt of 1582 brought an end to the chapters' active 
participation in the Sticht's political affairs. The business of 
their meetings was now restricted to the administration of their 
property, the admission of new canons, and the exercise of their ius 
patronatus, which enabled them to exercise some influence on the 
province's religious development. For ten years after 1582, they
administered the Hieronymus School in the city. (64) Yet they were 
still occasionally consulted by the Estates on matters which ought to 
have been outside their competence, like the submission to the king of 
France, and the Estates-General and the Council of State continued to 
address themselves to the chapters on a few important questions.(65) 
What is more, the chapters survived as institutions, providing 
sinecure incomes for the sons of the gentry and the urban patriciate, 
as well as a lucrative source of patronage for the Estates, until they 
were finally abolished in 1811.(66)
The new First Estate acted, not as representatives of the clergy,
but as a body of seven individual laymen, each of whom took a very 
active part in the Estates' business: in February 1583, for example,
one Geeligeerde (Johan Rengers, of St. Jan) was the Estates'
representative at the Landraad, and one (Floris Heermale, of
Oudmunster) was their permanent delegate to the Estates-General. 
Nevertheless, a scheme to increase their numbers came to nothing, 
despite the approval of the Estates, and in fact the Geeligeerden had 
to survive a number of attempts to remove them altogether.(67) Even 
after the Landraad had reached its decision in 1582, for instance, the 
city wrote twice to Orange asking for his approval of the abolition of
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the First Estate, so that for two and a half months the city's 
attitude to the Geeligeerden was ambivalent, to say the least. Orange 
would not co-operate however; in July 1582 he upheld the Landraad's 
pronouncement and forbade anyone to make any changes in it,(68)
Several years later, after Orange's death, the existence of the 
Geeligeerden became an element in the power struggle which took place 
in Utrecht under Leicester.(69) The burgerhoplieden, concerned as ever 
about a possible leakage of information to Parma and about 'Roman' 
influence on the Estates, brought about a purge of the First Estate in 
1586-87.(70) Once again, the city council declared the Geeligeerden 
abolished, and again the Ridderschap prevented their complete 
removal. The number of Geeligeerden was reduced to five, of whom only 
three were the originals (Duvenvoorde, Zuylen and Rengers). No canons 
were left from Oudmunster, St. Pieter or Ste. Marie, the chapters 
which had always been most suspected of pro-Spanish leanings; the two 
additional members came from the Dom.(71) These five were always very 
conscious of their precarious position, and occasionally joined the 
Third Estate in voting against the Ridderschap.(72)
The changes made in 1586-87 were repealed in October 1588, when 
the arrangement of 1582 was restored.(73) Thereafter, though existing 
more or less on the city's sufferance, the Geeligeerden retained a
certain amount of influence within the Estates: the most senior of
them presided, and individuals, particularly Heermale with his long
political experience, were frequently consulted on important
issues.(74) In 1618, when the government of the province was in a 
state of flux, Maurice of Nassau made the final change in the
—  36 —
composition of the Geeligeerden: he increased their number to eight
(four nobles and four burgers of Utrecht), to be chosen by the 
Ridderschap and the small towns from a list of sixteen nominations 
made by the city and approved by the Stadholder.(75) In that form, the 
Geeligeerden lasted until the upheavals of the late eighteenth 
century.
The First Estate, as was demonstrated above, owed its continued 
existence in large measure to the Second. There are far fewer records 
for the history of the Ridderschap than for that of the clergy, but 
all the same it can be seen that certain parallel developments took 
place within both bodies.
The Second Estate of Utrecht consisted of the nobles and gentry 
of the province. Utrecht differed from some of its neighbours in 
having no 'magnates' to speak of among its nobles: though men of the
standing of the Count of Egmont held some lordships in the province, 
their involvement in the Sticht's affairs at this time was 
minimal.(76) The great majority of the members of the Second Estate 
were, as S.M. Wyntjes points out, 'lesser nobility'.(77) The one 
exception to this rule was the Burggraaf of Montfoort, traditionally 
the first noble of the Sticht.
The medieval Burggraven had played an important part in the 
politics of several provinces, and had striven to build up Montfoort 
into an independent lordship.(78) This ambition was frustrated in 
1546, however, when Charles V redeemed the 'high jurisdiction' during 
the minority of Burggraaf Johan IV.(79) Nevertheless, the land of
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Montfoort and the town of the same name (situated in the south-west of
the Sticht on the border with Holland), still enjoyed a peculiarly 
privileged position within the province, and the town in particular 
took advantage of this to evade the Estates' demands.
As the first noble, the Burggraaf was automatically summoned to 
attend the Estates' meetings, and during the 1560s and 1570s Johan IV 
did so quite frequently. The Ridderschap occasionally used his town 
house for their deliberations.(80) After the Pacification of Ghent, 
however, the Burggraaf seems to have withdrawn to a large extent from 
political developments that were clearly not to his taste; and in fact 
he is recorded as having been present at only one session of the 
Estates between February 1577 and his death in 1583. He was accused 
of being implicated in the anti-Union conspiracy of 1578 and there is 
no doubt that he was opposed to any closer alliance with other 
provinces than that embodied in the Pacification.(81) Indeed, an issue 
of such seriousness was the only thing that would bring him to make 
the journey to the city.(82)
The Ridderschap were not, therefore, receiving the leadership 
which they might have expected from their head, whose views remained 
conservative in a time of great change. Johan IV believed, for 
example, that Utrecht should take the opportunity offered by the 
Abjuration of Philip II to return to the jurisdiction of the Holy 
Roman Empire, and his Catholicism enabled Montfoort to continue as a 
Catholic enclave in a nominally Reformed province, sheltering 
fugitives such as Brother Wouter Jacobsz.(83) This latter problem was 
compounded when the Burggraaf was succeeded in 1583 by his sister
-  38 -
Philippota, whose husband, Johan van Merode, lord of Moriamez, was 'a 
Papist and vehement assister off the Prince of Parma".(84) The future 
first noble, Philippota's son, was thus being brought up "in false 
idolatrous superstition and enmity to this country's liberty'. The 
scandalised Estates did not succeed in educating the heir as they 
wished, however : a year later, he was in the king of Spain's
service.(85) The inheritance eventually went to Philippota's daughter 
Anna, and continued in the Merode family until the Estates bought the 
lordship from them in 1649.(86)
The history of the Second Estate during the 1570s and 1580s can 
thus be considered quite separately from that of its first noble. The 
qualifications for membership of the Ridderschap were similar to those 
in other provinces: that is, according to the Verbandbrief of Bishop
Frederick van Baden (1512), members must be of the 'lawful'
Ridderschap and must possess a fortified house with a drawbridge. A
closer definition was laid down between 1536 and 1539, when lists were 
drawn up of the recognised ridderhofsteden (as these houses were 
called), which were exempt from the increased house-tax introduced by 
the Regent, Mary of Hungary.(87) By 1600, there were 56 of these, 
whose holders, if they were adult males of good birth, were eligible
to be summoned to the Second Estate. During the period under
consideration several men appeared as lords of ridderhof steden 
inherited by their wives (Reynier van Aeswijn, lord of Brakel, is a 
case in point: he married the heiress of Sterkenburg) while one fairly 
prominent member of the Ridderschap attended on behalf of his 
nephew.(88)
-  39
Membership of the Ridderschap conferred certain privileges and
exemptions: the gentry, for example, were not compelled to answer the
village alarm bell, or to billet troops as ordinary farmers were-. At 
one point the Estates threatened forfeiture of these privileges in an 
effort to produce a better attendance of the Ridderschap: the threat
succeeded on that occasion, since the matter in 
question - negotiations with Prance after Orange's death - was 
sufficiently important to bring the 'outside' Ridderschap into Utrecht 
from their country houses.(89) For the most part, however, only the 
members of the 'inner' Ridderschap, who lived more or less permanently 
in the city, attended the Estates' meetings regularly. Indeed, of a 
total of 46 men who were summoned in 1580, only 25 are recorded as 
present at one meeting, at least, between 1577 and 1590.(90 ) Numbers 
fluctuated considerably (early in the period only two gentlemen 
represented the whole Second Estate) and several attempts were made to 
secure a better attendance, and to bring the register of those 
summoned up to date.(91) At one point, during the crisis of the
mid-1580s, it appears that the city council thought of packing the
Second Estate as it had the First, to its own advantage.(92) This was 
possible only temporarily, however, and towards the end of the 1580s, 
a pool of about ten regular attenders became apparent, out of which 
between five and eight were present at every meeting. (A parallel 
tendency was visible in the other Estates.)
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With the clergy, the Ridderschap - supposedly - represented the 
rural interest in the Estates. The 'first two members' as they were 
called, tended to stick together and outvote the Third Estate, at 
least until the advent of the Geeligeerden. It was the Ridderschap, 
along with the small towns, who saved the clergy from total abolition: 
not out of reverence for their ecclesiastical status, but out of a 
feeling of solidarity, because the clergy had always held their place 
as the First Estate, being 'the principal landowners in the 
province'.(93) The gentry did occasionally speak in favour of
reductions in the taxation of the countryside, or threaten to keep for 
themselves taxes levied in the villages (when the towns were 
withholding imposts), but by and large they did not consistently
champion the rural interest vis-à-vis the towns, unless it was to
their own advantage.(94) Thus the Estates' assembly once accused the 
bulk of the Ridderschap of 'taking the protection of the countryside 
[against the Estates-General's troops] so little to heart in that so 
few of them came [to the meeting], although they and the colleges are
the most affected by this [i.e. the troops' raids]'.(95)
On the other hand, it would not be true to say that the
Ridderschap identified with the towns' interests, however strong their 
urban connections were. Many of them lived in the city for much of 
the time, and took an active part in its politics: throughout the 
sixteenth century, members of the gentry families served on the city 
council and held municipal office in the other towns. The family van
Oestrum, for instance, had a monopoly of the office of schout in
Wijk.(96) Similarly, between 1577 and 1590, eight nobles are recorded
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as having represented both the Ridderschap and the city in the 
Estates: half of these were among the most regular attenders. Three
spent some years as burgomaster; one, Niclaes van Zuylen van 
Drakenburg, succeeded his father as the Schout of Utrecht.(97)
It is a fairly common assertion that the gentry were also 
connected by blood and marriage to the urban patrician families.(98) 
There is, however, little evidence to suggest that this was the case 
to a substantial degree: rather, members of gentry families married
into other gentry families, some members of which held municipal 
offices.(99) Even the purchase of a ridderhofstad by a member of the 
city council did not guarantee him admission to the Second Estate - at 
least until the next generation.
What is more, these connections were not strong enough to prevent 
open hostility between the Ridderschap and the city, which several 
times produced serious political conflicts within the Estates. In the 
summer of 1583, for example, the Ridderschap withdrew from the Estates
altogether for two months (and for even longer from the Standing
Committee) until 'arrangements can be made so that they may advise and 
give their opinion for the common good of the provinces, freely and
with a good conscience'.(100) In a declaration made later of their 
reasons for this withdrawal, the gentry stated that their lives had 
been threatened - and even endangered - by the townspeople, because 
the Estates had hired two companies of waardgelders for the province's 
defence, which the burgerhoplieden considered to be quite safe in 
their own hands.(101) The normal workings of the Estates came to a
halt until the autumn, when the dispute was settled by a delegation
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from Orange and the Estates-General.(102)
In this case the gentry were unanimous in their withdrawal from 
the Estates. Four years later, in 1587, the quarrel between them and 
the city was much more serious, resulting in a split of the gentry 
into two factions. The members of the larger took refuge across the 
provincial border and laid their grievances before the Estates of
Holland and the Estates-General (from whom they received powerful 
support).(103) The smaller faction was composed of the three former 
burgomasters: Lubbert van Parijs van Zudoort, Johan van Abcoude van
Meerthen and Reynier van Aeswijn, lord of Brakel, together with his 
brother-in-law, Floris van den Bongard, lord of Nyenroode.(104) This 
quartet threw in their lot with Leicester's party in the city council 
and continued to act as the legally constituted Second Estate. 
Although their legality was naturally challenged by the exiles from 
their base at Woerden in Holland, the Estates continued to function as 
usual, since a minority of the Ridderschap was always present. 
Personal enmities came to the fore, and a violent confrontation took 
place between two members of the opposing factions, each with 
different ideas on how to uphold the privileges of the Ridderschap, 
who had to be prevented from coming to blows.(105)
This situation was reversed when Nieuwenaar, now in sympathy with 
the exiles, made a successful bid to recover power in September 1588. 
The leaders of the opposite faction were banished; the exiles
returned. Thenceforward, the first burgomaster of Utrecht was always 
a member of the Ridderschap. It remained only for the majority of the 
gentry to ensure that the Leicestrian quartet would no longer be
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summoned to the Estates. They accused the four of conspiring with 
refugees from the South to bring in an 'absolute tyranny' under 
Leicester, to the oppression of all the inhabitants of the Netherlands 
and the subversion of the provinces' welfare. Brakel was said to have 
been principally responsible for taking over the government of the 
Sticht.(lOô) The complete change of attitudes that took place between 
1586 and 1588 is illustrated by the charges of misappropriation of 
funds levelled by the Ridderschap against Brakel, whom they had 
defended in 1583 against similar accusations by the burgerhoplieden 
and the citizens of Utrecht. At that time he was cleared of the
charges, and the slanders against him were attributed to personal 
enmity.(107) After 1588, however, the Estates continued to demand a 
full accounting for the sums which had passed through his hands as 
commissioner for Utrecht's troops; an accounting which he refused to 
give until 1598, when his accounts were audited and found to be 
'defective'.(108)
The Second Estate was thus no more united than the First. And its 
disunity continued into the next century and the next generation: 
Brakel was a leading figure in the revolutionary movement of 1610, 
while in 1618, his son, Antonius, was added to the Ridderschap when 
the sons of several Woerden exiles were expelled from it.(109) Even 
individual families were divided: the family of de Wael van Vronesteyn
is a case in point. Adriaan de Wael van Vronesteyn signed the
Compromise of Nobles and was executed in August 1568 for allegedly 
helping the iconoclasts in Utrecht in 1566, though there is 
considerable doubt as to the truth of this charge.(110) His brother
Willem was on the city council from 1578 to 1579, and frequently
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represented the Ridderschap in the Estates until 1584. On the other 
hand, one of Adriaan's two sons, Lubbert, was a captain of foot in the 
Spanish service, and was threatened with the confiscation of his 
property in June 1580, while the other, Frederick, was expelled from 
Utrecht in the purges of April 1585 and July 1586, presumably for 
suspected sympathy with the enemy.(Ill)
These purges and expulsions were conducted partly at the 
instigation of the city of Utrecht, the most important element in the 
Third Estate, which, in its turn, was in some ways the most important
of the three Estates at this time. It was composed of the five voting
towns: the city, and the four so-called 'small towns' - Amersfoort,
Rhenen, Wijk-bij-Duurstede and Montfoort. As early as 1375, 
Amersfoort and Rhenen were mentioned in the Stichtse Landbrief as 
belonging to the Third Estate; Wijk, the site of the bishop's country 
residence, the Huis te Duurstede, was added after 1459, and Montfoort
in the sixteenth century.(112) The pre-eminence of Utrecht is 
reflected in the Estates' terminology, where the towns were always
described as 'stad en steden van Utrecht'. This pre-eminence, though 
much resented by the small towns, particularly Amersfoort, the 'second 
town' of the Sticht, is not to be wondered at: the population of the
city was far greater than that of the other four towns combined;
moreover, it was the seat of provincial government and the residence 
of a majority of those involved in the Estates.(113) It is not 
surprising, therefore, if historians have tended to concentrate on 
events and developments in the city, neglecting the rest of the 
province.
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In view of the relative size of the city, how much importance 
should be attached to the small towns? Generally speaking, their 
nuisance value appears to have been greater than their power to exert 
a definite influence in any direction: they could, and did, make
things awkward for the Estates, and take up a disproportionate amount 
of time at meetings, particularly Amersfoort, by virtue of its size, 
its position as second town, and its long tradition of anti-Utrecht 
feeling. Similarly Montfoort, because of its unusual position under 
the Burggraaf's protection, was able to defy even the Stadholder over 
the appointment of its magistrates in 1588.(114) Rhenen's economic 
decline in the sixteenth century, however, coupled with the loss of 
its military significance as a frontier fortress against Gelderland, 
meant that its political activity was limited to more or less token 
participation in the Estates' assemblies.(115)
In the later Middle Ages, the small towns sent deputies to the 
Estates' assemblies only for very important political, financial or 
military questions in which they were, or could be, concerned, as well 
as for business concerning the Landbrief itself, or in time of war. 
In 1493, for example, delegates from Amersfoort attended six meetings, 
though it is not clear what proportion of the total this
represents.(116) In 1569-1570, on the other hand, it was quite common 
for deputies from several small towns to attend, while on a number of 
occasions all four sent delegates to help in the struggle against Alva 
and the Tenth Penny. Five years later, however, after the restoration 
of the privileges, the small towns were seldom represented: at most,
one burgomaster from Amersfoort attended, with occasional support from
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one other town.(117) In the late 1570s and the 1580s the towns did 
make an effort to be present, insisting that the letter of summons for 
each meeting should reach them the statutory three days in 
advance.(118) Although the towns would sometimes respond to a direct 
request to send deputies to a particular session, as the years went by 
this became increasingly difficult because of enemy activity and
poverty. In 1587, for instance, Rhenen excused itself from one
meeting, even though it would lose its vote by absence, because of the
'danger' of the roads.(119) Deputies from the city were always
present, however (unless they absented themselves in protest at some 
intention or policy of the Estates), and it is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that the city council very often considered itself alone as 
the Third Estate, especially as the small towns rarely sent deputies 
to the Standing Committee, to which they had originally objected 
strongly on grounds of expense and violation of their privileges.(120) 
Thus the small towns were able to exert little influence on the 
day-to-day running of the Sticht's affairs. Nor was their financial 
contribution to the Estates' funds large enough for them to gain an 
advantage by threatening to withhold it, as they did for much of the 
period under discussion (see below. Chapter IV).
Although there was usually little love lost between the city and 
the small towns, they would occasionally join forces against the other 
two Estates, especially if a question of finance or privilege were 
concerned. One example of this is the continuing dispute over the 
administration of ecclesiastical property in the towns. The first two 
Estates appointed a steward responsible to them for the whole 
province, whereas all the towns maintained that the religious houses
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within their boundaries came under their jurisdiction.(121) Moreover, 
when they were offered the chance to sever the connection with the
city, and become a separate Estate on their own, the small towns would
have none of it, and helped the Ridderschap to bolster up the First 
Estate.(122) Even in 1586, after the city had declared the 
Geeligeerden abolished, the Amersfoort magistracy believed that the
city and towns should have a joint vote in the Estates, as
hitherto.(123) In view of the towns' jealous attitude towards their 
rights as members of the Third Estate (shown, for instance, in their
insistence on representation at the audit of the Estates' accounts),
this reluctance to break away from the city seems at first sight 
inexplicable. It is possible, however, that the towns were actuated 
by an innate conservatism, or by motives of economy, since full-time 
representation at the Estates would have been expensive, and the small 
towns did often follow the city's lead in minor matters anyway, or by 
a belief that they had a better chance of influencing Utrecht on more
important questions from within the same Estate.
This is not to say that the towns were not prepared to act
independently of the city. Amersfoort, at least, pursued a separate 
course wherever possible: its feud with Utrecht dated back to the
mid-fifteenth century.(124) The town's refusal to sign the
Satisfaction, for example, shows its resentment at the city's attempts 
to involve the entire province in the expense of the siege and 
demolition of Vredenburg, and its determination to assert its own 
identity, by negotiating with Orange 'as the town of Amersfoort had 
treated separately with His Majesty the Emperor (Charles V)... in the 
year '28'.(125) The city later accused Amersfoort of inciting the
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other towns to cut themselves off from the rest of the Estates, by 
refusing to admit garrisons at a time of military crisis.(126) But the 
most outstanding example of Amersfoort's 'resistance... to the 
resolutions taken by the Estates of Utrecht' was the town council's 
refusal to accept the Union of Utrecht in January 1579, on the grounds 
that other provinces had not yet agreed to it.(127) (In fact, the 
council probably feared the Union's anti-Catholic potentialities.) 
This recalcitrance gave rise to a 'great suspicion... that they have 
an understanding with the enemy', which led the city to arrest 
Amersfoort's deputation to the Estates, as a preliminary to an embargo 
on the town's trade with other parts of the country.(128) This was 
followed by a full-scale siege in March 1579, conducted by Orange's 
brother, John of Nassau, Stadholder of Gelderland.(129) The magistracy 
was changed after the siege, although it was by no means a
root-and-branch purge: out of twenty-six men on the new council, at
least ten had served on it in the few years preceding 1579.(130)
Nevertheless, Amersfoort became more docile after the siege, and
abandoned its efforts to revive the old system of choosing the 
municipal government by lot, which had been in force before Charles V 
punished the town for its alliance with Gelderland in 1543.(131) From 
1579 onwards, the right to appoint the magistrates lay with the 
Stadholder, as it did in Utrecht itself, and in Wijk and Rhenen.
The composition of the city council of Utrecht was also a matter 
of dispute at this time. Since 1528, the two burgomasters, twelve
schepenen, two treasurers and twenty-four councillors had been chosen 
by the Stadholder, but the urban patriciate wanted control of the 
selection of the council for itself.(132) In 1577, however, the
-  49 -
council was forced to yield to popular pressure, and allow Orange to 
include twenty of his own nominees in the pool of one hundred men from 
whom he chose the council.(133) (The other eighty were the outgoing 
council and forty other citizens approved by it.) In fact. Orange 
installed twenty-four 'new' men in the first council he appointed 
after the Satisfaction: two-thirds of the old one were sent home.(134) 
After Orange's death, the city council seized its chance to make 
itself exclusive and self-perpetuating: Villers permitted the
establishment of an Erfraad, or hereditary council, in which vacancies 
caused by death would be filled by co-option. His successor, 
Nieuwenaar, clung to his right of appointment, as far as possible
(pp. 24-25 above), and a later attempt to introduce the Erfraad was
rejected by the Estates in 1598 because 'the memory is still fresh' of 
the trouble it had caused in 1584.(135) The city council finally 
achieved its aim after the troubles of 1618, when Maurice set up a
hereditary body, very much on the 1584 pattern, in order to reduce the 
Estates' influence on appointments.(136)
The city council was usually represented at the Estates' meetings 
by one or both of the two burgomasters, supported by various other 
members of the council. The delegation was sometimes headed by the 
Schout. Of all the Estates (apart, naturally, from the Geeligeerden) 
the city achieved the greatest continuity of representation,
particularly towards the end of the 1580s when the same four men - the 
burgomasters Dirck Canter and Dirck de Goyer, and the schepenen Jan 
Spruyt and Roetert van Lanscroon - attended almost every session.
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The relatively closed nature of the municipal government in 
Utrecht was one of the main issues over which the city council and the 
burgerhoplieden were in dispute. Indeed, the citizen militia of 
Utrecht - eight companies, each of two hundred men - under the 
leadership of their captains, might almost be considered as a fourth 
Estate, frequently at odds with the other three. As far as Utrecht 
was concerned, the militia was a new force in politics: it is usually 
stated that the companies were formed in 1573 by the Stadholder Bossu, 
but one contemporary was of the opinion that they were first armed, at 
least, by Noircarmes, who succeeded Bossu when the latter was captured 
by the Beggars in 1573.(137) In any case, in the late 1570s and 1580s, 
Utrecht's tradition of popular unrest was carried on by the citizens 
and their captains, who saw themselves as 'tribunes of the people', 
and took a hand in most of the major political developments of the
time(138): the decision to adopt the Satisfaction, the establishment
of the Geeligeerden, the provisional appointment of Nieuwenaar as 
Stadholder and his confirmation in office; the offer of sovereignty to 
Queen Elizabeth of England; the repeated expulsions of suspect 
persons; the arrest of Paulus Buys in 1586 - on these and other 
occasions the burgerhoplieden played an active role. The captains 
sometimes attended the Estates' meetings (as they did on 
17 February 1577), whether or not they were invited to do so; indeed, 
if the Estates did permit them to be present, it was always with the 
proviso that no precedent had been established for future 
attendance.(139) More frequently, the burgerhoplieden exerted pressure 
on the deliberations of the city council. They went so far as to
attempt interference in the affairs of other provinces, and took
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particular exception to Amsterdam's trade with the enemy, driving the 
Amsterdam burgomaster Reynier Cant to describe them as 'not 
far-seeing, and with little experience of policy'.(140) At all times 
the militia companies greatly resented the introduction of military 
forces other than themselves to protect the rural areas from raids by 
enemy - or Estates-General - troops. Despite their protestations that 
they had guarded the city for years at great financial cost to 
themselves,(141) it seems that the companies were in fact significant 
more as a political than a military force, with, as their most 
effective weapon, the threat of popular action, and, occasionally, the
fulfilment of that threat. As the captains were officers of the 
wijken, or districts into which the city was divided for 
tax-collecting purposes, they were consulted about the introduction of 
new taxes, and their opposition could bring armed men out into the 
streets to protest.(142) After the 'great commotion' of August 1583, 
which frightened the city council into withdrawing increased levies, 
the proposed taxes were reintroduced a few days later, with the 
goodwill of the burgerhoplieden, who disclaimed all responsibility for 
the riots, which, however, they had done nothing to quell.(143)
The appointment of the burgerhoplieden lay, for the most part, 
with the city council or the Stadholder, though there is evidence that 
the inferior militia officers sometimes chose their own captains.(144) 
In 1581, Orange laid down that the captains were to be renewed 
annually at the time of the change of the magistracy, and that no more 
than two or three at a time were to sit on the council.(145) In 
accordance with this pronouncement, the eight captains did appear 
before the council on 30 October 1581, to be confirmed in office or
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replaced as the magistracy saw fit.(146) Nevertheless, a number of men 
continued to combine a position on the council with a captaincy in the 
militia, despite Nieuwenaar's efforts to keep the two apart. In 1585, 
Nieuwenaar replaced four of the captains in the council, despite 
warnings that all eight of them were 'upset' by his intention to do 
so, and would resist any such change.(147) It is, however, indicative 
of the relative power of a captaincy and a seat on the city council 
that the Utrecht secretary, Gosen van der Voort, believed that most of 
the burgerhoplieden would give up the latter position if faced with 
the choice.(148) Following his coup d'êtat in 1588, Nieuwenaar 
replaced seven of the captains - presumably those who had taken the 
opposing side - after which the burgerhoplieden retired for a while 
from political activity. They eVen refrained from expressing an 
opinion on the release from prison of three leading members of the 
pro-Leicester faction.(149) But ten years later they could still exert 
sufficient pressure, with irate citizens behind them, to achieve the 
suspension of an unpopular house tax.(150)
The basic structure of the Estates had thus been established 
after the upheavals of the 1580s, and it endured in its essentials 
until the Batavian Revolution of the 1790s. It did undergo certain 
lesser alterations in the course of two centuries, when later 
political and religious conflicts - for example in 
1618-19 - temporarily altered the balance. But a trend begun in the 
formative years after the Satisfaction continued: the transfer of
influence from the First Estate to the Third became so marked that by 
1654 it could be said that the city and the towns, despite recurrent 
differences, were 'more than half the Estates in weight'.(151) The
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question of how the Estates functioned within this structure will be 
considered in the next chapter.
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Chapter III
The Estates at Work
Under the Habsburgs, the Estates of many of the provinces in the 
Netherlands had developed bureaucracies of some complexity, and 
permanent committees for current affairs.(1) In Utrecht since 1530, 
however, these functions had been carried out primarily by the Hof, or 
by the Chamber of Accounts in Holland, with the Estates occupying a 
secondary position. Thus when the Estates assumed effective 
government of the province in 1577, they had to conduct their business 
according to rules and customs which had evolved over the previous two 
centuries, and were perhaps not best suited to the demands of an 
unprecedented situation. Nevertheless, the Estates continued to 
operate - in appearance at least - within the age-old procedural 
framework, although radical changes were taking place beneath the 
surface. It is sometimes difficult to establish the Estates' routine 
procedures, since these were often taken for granted and have to be 
deduced from mentions in the records of what was new, or exceptional 
in some way. However, the years between 1576 and 1590 saw much that 
was both new and exceptional in the governing of the Sticht, and these 
changes contributed a great deal to the development of definite, 
regular procedures by the Estates.
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The invariable preliminary to every full meeting of the Estates 
was the beschrijving or summons. This took the form of a letter 
convoking the separate Estates to meet on a certain day, in order to
discuss and resolve a number of items which the members■ of the
Standing Committee thought too weighty to be dealt with by themselves 
alone. Once the Estates had won their fight to summon themselves, 
independently of the Stadholder or the Hof (that is, about 1578),
these letters were sent out in the name of the Domdeken until February
1587, when one of the conditions in the compromise between the Third 
Estate and the rest was that the letters should go out in the name of 
the Standing Committee.(2) In any case, the Committee had for several 
years enjoyed the right to examine the terms of the summons, and to 
issue one on their own authority in an emergency: for example, if the 
enemy were at hand, or indeed if the Sticht needed protection from the 
Estates-General's own forces.(3)
In November 1577, the Estates resolved that the summons was to be 
made no more than three days in advance of the date fixed for the 
meeting. Three months later, it was laid down that the five chapters, 
the Ridderschap and the city and towns were to meet separately on the
day before the appointed date, and send their delegates to the full
assembly, to deliver the decisions of the individual Estates, and
arrive at a final resolution.(4) The First Estate and the Third had 
ready-made meeting places in the chapter-houses (the colleges used 
that of the Pom for their joint sessions) and the town halls
respectively. The clergy's deliberations can be found in the Pom's
records, while those of the Amersfoort town council on each agenda are
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set out point by point in its resolution books. Letters from the 
other small towns informing the Estates of their decisions have been 
preserved. After 1579, however, except in unusual circumstances, the 
city council confined its comments on the agenda to a note that 'the 
summons was dealt with as recorded in its margin', with the result 
that its opinions must be inferred from the Estates' own account of 
their meetings. The members of the Second Estate, on the other hand,
scattered as they were throughout the countryside, had no such focal 
point. Accounts of separate meetings of the Ridderschap are few, and, 
for the most part, record their response to exceptional situations, 
such as the Abjuration of Philip II in 1581, or the Ridderschap's own 
withdrawal from the Estates in 1583.(5) The gentry were aware of the 
problem, but their attempts to solve it - for instance, by a plan that 
all those in the city should meet once a month to discuss political 
matters - seem to have come to nothing, or, at any rate, to have left 
no record. Instead, the resolutions of the Estates or their Standing 
Committee mention occasional meetings of the Ridderschap at one of 
which, it is interesting to note, two members exercised their vote by 
proxy.(6)
In 1580, the Estates' instruction for their secretary 
incorporated a provision that summonses should be sent out six days in 
advance, in order that they might arrive at their destination three 
days before the meeting; the small towns later complained, however, 
that they were not being given a full three days to deliberate on the 
agenda.(7) In fact, the prescribed arrangements were often not put 
into practice: the cathedral chapter was of the opinion that the five
churches ought to meet at 8 a.m. on the day prescribed for the
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Estates' meeting (which started at 9 a.m.); the city council also 
quite frequently discussed the agenda early on the morning of the 
assembly.(8)
Meetings did not always commence on the appointed day, or at the 
proper time, therefore, and the Estates made periodic efforts to 
enforce punctuality on their members.(9) On one occasion, gentry who 
came from outside the city, and other members of the first two 
Estates, protested at the lateness of the city's deputies, and 
suggested that if any delegate had failed to appear by 10 a.m., the 
meeting should go ahead regardless. (The Estates ordered this idea to 
be included in a forthcoming agenda, but, like many other proposals, 
it was lost in the confusion surrounding Nieuwenaar's coup in 
September 1588.[10]) One method of compelling a full attendance was 
the threat that any element of the Estates which did not send 
representatives would lose its right to vote when the final resolution 
was taken. This threat was most frequently used, naturally enough, 
when the meeting was called to discuss matters of great importance, 
such as the Satisfaction, the Union of Utrecht, the reform of the Hof, 
or the treaty with England.(11) Occasionally, the threat had to be 
repeated, and strengthened: on 6 March 1578, for example, the Estates 
were summoned for the third time, to discuss the introduction of new 
taxes for the gemene zaak 'on pain of the forfeiture of their vote'. 
Since no decision was reached, another summons had to be sent out, 
eleven days later, 'to resolve finally and without separating [until a 
resolution has been achieved] on pain of forfeiture of the vote'. 
This time, they managed to reach a decision: to contribute 2500
guilders per month to central funds.(12) In a serious crisis such as
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followed Orange's assassination, however, the Estates could and did 
waive these attendance requirements: in July 1584, they met with the
unusual provision 'that those present may resolve without the
absentees, so that business may not be delayed'.(13)
Until October 1577, the Estates assembled in the chancellery of 
the Hof, as they had done since the creation of that body by Charles V 
in 1530. With the signing of the Satisfaction, however, they returned
to the great chapter-house of the Pom, which they had used from time
immemorial, and which was much more convenient, having separate 
chambers where the individual Estates could consult in private.(14) As 
the role of the chapters in provincial government decreased, it seemed 
appropriate that the Estates should have a meeting place of their own, 
independent of the Catholic clergy as they were now independent of the 
royal Hof. In April 1581, therefore, it was decided to leave the Pom 
for the now vacant Franciscan church, where the Estates continued to 
meet until the eighteenth century.(15) From the account of an English 
representative who asked audience of them, it appears that each Estate 
sat at a table of its own.(16)
The Estates began each meeting by dealing with the items of 
business on the agenda, turning later to any requests from individuals
or other business that had not been included in the summons. If an 1
• Iimportant question was raised at this stage in the proceedings, the j
, IEstates would order a meeting to be held expressly to discuss it.(17) 1
In the early years of the period, resolutions were usually reached, as
the secretary noted, 'after long discussion and mature deliberation',
and, on at least one occasion, 'after lengthy disputation as
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well'.(18) In some cases, however, discussion seems to have been 
merely a formality. The summons to a meeting for 6 June 1580 casts a 
revealing light on the procedures of the Estates, and on the dominant 
part played by the chapter clergy, particularly those of the Dorn in 
the process of decision-making. Three successive sets of comments in 
the margins of this document record first, the reactions of the 
members of the Pom, followed by the First Estate as a whole (these 
differ only in minor ways from the Pom's comments). Finally, the 
resolutions of the full Estates' assembly j;ere noted, and these had 
been significantly altered from those of the clergy in only one 
particular: the canons thought that complaints from landholders near
the Holland border about encroachments from Holland on their dyke 
rights were no concern of the Estates; the full assembly, however, 
decided to send an official letter of protest to their colleagues in 
Holland.(19) Since rural taxation was the main item on the agenda, a 
meeting of the Ridderschap also took place, at which it became clear 
that the first two Estates were in accord about the measures to be 
adopted.(20) After April 1582, when the clergy lost their political 
power, the initiative in the Estates shifted to the city of Utrecht: 
some agendas sent to the Geeligeerden after that date have survived, 
with no apostils to indicate how the new First Estate arrived at its 
conclusions, while from others it is clear that the Geeligeerden 
usually agreed with the other two Estates.(21)
Naturally enough, it was not always possible for the Estates to
complete all the business on the agenda in one day. Pelays occurred 
for a wide variety of reasons: sometimes, for instance, a meeting had
to be postponed because the members were not present in 'sufficient
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numbers'. Although it was never stipulated exactly how many 
representatives constituted a quorum, some inferences can be drawn 
from the meeting of 4 October 1583, which was attended by five 
Geeligeerden, three members of the Ridderschap, three deputies from 
the city, one from Amersfoort and one from Montfoort. Since the 
Second and Third Estates were so poorly represented, another summons 
was dispatched for 8 October, and produced a slight increase in 
attendance: six Geeligeerden, four gentry, three from the city and
'deputies' from Amersfoort, Wijk and Montfoort. This was considered 
sufficient for the meeting to go ahead.(22) There was no hard and fast 
rule, however, and it was quite normal for business to be conducted in 
a much smaller or a much larger gathering: the Estates' next two
sessions, of 29 October and 19 November 1583, illustrate this point. 
The former was attended by four representatives of the First Estate, 
five of the Second, four from the city and two from Amersfoort. Three 
weeks later, on the other hand, only three Geeligeerden were present, 
but the Second and Third Estates turned out in force, with twelve 
nobles (an unheard-of number), the same four deputies from the city, 
and two each from Amersfoort, Wijk and Rhenen. Admittedly this 
session was convoked to discuss the important question of closer links 
between Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, following the conference at 
Dordrecht.(23)
More frequently, business was delayed because one Estate had not 
reached a decision on part of the agenda, with the result that the 
meeting had to be prolonged until the deputies received instructions 
from their principals, or else the items in question had to be carried 
over to the next meeting, so that the deputies could return home to
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seek advice. This practice of ruggespraak, on which the Estates also 
insisted in their dealings with the Estates-General, frequently caused 
annoying, indeed crippling, delays.(24) The Amersfoort town council, 
for example, often instructed its representatives to hear proposals at 
the Estates' meetings and return for consultation; and the deputies of 
each Estate were liable to refer back to the main body on matters 
which concerned it particularly closely: the clergy on a plan to tax
tithes, for instance, or the small towns on a suggestion that they 
should raise a force to help the farmers in case of enemy attack.(25)
At times all three Estates at once would avail themselves of their 
right of consultation, as they did in 1580 on the difficult question 
of accepting the Duke of Anjou as the Netherlands' protector, and 
before 'choosing the better and more bearable of two evils' to raise 
money for the war effort in 1588.(26) In some cases, ruggespraak was 
nothing but a formality, as it was when the Estates nominated the Lord 
of Villers as the Stadholder of Utrecht in September 1584: the
deputies of Amersfoort and Wijk had to report to their respective 
principals, who had not considered Villers for the position. But the 
Amersfoort town council raised no objection to the appointment, and 
simply conformed with the decision of the first two Estates, the city 
and Rhenen.(27) On other occasions, ruggespraak provided a useful 
opportunity for the individual Estates to discuss points not included 
in the original summons, or, as with extremely important decisions 
such as the Abjuration of Philip II, to consult a wider constituency: 
in November 1581, the 'most notable' citizens of Amersfoort and Wijk 
were called in to consider this question in accordance with 
custom.(28) Nevertheless, the practice of ruggespraak was so habitual 
that the Estates - just like the Estates-General - found it necessary
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to ask the towns to grant their deputies full powers to resolve 
important matters without reference to their principals. But just as 
the Estates themselves were extremely reluctant to authorise their
delegates to the Estates-General to take decisions without referring 
back, so the individual Estates clung to their right of ruggespraak, 
and a proposal to give the assembly the power to resolve important 
questions was rejected in 1581 by a majority vote.(29)
Decisions formally taken in this way - that is, by a majority of 
two Estates to one, not by a majority of those present - occurred on 
average once a year.(30) This practice, which was known as 
overstemming, was nothing new in the Sticht: apart from the Estates
themselves, the five chapters employed this 'ancient and laudable 
custom' in arriving at their decisions. (In 1577, during the 
Satisfaction controversy, for instance, the Orangist colleges of St. 
Jan, St. Pieter and the Dom had overruled their two more conservative 
fellows.[31]) A resolution from early in the period illustrates how 
overstemming usually worked in the Estates: in November 1576, the
clergy and the gentry forced through a tax on trade to pay the 200,000 
guilders promised to Philip II in lieu of the Tenth Penny and its 
associated taxes. The city magistrates, representing those most 
likely to be affected, protested that the two-to-one rule did not 
apply in this instance, but they had no hope of carrying this point or 
of introducing an additional tax on tithes and land rents, which would 
have fallen on the first two Estates. The city council consented to 
the tax on trade, therefore, with a face-saving provision that 'the 
other two Estates can never use this present agreement against the 
city in any way in the future'.(32) It was not always the Third Estate
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which gave way, however: a year later, the clergy, under compulsion,
agreed to the candidate supported by the Ridderschap and the city for 
the stewardship of the domains, on condition that in similar
circumstances the magistracy would also bow to the will of the
majority.(33) For much of the time, the resolution of the majority was 
accepted without question: the Amersfoort town council regularly
instructed its delegates to 'conform with the most votes'; in other 
cases dissenting voices have simply gone unrecorded. Sometimes there 
was no ill-feeling involved in the process of overstemming: when the
first two Estates resolved to grant a yearly allowance of 1000 
guilders to Prince Maurice of Nassau, in 1583, 'the deputies of the 
city and the towns, seeing that they were outvoted by the [other] two 
Estates, readily agreed'* Similarly, after Orange's death in 1584, 
the Ridderschap, city and towns voted in favour of opening 
negotiations with Holland and Zeeland about the government of the 
provinces; the Geeligeerden conformed 'although they hold the opposite 
opinion'.(34) Matters were not always so amicably settled, however; in 
1580, the chapters accused the Ridderschap and the towns of forcing 
'eternal servitude' on them, by forbidding the clergy to fill the 
various prebends left vacant by the recent death of Archbishop Schenk 
van Toutenberg.(35) In case willing agreement was not forthcoming, a 
resolution was passed in 1582, to the effect that whatever was decided
by any two of the Estates, after lawful convocation and mature
deliberation, would be binding on the third. This resolution was 
later cited by the Geeligeerden and the Ridderschap, in August 1588, 
to enable them to overrule the city at a time when the Third Estate 
appeared virtually all-powerful.(36) The practice of overstemming
continued to cause dissension within the Estates until 1645, when the
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Stadholder, Prince Frederick Henry, laid down that unanimity was 
obligatory in major decisions, such as those on war and peace, and 
alterations in the government of the province or its long-established 
customs and privileges.(37)
This then was how the Estates arrived at their decisions: but
how, and by whom were they carried out? Ever since the transfer of the
temporality to Charles V in 1528, the Estates had appointed temporary 
ad hoc commissions, usually composed of one or two deputies from each 
Estate, to put their resolutions into effect. In the 1570s and 1580s 
they continued and expanded this system to deal with numerous 
short-term problems.(38) At the same time, the increase in the volume 
of Estates' business described below (pp. 70-71) made it necessary to 
set up a number of more permanent commissions, to deal with particular 
aspects of the work of government.
Perhaps the best example of this delegation of authority is the 
commission for ecclesiastical property, which first came into being in 
June 1580, when the secularisation of Church estates began. The three
original members of this commission - who included the dean of 
Oudmunster - were to forbid all monasteries, convents and similar 
foundations to alienate or mortgage their property without the 
Estates' permission, and to order them to submit a full statement of 
all their assets and obligations within two weeks.(39) In the spring 
of the following year, the commission was put on a more permanent 
basis, in order to correct the 'untidy' administration of 
ecclesiastical property. The members - again, one from each 
Estate - were to serve for one year, from Easter to Easter, with an
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annual salary of 100 guilders, and the secretary of the chapter of 
St. Jan was to receive 150 guilders per annum for acting as secretary 
to the commission. These sums were to be paid out of the incomes of 
the property in the deputies' care.(40) A full and detailed 
instruction was provided, covering every aspect of the administration 
(only the five colleges were exempt from the commissioners' 
authority), and, in 1582, the commission's position with regard to its 
superiors was defined. Problems arising in the ' administration of 
ecclesiastical property were to be submitted first to the Standing 
Committee, for its advice; if this was not sufficient, the 
commissioners might seek guidance from the Estates themselves.(41) 
Within certain limitations - its authority was never recognised by the 
towns - the commission worked quite successfully, although it 
occasionally met opposition from lay patrons jealous of their rights 
over church property within their jurisdiction.(42) It advised the 
Standing Committee on the takeover of the administration of the 
Regulars' monastery in such a way that the property was handled by a 
paid lay administrator, the incomes were devoted to the maintenance of 
orphans, and provision was made for the remaining inmates of the 
monastery. The commission also assisted various religious houses to 
dispose of their property at the best possible price.(43) Changes in 
the commission's personnel under the Prouninck régime led to 
accusations of abuses in its work and its eventual dissolution by the 
Estates in October 1588. But there was such a great need for a 
permanent body to supervise the Sticht's ecclesiastical property that 
a new commission was set up shortly afterwards, with duties which 
included arranging for the payment of rural ministers.(44)
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Where the Estates had not delegated the work of enforcement to a 
specialised commission, each of their decisions was translated into an 
order, and made known to the province's inhabitants through a 
'placard', publicly proclaimed in the towns and villages, usually 
after the ringing of the town bell. Since 1530, publication of such 
decrees had been done in the name of the Stadholder and the Hof. The 
letter's refusal, in September 1578, to allow the Estates to announce 
the introduction of certain taxes, necessary to pay off the Sticht's 
debts, marks a turning-point in the history of the government of the 
province. The Estates, in full assembly, decided that in these 
circumstances they had no alternative but to publish the relevant 
placard in their own name, and to follow it immediately with an edict
concerning the introduction of generale middelen to finance the United 
Provinces' war effort. The Standing Committee then drafted a placard 
describing the new taxes and authorising one Gerrit van Water, in the 
name of the Estates, to inform all those concerned of the terms of the 
ordinance. At the same time, it was resolved to petition the 
Stadholder, William of Orange, that the Estates might initiate and 
administer all the province's taxes through officials appointed by 
themselves, and not by the Hof. The Hof was then 'requested' to 
ensure that none of these officials suffered any hindrance in the 
execution of his duty and, shortly afterwards, arrangements were made 
for the publication of the placard throughout the Sticht, with or 
without the Hof's consent. In the end, the Hof gave its consent, 
perforce.(45)
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Although, for the next few years, placards were still sometimes 
issued in the name of the Stadholder and Hof, the relative political 
positions of the Estates and the Hof had been reversed.(46) This 
change was firmly established in the new instruction for^ the 
Hof - replacing that of 1530 - which the Estates drew up in 1583, 
stipulating, among other things, that the Hof would publish no 
placards without the consent of the Estates or of the Standing 
Committee.(47) The Estates were always quick to take advantage of this 
regulation, as they did in May 1586, when Leicester and his Council of 
State tried to circumvent normal procedures by publishing the famous 
edict prohibiting trade with the enemy through the Hof alone. The 
Estates insisted on receiving certain assurances before agreeing to 
issue the placard in June.(48)
To execute these placards outside the towns, the Estates looked 
to the four Marshals, one at the head of each of the four "quarters" 
into which the province was divided, and to the schouten who 
represented the government in the rural administrative
units - gerechten - which made up each quarter. There were 131 of 
these, varying enormously in size: sixty-three in the Nederkwartier
(roughly speaking, the western half of the Sticht), thirteen in 
Montfoort (the extreme south-west corner, round the town of that 
name), eighteen in Eemland (the north-eastern quarter, centred round 
Amer^foort) and thirty-seven in the Overkwartier (the south-eastern 
quarter, containing Wijk and Rhenen).(49)
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The Marshals were usually members of gentry families appointed, 
before the Abjuration of the king, by the Stadholder on the Estates" 
advice, and by the Estates themselves after 1581. They took their 
oath of office to the members of the Chamber of Accounts resident in 
Utrecht (50) (the Chamber, which served both Holland and Utrecht, fled 
from the Hague to Utrecht in 1572, and left some of its members behind 
when it returned after 1576). The Chamber was also concerned with the 
installation in office of the schouten in those lordships held by "the 
[king"s] Majesty", and later by the Estates themselves, although in 
1580, the Estates claimed the right to approve of the men appointed to 
these posts, and occasionally spent some time deciding on the best man 
for the job.(51) In lordships which were held by private individuals, 
however, the Estates could not control the appointment of schouten in 
the same way, though they could, and did, exercise a great deal of 
influence on the chapters" administration of their lordships.(52) An 
attempt to tighten up procedures in this matter, and to remove the 
possibilities of corruption was made in 1580, when the Estates forbade 
the farming-out of the office of schout, in both kinds of lordship; 
instead, the most suitable local resident was to be appointed, without 
any payment on his part. It soon became clear, however, that this 
system was unworkable, and the custom of leasing the offices 
continued, carried out by special deputies. The cost of one such post 
(in the villages of Bunnik and Vechten) was 36 guilders a year; by 
1588, it was calculated that all of them together yielded less than 
400 guilders annually, but even this comparatively small sum could not 
be spared, since the fund of the province"s domains was chronically 
short of money.(53) Much larger sums - in one case as much as
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3000 guilders - were placed by the schout as surety for his ability to 
fill the office and to collect the fines involved in his
administration of justice: these bonds were also a welcome addition to
the domains" revenues.(54)
Another attempt to streamline administrative procedures was made 
in 1582, when, on the death of one of the Marshals, the Estates 
decided not to replace him, and to amalgamate the four quarters into 
two larger districts. The three remaining Marshals came to an 
arrangement about the division of the province, but within two years
it became apparent that there was too much work in a double district
for one man, quite apart from the fact that the Marshal was supposed 
to reside in his quarter. It was therefore decided to return to "the 
old system", and in 1584 a new Marshal of Eemland was chosen: 
Maximilian van Baexen, a prominent member of the Second Estate.(55) 
Although the city approved this appointment at that time, three years
later, under Prouninck, the city"s representatives insisted that
Marshals should not be admitted to the Estates" meetings, "as they are
the servants of the Estates and should not sit together with their
masters". This was not so much an effort to enforce the separation of 
powers, as an attack by the city on Baexen himself as a member of the 
Ridderschap, which was intensified when he joined the exiled gentry in 
Woerden, at the end of 1587.(56) In the following year, the Estates 
declared that he had forfeited his office through his failure to 
reside in Eemland (though notice of this decision seems to have been 
delivered to him at his official residence in the quarter). Baexen 
himself did not recognise the authority of the Estates, acting in the 
absence of almost all his fellow gentry, to deprive him of his post.
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however, and the issue was still in doubt when Nieuwenaar"s coup of 
September 1588 confirmed Baexen in office, and prevented the Estates 
from reducing the number of Marshals to two once again.(57)
Even when there were no political circumstances driving men into 
exile, non-residence of officials was a common problem in the Sticht. 
It was usual for the Marshals to have assistants, or "substitutes", 
who appear to have done much of the work of administration. A deputy 
was particularly necessary, for example, for an earlier Marshal of 
Eemland, Gysbert van Hardenbroek, who was put in command of a company 
of infantry on condition that he installed a "substitute" to carry out 
his civilian duties. If the substitute was unsatisfactory, however, 
the Estates would urge the Marshal to fulfil the duties of his office 
in person, or at least to appoint a more suitable assistant.(58) 
Absenteeism also caused problems, about which the Estates could do 
little, at a lower governmental level; the Estates" intentions to 
replace an absentee schout of Rhenen, first expressed in
September 1588, had still not been carried out by January 1591, when 
the members of the outgoing town council complained that they could 
not hand over to their successors unless the schout was there to 
administer the oath of office in the name of the Stadholder.(59)
These commissions and officers of the Estates had to cope with a 
volume of business which increased steadily from 1577 onwards. A 
simple comparison will illustrate this point. In the first three 
months of 1578, thirteen separate summonses were sent out, that is, an 
average of one each week. Only three of these meetings lasted more
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than one day. In the comparable period of 1584, six assemblies were 
convoked (or one every two weeks), four of which were continued: 
indeed, the meeting which began on 27 February lasted for eight days. 
During the first three months of 1589, however, only one summons was 
actually sent out, for 3 February (the Estates had not met since 
29 October 1588), but the assembly continued, with almost daily 
sessions, until the end of March, and some items on the agenda were 
not resolved until January 1590. Moreover, the attendance at meetings 
became similarly concentrated: when separate sessions were convened on 
individual issues, almost any qualified member could be deputed to 
attend, with specific voting instructions. But when one meeting could 
last for two months, and deal with all manner of business not included 
in the original agenda, the instructions of deputies had to become 
more general. A fairly small group of regular, experienced attenders 
therefore developed; and ruggespraak and the threat of "forfeiture of 
the vote" were very seldom used by the end of the 1580s.
This increasing business in turn required the development of a 
new agency to supplement the Estates" existing procedures. Even in
the late 1570s, when the Estates were meeting once a week, it was felt 
that there ought to be a more permanent body which could act in 
emergencies. As early as February 1570, there had been meetings of 
"the Estates residing in Utrecht" [i.e. in the city] or "inner 
Estates" as they were called, but these had not been held 
regularly.(61) In the autumn of 1576, however, similar meetings began
to take place more often, with separate records kept by the Estates" 
own secretary, Willem van Lamsweerde. It was decided "to depute a 
small number [of men] who would discuss all possible contingencies
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that might arise in these worrying and troublesome times, and resolve, 
if the matters required haste and would not admit of delay". (These 
men took part in the negotiations with the Stadholder Bossu about the 
demobilisation of his troops in the early months of 1577.[62]) These 
"inner Estates" were succeeded by a body which grew, in time, into the 
Gedeputeerde Staten or Standing Committee of the Estates.(63) 
Initially, this was a rather clumsy affair: its first meeting was
attended by eighteen men (two from each chapter with one extra from 
the Pom, two from the Ridderschap and five from the city) but it had 
an advantage over the Estates proper in that it met from the beginning 
in the cathedral chapter-house and not under the shadow of the 
Hof.(64) In the early stages of the Committee's existence, there was 
no clear-cut distinction between its work and that of its parent body: 
the important decision to complete the demolition of Vredenburg was 
recorded in the resolutions of the Standing Committee, and not in 
those of the Estates, although the latter were in session at the 
time.(65)
In the following year, 1578, an attempt to create a more 
manageable committee met with considerable opposition from Amersfoort 
(which, it must be remembered, had not yet signed the Satisfaction, 
and was thus technically not aligned with the rest of the province 
under the Prince of Orange). The small towns felt that the new 
scheme - for a body composed of one representative from each chapter, 
two from the Ridderschap and two from the city - robbed them of their 
right to be informed of every aspect of the government of the Sticht. 
Amersfoort"s delegates protested that the proposal "was directly 
contrary to their privileges and old usage, and that therefore they
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would by no means consent to... the draft".(66) Although the small 
towns took their case for full representation to the Estates-General, 
the clergy, Ridderschap and city did not grant the request as they 
were ordered to do. Such objections did not significantly interfere 
with the Standing Committee"s development; even the Amersfoort town 
council, though steadily refusing to recognise "certain alleged 
deputies" of the Estates, cooperated in practice with these deputies 
on several occasions.(67)
After the siege in March 1579, which brought Amersfoort into line 
with the rest of the province, the small towns did send deputies to 
the Standing Committee"s meetings from time to time: indeed, in
January 1582 the Committee instructed the Amersfoort magistracy to 
keep in close touch with its proceedings through the town's 
representative, Hendrick Both, "so that nothing is done which might 
harm the town [and] he [Both] has as much of a vote as the city of
Utrecht",(68) Nevertheless, the relationship between the Standing 
Committee and the small towns continued to be somewhat uneasy: it was
expensive to keep a permanent representative in Utrecht and Amersfoort
argued that the Estates should pay Both's expenses "as otherwise it 
would seem that they want to shut the small towns out".(69) The towns" 
deputies complained, in December 1582, that the daily twenty stuivers 
(one guilder) allowed them for their attendance expenses was not 
sufficient "in these expensive and costly times while the days are 
short". A proposed increase of this allowance to thirty stuivers 
( 1 1 2  guilders) provoked a demand for parity of payment from the 
rural gentry, and a claim from the city's representatives that their 
allowance (which was less, since they had no travelling to do) should
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be increased to compensate them for the extra time they devoted to 
"the province's affairs [which] multiply more and more each day". As 
this would have removed the differentials in pay between deputies from 
inside and outside the city, the matter was shelved.(70)
At a time of increasing secularisation of the provincial
government, it was not likely that the Ridderschap and the towns would
continue to tolerate a built-in clerical majority of five to four 
against them in the Standing Committee. By March 1580, the Pom had 
lost its right to preside over all the Committee's meetings, and in
the same year the city began to campaign for equal representation, of
two deputies from each Estate, the clergy's representatives to be
"good patriots", nominated by, and acceptable to, the other two
Estates.(71) Although four of the chapters (St. Jan being the
exception) objected strongly to this idea, and boycotted the Standing 
Committee's sessions for several months early in 1581, in the end they 
were forced to acquiesce. By July 1581, the clergy had accepted a new 
ordinance, whereby each Estate had three deputies on the Standing 
Committee, and every three months the canons from the two most senior 
colleges stepped down in favour of the deputies from the two
unrepresented chapters.(72)
A similar system of rotation operated for the other Estates. The 
Ridderschap ensured the continuity of its representation on the 
Standing Committee by resolving that one of its three deputies should 
remain in office at each three-monthly changeover. This was later 
reversed, so that one deputy retired every three months.(73) Both the
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first two Estates found it difficult to adhere strictly to this 
system, however: after April 1582, there was a choice of only seven
Geeligeerden (six after April 1585, when Johan Proeys died), at least 
two of whom were almost permanently occupied elsewhere on the Estates" 
business, with the result that there were not enough Geeligeerden to 
replace those who retired from the Standing Committee. A similar 
situation arose in 1588 for those of the Ridderschap who did not go 
into exile.(74) Even when there were plenty of potential deputies 
available, those in office sometimes served much longer than their 
three-month term.(75) Within the Committee itself, the chairmanship
rotated on a weekly basis, each Estate taking it in turn to provide 
the president.(76)
The composition of the Standing Committee remained unchanged 
until 1610, when the Council of State laid down that each Estate 
should have four representatives at the "daily meetings", including 
two from the city, one from Amersfoort, and one from each of the other 
small towns in turn.(77)
The Committee's duties and powers are set out in its instruction, 
which dates from 1593, but appears to be substantially similar to that 
in force in the 1580s.(78) Its primary function was to deal with 
routine business and minor requests from individuals or institutions, 
in order to leave the Estates proper free to attend to 'matters of 
greater importance... which might concern anyone, particularly the 
individual Estates'. To this end, incoming letters were usually 
opened by the Committee, which answered them unless the contents were 
considered important enough to be referred to the main body of the
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Estates.(79) A commission was set up in 1580 to grant or refuse 
requests as its members saw fit: they were always to be answerable to
the Estates, who created a similar body ten years later.(80) In 
addition, the Standing Committee gradually took over responsibility 
for the day-to-day financial administration of the province: the
voting of taxes was always done by the full assembly, but the 
collection of all internal taxes (that is, those not destined for the 
gemene zaak) was in the Committee's hands, and three of its members 
were periodically deputed to authorise payment of all the 
Estates'normal obligations.(81) It was the Standing Committee which 
settled the problems of the Estates' tax-farmers, gave judgment in 
disputes between tax-farmers and tax-payers, and dealt with a 
multitude of claims for reduction of taxes because of flooding or 
damage by troops.(82)
It was left to the Standing Committee's discretion to decide 
which matters merited a summons of the Estates, and which could be 
dealt with at a lower level. In an emergency, the Committee would 
occasionally act on its own authority, as it did when it agreed to pay 
the Estates-General's troops a month's wages, since the Landraad, 
which should have been responsible, was, as always, desperately short 
of cash. On the other hand, the Estates imposed a limit on such 
expenditure by the Standing Committee: a limit which they themselves
would exceed after a full convocation.(83) Moreover, if the Committee 
did decide to summon the Estates, it could do a great deal to 
influence their final decision by framing the agenda in such a way as 
to put the words of the resolutions into the Estates' mouths. On at 
least one occasion, however, the Geeligeerden and the Ridderschap
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retained enough independence of mind to state firmly 'that they were 
not bound by the terms of the agenda as it had been worded by the 
Standing Committee, but that they were free to take whatever 
resolution they found advisable'.(84)
Lastly, it was the Standing Committea's business to dispatch to 
the three Estates copies of any documents which were to be debated at 
the assembly, such as each member's contribution to the provincial 
funds. The Amersfoort magistracy, however, frequently complained 
that, as they never received their copy, they were unable to reach a 
conclusion: this neglect argued a lack of respect for the town
council, and also caused delays to the common cause. (This may well 
have been a convenient excuse for Amersfoort's failure to pay up.)(85)
The keystone of this institutional structure in these years was 
unquestionably the Estates' advocate, Floris Thin, 'a learned, clever 
and intelligent man', as Bor called him.(86) From his beginnings as 
secretary to the chapter of Oudmunster, with a legal practice. Thin 
became the advocate used by the Estates in all their cases before the 
Hof. Although he and his brother Gijsbert (later secretary of the 
city) appeared before the commissioners of the Council of Troubles in 
1567, no sentence was passed against them, and Thin was sent by the 
Estates on various diplomatic missions over the next ten years. In 
1575, his requests for a permanent salaried position as the Estates' 
advocate were twice refused, 'for fear of the consequences', although 
the Estates freely admitted that they 'could ill spare his
services'.(87) In the autumn of 1577, however, when the Estates were
-  78
taking over the full-time government of the province, they needed 
full-time officials, and Thin was sworn in as the Estates' advocate on 
24 September. A few months later, it was laid down that he should 
attend all the Estates' sessions to take note of their resolutions. 
(The chapter of Ste. Marie, always conservative, objected to this 
proposal, but was overruled by the majority; St. Jan was firmly in 
favour of Thin's appointment.[88]) The city council stipulated that 
Thin's salary - then 600 guilders per annum - had been granted to him 
in recognition of his long and loyal service, and his unrivalled 
knowledge of the Estates' affairs: it was to cease at his death. In
other words, the post of advocate was not to be regarded as a 
fixture.(89)
As the business of government increased, Thin worked his way into 
a position of such indispensability that the Estates reacted with 
considerable alarm to his occasional threats to resign from their 
service. They promised him an increase in salary - to 1,000 guilders 
a year - with special payments for particular tasks, such as 
1,000 guilders for his work in drawing up the Hof's new instruction. 
Finally, in 1584, they appointed an assistant advocate, Hendrick 
Lyster, to ease Thin's work-load-(90) By this time, Thin's legal 
duties were minimal: the Estates' business had grown to such an extent 
that he had abandoned his own legal practice, and cases before the Hof 
were conducted by another advocate under Thin's direction. Lyster was 
appointed to help Thin by attending meetings of the Estates, the 
Standing Committee and some of the permanent commissions, by assisting 
at the audit of the Estates' accounts, drafting letters, placards, 
orders for payment and other documents, and by taking part in the
-  79 -
execution of the Estates' resolutions.(91) The advocate himself did 
all these things, and more: at various times in his career, he had
drafted and signed all documents concerning the domains, acted for the 
city in its cases before the Hof, and spoken on behalf of the 
Ridderschap during their absence from the Estates.(92) Like his 
counterpart in Holland, Thin was the Estates' spokesman in their 
relations with the outside world: from November 1576, soon after the
Pacification of Ghent, he was one of their most frequent delegates to 
the Estates-General, and he was often employed on negotiations with
Utrecht's neighbours, in which he was given considerable latitude to
use his own discretion, though he could not make commitments for the 
Estates without their permission.(93) As one of the main instigators 
of the Closer Union of Utrecht, Thin was a significant force in the 
affairs of all the United Provinces.(94) By 1585, the Estates were so 
dependent on him that he could virtually dictate his own terms of 
employment: the Estates agreed to pay his full salary for the rest of
his life if he should be prevented by any circumstance from living in 
Utrecht or from carrying out his duties.(95)
The Estates' esteem for their advocate was not shared by the 
whole political community, however: a few months after this contract
was concluded. Thin was suspected of delaying Nieuwenaar's permanent
appointment as Stadholder. The burgerhoplieden warned Thin that 
people in the city were abusing him as 'a scoundrel, a traitor, not 
fit to be hanged by the neck, who should be hanged by the heels'.(96)
These opinions, and popular dislike of his tolerant religious views, j
iwere undoubtedly reflected in Thin's expulsion from Utrecht, with 59 IIothers, in July 1586, less than a month after he had been entrusted i
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with some rather delicate dealings with Holland, about Gudewater's 
inteference with Stichtenaars.(97)
The absence of such an important and active official contributed 
greatly to the Sticht's administrative confusion under the Prouninck 
regime, the more so because Thin took with him into exile 'the 
registers, papers, muniments and other documents of these Estates and 
this province', which he repeatedly refused to send back to Utrecht. 
Early in 1587, in response to a request from Thin for his salary, the 
Estates cancelled the agreement of March 1585, and resolved never 
again to admit pensionaries to their meetings; henceforward, an 
advocate's place was to be in court. So strongly did the city council 
feel on this point that it was made one of the terms of the compromise 
with the other two Estates in February 1587, after which the council 
went on to engineer Thin's dismissal from his post. Faced with 
unemployment. Thin promised to hand over the papers in his keeping, in 
return for a pension of 200 guilders per annum.(98) The advocate's 
exile lasted only until September 1588, however: with the rest of
those banished in July 1586, he returned to Utrecht, and was 
reinstated in office, to resume his duties according to his 
instruction. He died less than two years later, in August 1590.(99)
While Thin was in exile, much of his routine work was carried out 
by the Estates' secretary, Johan Strick, the first holder of this 
office who did not combine it with the secretaryship of the Dom 
chapter.(100) The secretary's own duties were many and varied: he was
responsible for the dispatch of letters of summons to meetings of the 
Estates, and for the secrecy of the Estates' records, 'for it is not
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desirable that the protocols should fall into many hands'.(101) A 
further memorandum instructed the secretary to keep note of those 
present at the meetings of the Estates and the Standing Committee and 
to compile registers of the instructions, commissions, minutes of 
letters and orders for payment issued by his masters.(102) Moreover, 
the secretary drew up and presented the Estates' accounts for audit: 
in this, as in some of his other work, he was helped by the secretary 
of the city council. Although the secretaryship was not as well paid 
as the post of advocate (Lamsweerde earned 500 guilders a year), it 
was possible to use it to influence the Estates' policy and
decision-making, as did Strick's successor, Gilles van Ledenberg. He 
entered the Estates' service as Thin's clerk, and became their 
secretary when Strick was dismissed for his part in the Leicestrian 
government (see Chapter VII, p. 217 below). After Thin's death, the 
position of advocate remained unoccupied for two years, leaving the 
way open for Ledenberg to fill the gap thus created in the
administration. Furthermore, when the Estates failed to appoint 
Francois Vranck, the active and able ex-pensionary of Gouda, as their 
advocate, because of his personal objections to moving to Utrecht,
they employed instead one Anthonis Kuyck, who proved unable to achieve 
the dominant position which Thin had held. In fact, he was appointed 
on the express condition that he should never attend a meeting of the
Estates except at their invitation. On the death of the next advocate
in 1610, the Estates decided to leave the post vacant, whereupon the 
office of secretary grew in importance and became more lucrative.(103) 
This decision may well reflect the city's abiding dislike of the
office of advocate and the power its holder could exercise over 
provincial government; perhaps the citizens feared the possibility of
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another Oldenbarnevelt in the Sticht. Instead, for nearly thirty 
years, Ledenberg was Oldenbarnevelt's loyal follower.(104)
Although certain individuals - Thin, Prouninck or Ledenberg, for 
instance - could sometimes exert considerable influence over the 
Estates, they could do little to speed up the workings of the somewhat
cumbersome procedures outlined in this chapter. The debate over the 
elevation of William of Orange to hold the 'high authority' over the 
Sticht illustrates the Estates' leisurely methods of dealing with even 
such important matters as this. The issue was first raised in 1581, 
as a corollary to the Abjuration of Philip II. Several months passed 
before any positive action was taken; then, in November, an ad hoc 
commission was, as usual, delegated to examine the conditions on which 
the offer would be made.(105) In March 1582, the assembly decided to 
put these terms to each Estate separately: the colleges on 12 March,
the city on 13 March and the Ridderschap, at a specially summoned 
meeting, on 14 March. Deputies were also to be sent to the small 
towns to discover their views. As might have been expected, however, 
it took a little longer than that: the Ridderschap did meet as
planned, and voted to give Orange the authority on more or less the 
proposed terms, but, in the city, the question of the abolition of the 
First Estate intervened, so that the council did not consider the 
'high authority' issue until 23 April.(106) Similarly, as the chapters 
were being excluded from the political sphere, they could not be 
allowed to examine an important document like these draft terms: St.
Jan, naturally enough, said that in those circumstances it could not 
resolve on the matter. In Amersfoort, the sitting magistrates
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consulted a number of their predecessors.(107) A deputation was 
eventually sent to Orange, in June, to discuss both the 'high
authority' and the abolition of the First Estate. But nothing more
was done about the former, for fear that closer connections with 
Holland and Zeeland would alienate the Sticht's eastern 
neighbours.(108)
On the other hand, the Estates could sometimes take speedy and 
effective action in an emergency, though it must be admitted that this 
was the exception rather than the rule. In November 1582, for
example, a serious crisis arose when four ensigns of cavalry and eight
infantry companies in the Estates-General's service descended, unpaid, 
on the Sticht. A full meeting of the Estates, with representatives 
from all four small towns, assembled on 7 November, and continued in 
daily session until 14 November, concentrating almost exclusively on 
making arrangements for the payment and billeting of these troops, and 
for their removal from the province, 'willy-nilly'. The Estates 
blamed this invasion on the other provinces, which, they claimed, had 
failed to produce their quota in the troops' wages. Nevertheless, 
after consultation with the Landraad, which was nominally responsible 
for military finance, the Estates agreed to advance the substantial 
(for Utrecht) sum of 16,075 guilders to pay the men off. Even the 
small towns, which were notoriously late with their contributions, 
paid up in a hurry to prevent the soldiers from extorting the money in 
their own way. Indeed, the Estates went so far as to resolve to take 
on extra troops, partly at their own expense, to preserve the Sticht 
from 'all further invasions and depredations from troops and 
soldiers', which were expected daily.(109)
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Money and troops - these were the Estates' principal and
inseparable problems. Because the war was so close and the need for 
money so pressing, the institutional development of the Estates could 
not take place in its own time; instead, circumstances forced them to 
undergo piecemeal change, at a perhaps unnaturally accelerated pace. 
Nevertheless, in the years under review, the Estates visibly changed 
from a part-time institution with a varying membership to a permanent 
governmental organisation, with its own executive committee, made up 
of much more experienced administrators. Yet, while on the surface 
this structure may have appeared to function fairly smoothly, in fact 
the Estates faced almost insuperable difficulties in what became their 
primary purpose: the raising of money to pay the troops. Their
struggle to meet the demands made on them by this aim is the subject
of the next chapter.
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Chapter IV
The Estates' finances
From their earliest beginnings, representative institutions in 
the Low Countries, as elsewhere, were principally pre-occupied with 
finance and taxation.(1) The Estates of Utrecht were no exception; 
from the outset of their independent existence, they were concerned 
above all else with the collection and disbursement of money. The 
first full session for which records survive (17 February 1577) was 
convened to discuss certain immediately pressing financial obligations
(the 50,000 guilders demanded by Bossu to pay off his troops; the 
costs of the recently successful siege of the fortress of Vredenburg; 
and the 200,000 guilders promised to Philip II in lieu of the Tenth,
Twentieth and Hundredth Pennies) and to consider proposed new taxes to 
meet these obligations. That meeting established a pattern of delay 
and procrastination in financial matters, a pattern which could be 
broken only in times of extreme emergency: Bossu's soldiers were
driven out of the city in April 1577 by the irate townspeople; the 
payments for the siege remained an item in the Estates' accounts for 
years, and the 200,000 guilders for the king provoked a serious 
internal dispute.(2)
The prospects for new taxation were far from bright. The Sticht 
had suffered so severely from the ravages of war in the 1570s, that 'a 
plough can hardly go freely in the fields, nor can the land be sown 
nor the corn harvested in peace; no ox, nor cow, nor horse, nor pig.
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nor sheep can graze in the fields without being taken by soldiers of
one side or the other".(3) While the Estates undoubtedly had an 
interest in making themselves out to be as poor as possible, the royal 
governor, Hierges, who had no such axe to grind, described the 
situation in the towns in equally gloomy terms: he protested to the
Council of State that the two companies of Spanish cavalry billeted in 
Wijk were 'the reason that most of the citizens must now beg their 
bread in God's name, for they have sold all their pewter, copper and 
garments, like the other small towns in the district, without hope of 
improvement'.(4)
Moreover, the Estates' existing financial resources were quite 
inadequate for their new needs. Habsburg revenues derived from the
Netherlands as a whole were of two kinds; firstly, the 'domains', or
income from the sale of natural products (grain, cattle or poultry)
and of certain rights, for example to mill or to collect tolls. After
1552, these domains were increasingly burdened with pensions and
interest payments, and were also sold off for lump sums to private 
individuals to finance the French wars. They were therefore of little 
use to the Estates when they took over the administration of the 
domains from the Hof in 1584: between 1571 and 1575, for instance,
interest payments owed by the domains amounted to nearly 
17,500 guilders, and by January 1580, the debt had increased to 
40,000.(5) Secondly, Charles V and Philip II counted on the 'aids' 
voted to them by the 'provinces accustomed to contributing together'
in the assembly of the Estates-General. The other, 'non-patrimonial' 
provinces, Utrecht among them, contributed to only some of these 
aids.(6)
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Since these aids were levied by the provinces not in proportion
to the ability to pay, but in inverse proportion to the ability to
resist, the rural population usually had to pay more than their fair 
share. In Utrecht, as in most of the provinces, patrimonial or
otherwise, a general assessment of landed property formed the basis of 
the system.(7) The oudschildgeld, as it was called in the Sticht, had 
originally been introduced by the Regent Mary of Hungary in 1539, for 
an initial period of ten years, to pay off debts incurred by the 
bishop before the transfer of the temporality to Habsburg rule in 
1528. From then on, it was levied at a rate of nine Flemish groats 
per oudschild, or unit of land value, payable by the user; in the case 
of rented land, half the tax was paid by the owner and half by the 
tenant.(8) In effect, this represented 'about the ninth penny [about 
eleven percent] of the entire income of the rural areas of Utrecht, 
out of which the Estates', as they informed the king, 'were often 
accustomed to pay their extraordinary expenses and obligations'.(9) 
Not surprisingly, the land tax was extended indefinitely after the ten 
years were up, and furnished the security for the grants made by
Utrecht to Charles V and Philip II. But by October/November 1576, the 
oudschildgeld was hopelessly inadequate for the Sticht's financial 
needs. For one thing, it was intended to yield a fixed annual sum: 
just over 23,669 guilders, of which approximately half was already 
earmarked for interest payments on loans raised between 1527 and 
1575.(10) Moreover, the land register on which it was based was not 
fully comprehensive even in 1539, and had not been revised since, with 
the result that this yield could not be increased by the inclusion of 
newly reclaimed or cultivated land.(11) In addition, the first two
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Estates reckoned that over the years 1571 to 1576 so much of the land 
had been left uncultivated that one-third of possible income had not 
been received, so that even interest payments could not be met.(12)
This serious shortage of cash, when it was believed that the 
mutinous Spaniards might descend on the city at any moment, clearly 
called for desperate measures. In November 1576, a deputation from 
the Estates appealed to Archbishop Schenk van Toutenberg for a 
temporary loan, offering an interest rate of 6 1/4 percent. The 
Archbishop, who had a reputation for parsimony, refused, threatening 
to protest to the Pope, the king of Spain, and other Catholic
potentates and princes. The deputation then forced an entry into the
palace and seized nearly 42,000 guilders from the archiépiscopal
coffers. Schenk's complaints got short shrift from the provincial
governor, Hierges, who pointed out that the prelate had come off 
lightly in comparison with the inhabitants of Antwerp and Maastricht. 
Apparently the Archbishop was so subdued by this response that he made 
no objection when the Estates 'borrowed' 20,000 guilders' worth of 
silverware from him three months later.(13) Indeed, the treasures of 
the Catholic Church were such an obvious source of funds that it is 
surprising that the lay authorities made no attempt to use them until 
early in 1578, when an order came from Archduke Mathias, the Council 
of State and the Estates-General, instructing the city's churches and 
religious houses to hand over all their 'unconsecrated silver'.(14) 
The five chapters, as the Church's political mouthpiece, naturally 
protested against this measure both to the Hof, as the body 
representing the Brussels government in the Sticht, and to the
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Archduke himself.(15) But at least two of the chapters had already
secretly taken steps to convert many of their valuables into currency 
for their own use, thus reducing greatly the treasure available to the 
government: the Dom, for example, melted down silver and gold objects
worth 12,560 guilders, to pay off its own debts, before the order was 
published, and a further 3,626 guilders' worth afterwards.(16)
Expedients such as this could be no. more than temporary, however, 
and very early in their recorded proceedings, the Estates resolved to 
explore all possible ways of raising money.(17) In keeping with the 
Sticht's fiscal tradition, they turned first to direct taxation: a
capitation, 'of each according to his quality' was levied in the city 
in 1577. Although this apparently met little outright resistance, it 
was not promptly paid, and a similar scheme later in the year was 
unsuccessful.(18) This was the attempted introduction of a chimney 
tax, which had a useful by-product in the chimney-count discussed 
above (Chapter II, note 2), but collected very little money, as the 
city council refused to carry out the imposition (which was designed 
to raise demobilisation pay for Bossu's soldiers) until the troops had 
left Utrecht.(19) In any case, the Estates intended to reimburse the 
chimney tax payers from future revenues once the soldiers had been 
paid off. The principle of direct taxation suffered another blow in
1578, when the Estates-General called for a levy of a Hundredth Penny 
(1 percent) on all incomes, just as Alva had done in 1569. The 
Estates hoped to use this money to pay their debts to the province of 
Holland, but their efforts to raise it met with determined opposition 
in many rural areas, particularly in the quarters of Montfoort and 
Eemland.(20)
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Whether or not these attempts were successful, they were clearly 
no more than temporary expedients, like sequestering the Archbishop's 
silver. The real need, in the autumn of 1576, was for a reliable,
permanent tax to supplement - and indeed supersede - the 
oudschildgeld, to supply the 200,000 guilders promised to the Council 
of State in lieu of the Tenth, Twentieth and Hundredth Pennies. This 
was the main subject of discussion in the months following the 
Pacification of Ghent, and the nature of the proposed new 'securities' 
(i.e. for loans) immediately became a political issue with the
Estates divided two-to-one, as usual. As landowners, the clergy and 
gentry favoured the introduction of indirect taxation, in the form of
a levy on 'goods and merchandise', or consumer commodities such as
wine and beer, in view of the 'poverty of the countryside'.(21) The 
city and towns, on the other hand, maintained that this would
discriminate against them, and called for a tax on tithes and landed 
property as well, to spread the burden more equitably. Faced with a 
majority in the Estates, the towns were forced to give way, insisting 
meanwhile that these new 'imposts' were to be employed only to pay off
the 'aid' of 200,000 guilders.(22)
The imposts were finally decreed by an ordinance of January 1577, 
whereby all inhabitants of the province - rural or urban, cleric or 
lay - were to pay a specified sum when purchasing a wide range of 
commodities, from wheat and rye to soap and silk, and from peat to 
beer (foreign and domestic), wine and brandy.(23) These duties 
continued to cause dissension, however: very soon the income from them 
was being used to discharge other debts, much to the annoyance of the
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small towns, who later used this as an excuse for non-payment.(24) Nor
were the disputes over the imposts merely a division between the first 
two Estates and the Third: there was a rift between the city and the
other towns as well, since the former did at first hand over most of
the proceeds to the provincial treasury, albeit reluctantly, while the 
small towns kept the money firmly under their own control, and refused 
to treat the imposts as a provincial tax at all. The accounts for
1580-81 record that no imposts were received from the four towns
'because of their notorious opposition'; for their part, the city 
magistrates soon grew tired of bearing more than their share of the
tax burden, and also decided to appropriate the imposts for their own
use: for the fortification of the city, for instance.(25) Despite
repeated attempts by the Estates to resolve this dispute by
arbitration (either by a committee nominated by the towns or by a 
higher authority such as the Stadholder), the towns would not 
compromise or submit to intervention from outside the province.
Moreover, since it proved impossible for the Estates' officials to
collect the imposts in rural areas, because of 'the passage and 
billeting of our own troops and the violent incursions of the enemy',
the imposts ceased to figure significantly in the Estates' incomes, 
and became 'without any controversy, the concern only of the
towns'.(26)
One of the principal reasons for the towns' intransigence over
the imposts was the fact that the municipalities needed them to pay 
for another fiscal innovation of the 1570s and 1580s - the so-called 
'monthly quota', contributed by some of the provinces to finance the
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war. Not that the quota system itself was new; in fact, the oldest 
known allocation of contributions to the aids dates from 1462, and as 
new provinces came under Burgundian or Habsburg rule, they were 
assigned a proportion of the aid as their quota. (In the 1540s,
Flanders and Brabant contributed 62.5 percent of .the aids between 
them; Utrecht"s share was one-tenth of Holland's, or about 1.3 percent 
of the total.[27]) At that time, the contributions were raised as each 
province saw fit; after the Pacification, however, the Estates-General 
tried to introduce general excise duties - the generate 
middelen - which were to be levied at the same rate in all the 
provinces.(28) Utrecht was not alone in objecting to this scheme, in 
spite of the advice of two of the Sticht's most experienced 
politicians, Floris Thin and Floris Heermale, who pointed out that the
new taxes were quite tolerable, and, in any case, would probably 
outlast their lifetime.(29) No province was willing to introduce these
duties until it was sure that all the rest would introduce them too: 
Utrecht, for instance, was afraid of losing trade and craftsmen across 
the border to Gelderland.(30) Besides, the Estates felt that to be 
treated as a patrimonial province, like Holland and Zeeland, 'would 
leave...a bad after-taste'.(31) Even when the generale middelen were 
finally put into effect in the Sticht, for a provisional three-month 
period in 1578, the city council insisted that the money should not be 
released until neighbouring provinces had taken the lead.(32)
The principle of uniformity was firmly re-stated in the Union of
Utrecht, in January 1579; 'it is agreed that in all the united 
provinces there shall be imposed, levied, and either publicly let out 
to the highest bidder...or collected...uniformly and on the same
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footing, for the general defence of these provinces, certain duties on 
all sorts of wines, foreign or domestic beers, the grinding of corn or 
cereals, on salt, gold, silver and woollen clothes, on horned cattle 
and seeded fields, on slaughtered beasts, on the sale and exchange of 
oxen and horses, on goods brought to the weigh-houses, and such other 
duties as may be agreed upon by common advice and consent."(33) Yet 
provincial particularism defeated this scheme as well, and these 
duties were never implemented on a federal basis. Most of them were, 
however, introduced into Utrecht at a provincial level, under the name 
of generale middelen (those on horned cattle and seeded fields being 
an exception), and were administered by the Estates themselves, not by 
officials of the Estates-General. Although the Estates conceded that 
the generale middelen were 'the most equitable tax one could imagine, 
and the least hurtful to the community and to each individual', they 
would never agree to increase the rate at which they were levied to 
equal the rate in Holland and Zeeland - not even to please the Earl of 
Leicester.(34)
It was from these generale middelen that the Estates met most of 
their share in the monthly quota. This began in 1578 as an agreement 
to pay 2,500 guilders, monthly, for six months; after the Union of 
Utrecht, the amount increased to 6,000 per month; later in 1579, it 
doubled to 12,000 guilders, though that level could not be maintained, 
and in December of that year, it fell to 10,000 guilders each month. 
As Parma achieved increasing military and diplomatic success in the 
South, the Estates-General's need for money grew, and the burden fell 
on fewer and fewer provinces: by September 1581, the Sticht had to
find as much as 13,000 guilders every month.(35) In 1584, the four
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remaining 'contributing provinces' - Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and 
Friesland - resolved on a joint monthly budget of 200,000 guilders, in 
which Utrecht's allocation amounted to about 13,290 guilders, or 
one-tenth of Holland's.(36)
Despite an increase of over 100 percent in the Sticht's revenue 
from the generale middelen between 1579-1580 and 1585-1586, the 
Estates could never satisfy the Estates-General's demands for money. 
Six weeks after their first promise in 1579 to pay 12,000 guilders 
within a month, they had collected no more than 950 guilders towards 
this total.(37) Special committees were set up to devise ways of 
meeting the Sticht's obligations. The revenues from other taxes (the 
imposts, the oudschildgeld) were pressed into service to make up the 
deficits.(38) At one point in 1581, the central authorities seem to 
have taken it for granted that Utrecht's quota for June would still 
not have been fully paid by August, but towards the end of September,
pressure on the Estates to pay June's contribution was increasing.(39) 
It soon proved so difficult to put the standard generale middelen into 
effect outside the towns (and, in any case, the estimated yield was so 
small) that the Estates decided instead to impose first a surcharge on 
the basic land tax, then a fixed levy on craftsmen and tradesmen in 
the rural villages (known as the consumption tax) and finally, an 
extra land tax at twice the usual rate.(40)
Still it was not enough; when Leicester's arrival in 1585 brought 
new financial demands, the Estates protested that their 'coffers are 
empty and bare from paying previous monthly quotas and other 
extraordinary costs'.(41) In September 1585, only two-thirds of the
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monthly quota could he obtained; the Estates therefore entered into
negotiations with the towns and with certain individuals, to raise a 
loan of 40,000 or 50,000 guilders. If this could not be done by the 
usual methods, a representative was to be sent to the Amsterdam money 
market, to 'pledge all the Estates' property and revenues, as well as 
the persons and property of the [province's] inhabitants'.(42) Thus 
the generale middelen became mortgaged to pay the interest on these 
loans, and yet more fiscal expedients had to be sought to relieve this 
ever-increasing burden, especially as it was estimated in January 1588 
that the yield from the generale middelen was about to fall
considerably, even in the towns.(43) The situation became so serious 
that the Estates warned the Estates-General that they could not pay
their ordinary quota, and debated 'whether it would not be advisable
to accept no higher obligation than we have means to pay'. Finally, 
in May 1587, they resolved unilaterally to reduce their contribution 
by half, to one-twentieth of Holland's, a reduction which remained in 
effect for about a year.(44) After the return of the exiles in 1588, 
however, the Estates were anxious to show their loyalty to the 'common 
cause' by resuming their 'old quota' in the regular monthly
200,000 guilders. For this purpose, they increased the rates of some 
duties, especially those on beer, because 'it is easier and less
hateful for the community to increase existing taxes than to introduce
new ones'.(45)
But not even this display of patriotism could bring the Estates 
to agree to another in a long series of 'extraordinary' levies,
proposed by the Council of State or the Estates-General to raise money 
for specific objectives. In March 1589, the goal was the defence of
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Bergen and Tholen; ten years earlier, a 'voluntary generous 
extraordinary contribution' had been required for the relief of 
Maastricht, for which the Estates had to float a special loan, since, 
even in 1579, their other revenues were all committed.(46) In 1585, 
when Antwerp was under siege, the Estates-General suggested another 
'voluntary contribution' (and a day of prayer) from all the provinces 
to save the city from Parma. But the Estates of Utrecht, thinking 
'that only the willing would burden themselves with this', preferred 
to finance directly a number of troops to go to Antwerp's aid; 
unfortunately, no money could be raised for this purpose before the 
news reached Utrecht, secretly, that Antwerp had decided to negotiate 
with Parma.(47) Shortly afterwards, Leicester demanded an extra
400,000 guilders from the provinces for a field army, of which the
Sticht's share was to be 26,581 guilders.(48)
Since the regular generale middelen were not sufficient even for 
the routine expenses of the war, these extraordinary requirements had 
to be met by various extraordinary expedients. Private individuals 
sometimes had to advance money to the Estates out of their own 
pockets, and hope for payment from future revenues; indeed, at one 
time the Estates held a list of wealthy men and women who would always
keep certain sums to hand, for the Estates to borrow, interest-free,
in an emergency.(49) At other times, the Estates would raise loans 
from merchants, using the credit either of individuals (soon 
exhausted) or of the city council, or the Amersfoort magistracy; the 
latter was considered to be good for only 2,000 guilders, however.(50)
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Loans were necessary to meet even the Estates' ordinary 
obligations, and were floated in time-honoured fashion, by the sale of 
renten or annuities. Indeed, the whole structure of provincial
finance, in Utrecht as in the other provinces, was dependent on 
annuities, since the city and towns used the same method to raise 
money for the Estates. An annuity has been defined as 'a single lump
sum paid to the [Estates] by an investor who in return 
received...payments at an agreed rate for a pre-determined time'.(51)
The investor could be an individual or a corporate body such as a 
town, a village, or a religious institution, and the annuities were 
usually of two kinds; redeemable annuities and those issued for the 
lifetime of one, two or three persons. In the first case, the 
government had to continue its interest payments until the entire 
principal had been repaid, a process which could take generations (in 
the 1580s, the oudschildgeld was still paying off annuities sold some
fifty years earlier). For that reason, it is understandable that 
governments generally preferred to sell life-annuities, since these 
had a foreseeable limit, although they usually carried higher interest
rates, and were often attached to the lives of very young 
children.(52)
As the years passed, and the Estates' need for money grew more 
desperate, ever-larger loans were raised by the sale of annuities; the 
Estates got further into debt and more and more revenues were 
mortgaged in advance, or indeed handed over as security (in 
December 1589, for example, the Estates gave the city council control 
of the generale middelen in return for a loan of 25,000 guilders, to
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be raised by the sale of annuities of both kinds at a variety of
interest rates. As the city council considered this security
sufficient only for a loan of 10,000 guilders, the Estates were 
compelled to offer the single oudschildgeld as well - the only revenue 
still unencumbered enough to underwrite emergency loans).(53) By that 
time, the Estates had found that annuities issued in their name were 
no longer regarded as a worthwhile investment. Interest rates had 
been forced upwards; whereas, before the Revolt, 6 1 4  percent (the 
'sixteenth penny') was the norm (indeed, the Habsburg government 
sometimes insisted on even less), during the financial crisis 
surrounding the fall of Antwerp in 1585, the Estates could not sell 
life-annuities at 12 1 4 percent, and had to offer over 14 percent
(the 'seventh penny'). In 1589, redeemable life annuities were
offered at the still higher rate of the 'sixth penny'.(54) The Sticht
was not alone in this; in Holland, at the same time, a rate of 12
percent to 13 percent was common for annuities. Yet it appears that 
during the late 1570s and the 1580s, the Estates never formally 
suspended payment on their renten, unlike their hard-pressed 
neighbours in Holland, who stopped paying all interest in 1575, for 
two years.(55) It is clear, however, that the Estates often fell 
behind with their interest payments, since, under pressure, they would
call on their available resources to discharge arrears, or even to
redeem some annuities completely, as they did after the riots in the 
city in August 1583.(56)
—  99 —
While these three taxes - the oudschildgeld, single and double, 
the imposts, and the generale middelen and their substitutes - formed 
the bulk of the province's regular income, the Estates did at times 
derive revenue from certain other sources as well. Customs duties, 
which had been levied on goods exported to Amsterdam, for instance,
were ruled out by the Union of Utrecht.(57) Nor could the Sticht 
profit very much from the 'convoy and licence' dues introduced by the 
Estates-General, because Holland insisted that duties on goods coming 
down the Rhine should be collected only at the final destination (i.e 
Holland), and not at any intermediate point of trans-shipment such as 
Utrecht.(58) The domains did not yield a great deal of money either: 
apart from their inherited debts, the domains were supposed to be 
responsible for the salaries of important officials like the 
Stadholder. Orange's salary rose from 1,200 guilders per annum in 
1578, to 4,000 in 1581, of which the domains could pay only one 
quarter. Other revenues therefore had to be called upon to discharge 
the domains' debts.(59)
In addition to the royal domains, the Estates took over all the 
incomes from the Archbishop's 'tithes' (tienden). These were not 
tithes in the sense of one-tenth of crops or livestock given to the 
Church; rather they were the revenues from certain areas of land in 
various parishes, on which specified crops were traditionally 
grown.(60) The tithes belonging to the five collegiate churches could 
not be so easily acquired, however, as the chapters' possessions were 
exempt from the otherwise general secularisation of Church property.
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The Estates did their best to tap what the Amersfoort magistracy 
called 'the principal wealth' [of the Catholic Church] by taxing the 
tithes, by an amount which increased from 10 percent in 1578 to over 
14 percent in the mid-1580s. Since many tithes had fallen into lay
hands over the years, a tax on them affected members of the
Ridderschap as well. To begin with, the chapters cooperated - 
sometimes willingly, sometimes under pressure - but by 1587, the tax 
on tithes was considerably in arrears.(61)
The city and the towns were at all times enthusiastically in 
favour of a tax on tithes which would strike at the first two 
Estates. Equally naturally, on the other hand, the Third Estate
consistently opposed another of the Estates' fiscal schemes: a
resolution in September 1579 that the towns should jointly contribute 
one thousand guilders each month, over and above all other taxes, the 
money to be administered along with the generale middelen. Although
the city originally approved this proposal, it never produced its full 
share of the levy (600 guilders) on time, while the small towns, 
particularly Amersfoort, repeatedly objected to their assessment 
relative to Utrecht's.(62) The city continued to pay its share, after 
a fashion, until 1584, usually with the money from the imposts: the
city council was prepared to grant the Estates either the imposts or 
its monthly 600 guilders, but not,, both; the small towns, however,
contributed no more than an occasional lump sum in exceptional 
circumstances.(63) Indeed, out of a supposed income of 12,000 guilders 
from this source for the year 1585-86, the Estates' receiver recorded 
only 754 guilders, most of which came from Montfoort, usually much the
most difficult of the towns.(64) Like the imposts, the issue of the
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division of this forced loan among the towns became extremely 
contentions: committees of arbitration, which were supposed to
represent all parties concerned, were summoned but never met, and the 
dispute interfered with the Estates' financial administration to such 
an extent that the Estates-General finally intervened in 1589. In the 
end the towns accepted the judgment of the new Stadholder, Maurice of 
Nassau.(65)
These, then, were the sources from which the Estates derived 
their income. Each tax was known as a 'chamber' or 'fund' (comptoir) 
and had its own 'receiver' (ontvanger) who was responsible to the 
Estates, usually through the Standing Committee, for its collection 
and administration. Quite often one man was the receiver for several 
chambers at once: in the mid-1580s, for instance, Niclaes van Berck, a 
canon of St. Jan and a member of the Geellgeerden, held the chambers 
of the single and double oudschildgeld, the consumption tax and the 
Archbishop's tithes.(66) In theory, receiverships were meant to change 
hands annually, and to be held by a member of each Estate in turn, but 
in practice the same man would continue in office for years, like 
van Berck, or else the same Estate would nominate his successor, as 
the city council appointed the receiver of the imposts in 1581 and
1582. In some cases, the office of receiver was handed down from 
father to son, and if a receiver died, his heirs were held responsible 
for closing his accounts.(67)
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As far as the method of collection is concerned, it seems that 
the oudschildgeld, like its predecessor the morgengeld, was supposed 
to be paid directly to its receiver in the city. In practice, since 
this was often difficult for tenants in outlying districts, it is 
probable that the schout gathered the money for his area and took it 
to the receiver.(68) The newer taxes (and the Archbishop's tithes), on 
the other hand, were farmed out to the highest bidder, on a three or 
six monthly basis, at public auctions held in each district at the 
beginning of each season.(69) The tax farmer, usually a local man,
paid over to the receiver an agreed estimate of the yield of the tax, 
and the Estates found, on at least one occasion, that no amount of
pressure would force one particular tax farmer to increase his bid 
above his own estimate of the revenue.(70) The tax farmer was then 
responsible for the collection of the duty at the point of sale, or at 
the mill or the weighhouse.
The alternative to farming out the taxes was direct collection by 
a representative of the Estates. Since the town council of Wijk had 
not introduced the generale middelen by November 1580, the toll-keeper 
there was authorised by the Standing Committee to collect the duties; 
when the town council continued uncooperative, a fixed monthly levy of 
250 guilders was imposed on Wijk until the generale middelen 'are 
raised calmly and quietly, without any obstruction'. An attempt to 
return to tax-farming failed when the magistrates resisted payment of 
their own taxes, and the farmers asked to be relieved of their 
obligations•(71)
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Whether the taxes were farmed or collected, the money had to be 
accounted for to the Estates. The tax-farmers' bids formed the 
receivers' estimated income; a receiver whose receipts fell short of 
this target had to make good the deficit out of his own pocket or see 
it carried forward into his accounts for the next year. If he paid 
up, he could do no more than hope for recompense from the following 
year's receipts.(72) Each receiver or tax-farmer had to have two 
guarantors, who were held liable if he defaulted.(73)
The administrative confusion prevalent in the 1580s is reflected 
in the delays - often as much as five years - before receivers 
presented their accounts for audit. Special commissions, which were 
periodically appointed to inquire into the Estates' finances, usually 
found that most receivers were seriously in arrears with the 
collection and expenditure of their chambers; in 1583, for example, it 
was revealed that money was still owing to the Estates from as far 
back as 1578, and a total of 20,200 guilders (a considerable sum by 
Utrecht's standards) was still outstanding just on the accounts which 
had been audited so far. In December 1589, a commission found that, 
every year, about 18,000 guilders from the funds destined for internal 
provincial obligations had to be devoted to the gemene zaak (the 
common cause).(74)
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The procedure for auditing receivers' accounts also posed 
problems for the Estates. Under the Habsburgs, this had always been 
done by the President of the Hof, the chief accountant of Holland, and 
sometimes the Holland Chamber of Accounts (Rekenkamer) which took 
refuge in Utrecht in 1572.(75) After the disappearance of these royal 
institutions from the political scene, the Estates had to take the 
accounts into their own hands. At first, it was proposed to set up a 
committee with five representatives from the clergy and five from the 
Ridderschap, both burgomasters from the city and a representative from 
each of the small towns. This was thought to be too expensive an 
arrangement, however, and a later scheme recommended only three gentry 
'to avoid the great costs of these times', and a reduction in the
number of town deputies.(76) As ever, the small towns protested that 
they were being excluded from the audit, and demanded two 
representatives at the accounting of all taxes; the Estates, on the
other hand, held that the towns should have no representation at the 
audit of taxes to which they did not contribute.(77)
After 1590, the Estates' accounting procedures seem to have 
become more systematic, perhaps under the influence of Secretary 
Ledenberg, as the interval before audit was reduced to as little as 
one year, and the same experienced deputies regularly attended the 
audit. In the mid-seventeenth century the provincial bureaucracy 
swelled to include a Chamber of Accounts, similar in its functions to 
the Rekenkamer in Holland.(78)
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The problems of auditing the accounts faded into insignificance 
beside the difficulty of collecting the money from the tax-payers, 
inside and outside the towns. Far from improving after the mid-1570s, 
the plight of the farmers seems on the whole to have deteriorated; at 
any rate, in the late 1580s the Estates stepped up their protestations 
of rural poverty. In 1587, they declared that heavy taxation and the 
depredations of troops had produced a situation where 'the land 
itself, the very substance on which the wealth and the inhabitants of 
this province used to depend...has been almost reduced, may God 
improve it, to the same state as Gelderland and Overijssel'.(79) There 
certainly was severe and widespread devastation; the problem is - how 
was it caused and how far did it extend? Two examples, from the 
north-western and south-eastern corners of the province respectively, 
may help to answer this question. The villages of Kortenhoef and 
Ankeveen informed the Estates in 1586 that their land had been flooded 
in 1570 and 1571; since then they had been repeatedly raided by the 
enemy; the previous year, the villages had been plundered and their 
livestock stolen: they asked for a reduction of their taxes 'so that
they could breathe a little'. At the same time the land around Rhenen 
was described as 'a desert and unusable'.(80) Although the Estates' 
scorched-earth policies were not quite all-embracing, some of the 
devastation in the Sticht was undoubtedly self-inflicted: in 1585,
when the Spanish general Verdugo was about to invade the Veluwe, all 
mills in the Eemland quarter were rendered useless, and all stocks of 
grain were stored inside walled towns.(81)
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In such circumstances, the Estates were sometimes prepared to 
grant remission of certain taxes, in whole or in part, or at least to 
extend the time allowed for payment, if a claim was submitted in the
proper form.(82) To take an admittedly extreme example, in May 1587, 
eighteen individual inhabitants of the village of Amerongen claimed a 
total of 17,107 guilders in compensation for damage to property, crops 
destroyed, livestock lost or ransomed, and personal inconvenience such 
as capture by the enemy or forced moves into the towns: all this had
been sustained in the two years since the Spanish victory nearby in 
June 1585. It is not clear how much compensation was awarded.(83) 
Land that had been rendered uncultivable by the troops of either side 
was freed from the double oudschildgeld in 1587, while uninhabited
villages were decreed to be no longer liable for the consumption 
tax.(84) In the harsh financial climate of 1590, however, the 
oudschildgeld was demanded from villages previously exempt, but to no
avail, as Eemland and the Overkwartier were still heavily in arrears: 
indeed, the Overkwartier, previously known as 'the grain-store of the 
Sticht', had been 'thoroughly laid waste'.(85)
Devastation was not the only reason for the failure of the rural 
areas to pay their taxes. In January 1584, the Estates learned that 
parts of Eemland and the Overkwartier, the districts closest to the 
'no-man's land' between the two armies, had been paying protection 
money (verdinggeld) to the enemy.(86) Extortion of this kind by the 
armies of both sides was nothing unusual - indeed, from 1579 onwards, 
a regular 'contributions system' in the southern provinces played an 
important part in financing Parma's army - but it seems to have been
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practised very efficiently in the later 1580s by Thomas Grammaye, 
Philip XT's 'steward' (rentmeester) for the Veluwe.(87) From his base 
at Deventer, he sent demands for cash to villages in vulnerable areas 
of Utrecht, threatening to hand recalcitrant Stichtenaars over to the 
king's troops for ransom.(88) The Estates reacted by issuing a 
stringent prohibition of any payment of protection money, imposing a 
fine of four times the sum involved, and arresting those who acted as 
go-betweens in the negotiations, such as the priest of Kortenhoef, who 
was said to have gone to Zutphen on behalf of several villages.(89)
But these measures were fruitless: as the eastern villages continued
to reach agreements with Deventer, the Estates could only wish, with 
resignation, that they received as much in taxes as the enemy did in 
protection money. By January 1590, 'seeing that there are as yet no 
means available to protect the farmers', the Estates were compelled to 
turn a blind eye to the Overkwartier's dealings: indeed, they soon
came to accept that some of their own members had paid Grammaye, with 
the Stadholder's knowledge and permission. It was not thought
advisable to appoint these men to office, however, and the 
Estates-General were kept in the dark.(90)
As well as the Spanish soldiers, the Estates-General's own unpaid 
troops terrorised the countryside from their bases in the towns,
'taking from the farmer not only the means of paying his taxes, but
almost all he has to eat in his house and making it difficult for him
to take in his crop at this time of harvest'. When Nieuwenaar's
cavalry were let loose in the Sticht, 'much blood was shed in various 
places'.(91) In response to this problem, the Estates evolved a scheme 
whereby selected villages paid their consumption tax and double
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oudschildgeld directly to certain nearby military commanders, who in 
turn undertook to protect 'their' villages from raids by other 
troops. It appears that this plan, for all its good intentions, was 
limited and unsystematic in its application. (92)
Since 'the best and greatest part of the Sticht is entirely 
spoilt and lying desolate', the Estates had to look to the towns for 
much of their revenue.(93) In many ways this was a vain hope, however: 
protected as they were by long-standing privileges, the towns could 
not really be forced to pay against their will: the monthly levy of
1000 guilders (p. 100-101 above) is a case in point. Moreover, the
towns shared in the province's general economic problems, since much 
of their income was derived from the marketing of farm produce, and 
must have suffered fropi the rural devastation.(94) In any case, Wijk,
Rhenen and Montfoort were very small, and the first two were 
undoubtedly in a state of decline. Although Wijk still collected a 
toll from ships on the Lek, it had lost much of its raison d'être with 
the disappearance of the bishops from the provincial scene (Wijk was 
their country seat). Rhenen's river trade had suffered a death blow 
when its toll was moved to Wijk in 1483, and the Estates knew they 
could not demand much from it after a serious fire in 1585. On one of 
the rare occasions when the burgomaster of Rhenen brought some money 
to the Estates on the town's behalf, much of it was foreign coin, and 
therefore useless.(95) It is true that Amersfoort was significantly
larger than its fellows, and at one time had a flourishing brewing 
industry, but the magistracy complained bitterly, after the 
introduction of the generale middelen, of the loss of Amersfoort's
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trade, industry, and indeed population, to lower-taxed places across 
the provincial borders in Gelderland, for example.(96) The bulk of the 
Estates' urban income therefore had to come from Utrecht itself, which
had retained a certain amount of brewing, textiles and service
industries, though it had lost its principal medieval function, as 
ecclesiastical capital of the Netherlands. For these and other 
reasons, tax-collecting in the towns was no easier than it was in the 
countryside. The city council's initial efforts to levy a chimney 
tax, to defray Utrecht's share of the monthly thousand guilders, 
provoked unrest among the townspeople, and was abandoned, at least 
temporarily. A proposed house tax for the same purpose met the same 
fate.(97) As far as the provincial taxes were concerned, the towns 
frequently deducted at source revenues claimed by the Estates, to pay
troops billeted on them.(98) Furthermore, the magistrates refused to 
cooperate with the Estates' officials or to protect them from the 
anger and, occasionally, violence of the citizenry.(99) Riots, such as 
those in Utrecht in August 1583, made the city council reluctant to 
increase taxes for fear of further commotion, while at the same time
the farmers of the taxes on beer and milling protested that they dared
not collect the money for fear of their lives. These riots frightened 
the magistrates of Utrecht and Amersfoort to such an extent that, a 
few months later, they 'would not dare to suggest' bringing the 
generale middelen up to the level of Holland and Zeeland.(100)
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The Estates had various powers at their disposal to compel 
individuals or whole communities to pay their taxes. (It appears, 
however, that these powers were exercised more often in the early part 
of the period; towards the end of the 1580s, the granting of remission 
became more common.) The schout and the village court faced loss of 
office if they did not inform the Estates of the names of
defaulters.(101) The Estates' officials could be assisted in the
collection of arrears by the city militia; if villages still proved 
unwilling, the Estates would threaten to billet troops on them. (This
could be self-defeating, however, since it cost the villages so much 
to maintain the troops that they could pay no taxes for as much as six 
months after the soldiers left.[102]) More frequently, goods or 
livestock belonging to an individual or to a village could be seized 
in lieu of tax arrears, or until the money was forthcoming.(103)
Alternatively, private citizens such as tax farmers could be
imprisoned until their guarantors paid up, while village officials and 
town magistrates could be arrested as surety for the taxes owed by 
their communities or to force them to declare the taxable resources of 
their jurisdictions.(104) Even the Vice-domdeken was placed under
house arrest in 1581 to enforce the Estates' tax on the cathedral's
tithes.(105) And when Amersfoort was seriously behind with the payment 
of the double oudschildgeld, the Estates' Standing Committee stopped 
livestock entering the town; to enable the market to proceed freely, 
Hendrick Both and Herman Joostensz were held in the city while 
Amersfoort raised the first instalment of the debt. They swore a 
solemn oath to return to custody if later payments were not made on
time. Their confinement does not seem to have been too harsh.
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however; not only were their expenses paid by the town council, but 
Both was able to act as Amersfoort's representative in the 
Estates.(106) 'Seizure and imprisonment were unsatisfactory as 
sanctions, however; for one thing, they 'incur high costs and produce
little friendship', as the deputies of Amersfoort and Wijk put it in 
1583; for another, imprisonment was ineffective, at least in the case 
of one Willem van Rijswijck, who was relieved of his farm of the 
generale' middelen in February 1589, and was still pleading for his 
release from gaol in August 1590.(107)
Whether or not the taxes were collected, there were financial 
obligations to be met. It appears that at the beginning of the period 
under consideration, expenditure was not very well organised, for in 
1579, possibly in response to pressure from the city, the Estates laid 
down that no payment was to be made without a written authorisation, 
signed by three specially deputed members of the Estates.(108) This 
system worked adequately until the general breakdown of government 
caused by the dispute over the abolition of the Geeligeerden in 
1586-87, when the city and towns took it upon themselves to send money 
to the garrison in Deventer and the Zutphen fort just as if the order 
had been signed as usual by a representative of each Estate.(109) 
Normally, however, these authorisations, coupled with the receipts 
(for example, from the Estates-General's treasury) formed the basis of 
the receivers' accounts.(110)
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The most important of the Estates' financial obligations was 
their commitment to the gemene zaak, i.e. their monthly quota. This 
was met in two ways: firstly, by direct payment to the
Estates-General's treasurer or his assistant; secondly, by supplying 
the commanders of the troops which were Utrecht's particular 
responsibility with cash for the soldiers' wages, or, more frequently,
by reimbursing those who supplied them with food, drink or fuel. The 
'repartition' system, introduced in 1578, was intended to give each
contributing province a direct feeling of responsibility for the 
welfare of a section of the army. By 1592, Utrecht's repartition 
consisted of eleven companies of infantry, one of cavalry, plus their 
powder, shot and food. The resultant costs ammounted to all but
3,527 guilders of the Estates' ordinary quota for that year.(Ill) The
repartition payments were charged up to the monthly quota in the
accounts: sometimes, however, money destined for the Sticht's own
troops did not pass through the Estates' hands at all. The scheme for
assigning the taxes from particular villages to local military units
has been mentioned above (p. 107), but even when this arrangement was 
not in force, towns and villages understandably found it advisable to 
placate the troops on their doorsteps, rather than send the money to 
the Estates. This practice led, in turn, to claims from the towns and 
villages for tax-reductions.(112)
Compared with the monthly quota, the Estates' other financial 
commitments were small, though far from negligible. They included the 
servicing of annuities, the payment of officials' salaries, including 
a percentage of the income of each chamber for the receivers; and the
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costs of administration, such as payments to the Secretary's clerks 
for copying the accounts and to the deputies who were present at the 
audit. Occasional lesser expenditures could be met out of a surcharge 
on the regular taxes, as the salaries of a number of Reformed 
ministers were paid from the generale middelen of 1585-86.(113)
Each of these financial obligations was assigned to a particular
chamber, or fund, to be paid by its receiver. In 1581, for instance, 
the single oudschildgeld was made responsible for the interest on the 
annuities for which it was the security, and for the salaries of the 
permanent officials of the Estates and the Hof; the imposts were 
supposed to take care of their interest payments, subsidise deputies 
for attendance at meetings, and repay the loans made to the Estates by 
the Catholic clergy and the city for the relief of Maastricht; the 
general levy on the countryside (which had replaced the imposts there) 
was responsible for certain companies of cavalry, while the rest - the 
double oudschildgeld, the tithes, the generale middelen and the towns' 
extra thousand guilders a month - were required to discharge the 
monthly quota.(114) In an emergency, however, all chambers could be 
called upon to satisfy the Estates-General's demands, but in many 
cases there was very little left over after their assigned obligations 
had been met: of the 23,670 guilders expected from the single
oudschildgeld in 1585-86, only 1,446 were reckoned against the monthly 
quota.(115)
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This division of funds created certain problems, however. As the 
Estates admitted in 1587, 'the contributions [i.e. the province's 
taxes] are not paid every month, although the consented quota [to the
Estates-General] must be paid every month'.(116) The receivers 
therefore operated by, so to speak, 'robbing Peter to pay Paul'. If, 
when a payment had to be made, there was no money in the designated 
chamber, the receiver responsible would borrow from another chamber 
against a promise of future repayment from his own. The promises of 
repayment were sometimes over-optimistic: in November 1580, for
instance, Bernt Stell, the then receiver of the imposts, advanced
1,000 out of the 8,000 guilders granted for the relief of Steenwijk. 
By July 1586, when he rendered his accounts for audit, he still had 
not been reimbursed from the generale middelen as intended.(117)
This practice is only one of the factors making it extremely 
difficult to estimate the Estates' annual income and expenditure with 
any degree of accuracy. Another is the confusion of a private 
individual with his public office, so that receivers were sometimes 
held personally liable for the deficits of their chamber.(118) A third 
is the limitations of the archives themselves: the post-1550s accounts 
of the domains, for example, were destroyed in the nineteenth century, 
and even the best documented taxes, such as the generale middelen, are 
not available as complete series throughout the period.(119) The 
peculiarities of the Estates' accounting methods add to the confusion: 
in the first place, each chamber had its own fiscal year: the
Archbishop's tithes ran from January to December; the single 
oudschildgeld was traditionally collected on the feasts of St. Martin
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John (11 November and 24 June); the imposts were reckoned
from one Candlemas (2 February) to the next; and the tax year for the 
generale middelen finally settled down as May to April. In any case, 
money recorded in the accounts for one tax year was very often 
received or expended in another. Moreover, the accounts themselves 
may not always be reliable: at an investigation in 1583, it was found
that the receiver Loef van der Haer had been misappropriating the 
oudschildgeld by delaying interest payments to the holders of 
annuities.(120) And if they were usually honest, the receivers were 
not immune from arithmetical errors, although none was as serious as 
the extra 10,000 guilders which Niclaes van Berck calculated he had 
paid to the army from the double oudschildgeld and consumption tax for
1585-1586.(121)
Nevertheless, it is possible to gain an impression, nothing more, 
of the sums involved for the year 1585-86, by which time neither the
imposts in the towns nor the monthly thousand guilders contributed a 
significant amount to the provincial treasury. The following figures 
emerge, and it must be remembered that the actual total must have been
considerably higher, since these represent only the income from 
regular sources, excluding the various extraordinary levies:
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Consumption tax (country) 30,456
TOTAL 179,678
Turning to the other side of the ledger, almost 144,873 guilders, or 
just over 80 percent of the income, was paid out in one way or another 
to the 'common cause". A comparison of this figure with Utrecht's 
assigned annual quota of 159,840 guilders shows that the Sticht fell 
short hy relatively little of the Hague's demands.(123)
All these figures, partial as they are, must be viewed in the 
wider context of the war. Although Utrecht's contribution seems like 
a drop in the ocean of the Estates-General's annual war budget 
(3.2 million guilders in 1591), it was nevertheless significant - and 
somewhat unusual - that the Sticht contributed to the gemene zaak at 
all, since several of its neighbours did not.(124) Utrecht, like the
other provinces and towns, considered its own interests to be of 
paramount importance in determining how the money was to be raised and 
spent.(125) Some of the towns of Holland - Gouda was an extreme 
example - strongly objected to paying for the defence of the lost 
southern provinces, while Holland as a whole was in financial 
difficulties in the mid-1580s, and resented having to shoulder the
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main burden of the war effort alone* Yet Holland was prepared to help 
the Sticht, its "bulwark" against Parma, to prevent a repeat of the 
early 1570s; after the fall of Antwerp, for instance, the Estates of 
Holland responded to a plea from Floris Thin, by promising money and 
supplies for the garrisons in Utrecht.(126) By the same token, the 
Sticht occasionally advanced small sums to Gelderland, in the rather 
vain hope that the enemy could thus be kept at a distance.(127)
The problems of the Sticht reflected the problems of the 
Netherlands as a whole: as the military situation deteriorated, more
and more money was required from ever-shrinking resources. Some 
reference has already been made (p. 94-95 above) to the increased 
financial demands in the years of Leicester's régime; even before the 
Earl's arrival, deputies were being harassed in the streets of the 
Hague by the Estates-General's creditors.(128) In 1586, Leicester's 
trade embargo cut off one of the provinces' main sources of revenue, 
the 'convoy and licence' duties on trade with neutral or hostile 
countries. Nor did the English subsidy, irregular and late as it 
usually was, go far to compensate for this loss.(129) This shortage of 
funds provoked mutinies and defections in the army, for example at 
Deventer and the fort near Zutphen, which were betrayed to Parma by 
the Irish garrison in February 1587, and at St. Geertruidenberg, sold 
to Spain in April 1589, after prolonged negotiations, a threatened 
siege by Maurice of Nassau and the failure of the Estates-General's 
strenuous efforts to raise the troops' wages.(130)
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In the early 1590s, when Parma's forces were diverted to the 
civil war in France, Maurice of Nassau began to carry the war into the 
enemy's camp, and achieved a series of successes, beginning with the
capture of Breda in 1590. Admittedly, this change from the defensive 
to the offensive reduced the areas affected by Spanish protection 
levies in Gelderland, Overijssel and Utrecht, but it also entailed 
increased financial demands on the provinces.(131) The fiscal load on 
the Sticht grew far beyond its level in the 1580s, as the Estates 
turned once more to direct taxation to meet their increased quota. In 
1598, for instance, they attempted to introduce a 5 percent tax on the 
rentable value of all houses, but this aroused such widespread 
opposition that it had to be 'suspended... for two or three months' in 
favour of a further duty on beer, salt and renten. That year saw 
other desperate measures: a supplementary oudschildgeld, a fixed levy
on every village in the province, and (a new departure), a levy of
20,000 guilders on ecclesiastical property, including that of the five 
chapters.(132)
Even the addition of Groningen to the ranks of the contributing 
provinces in 1596, and the varying sums produced by Gelderland and 
Overijssel for the gemene zaak did little to relieve the over-burdened 
Estates of Utrecht, since the war grew more expensive every year. As 
the century drew to a close, the Estates' secretary lamented that he 
did not know where the next year's money was to come from.(134) The 
Estates themselves complained bitterly that 'in their singular zeal 
they have burdened themselves far beyond their capacity by their 
contributions to discharging the obligations of the war, and that they
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are already so deep in debt that they can see no way out'. The only 
consolation was that at last they had something to show for their 
money, as they could 'declare themselves extremely grateful to the 
Lord God Almighty for the great successes the United Netherlands have 
enjoyed, particularly in the last year'(1597).(134)
- 120
Chapter V
The Estates and the Reformation
All over the Netherlands at this time civil authorities were 
preoccupied with the development of Reformed Protestantism. A number 
of circumstances combined to make the course of the Reformation in the 
Sticht different in some ways from the one it followed elsewhere, 
although there were certain marked similarities of timing between 
Utrecht and its neighbours. One of these circumstances was the city 
of Utrecht's position as ecclesiastical capital of the Netherlands, 
which it held until the reorganisation of the bishoprics in the 
1560s. Although the Catholic Church in the province had resisted the 
Council of Trent's efforts towards internal reform, and was therefore 
vulnerable to attacks from outside, nevertheless the political 
predominance of the chapter clergy in the Estates must have done much 
to delay the advance of Protestantism in its early stages.
The religious troubles of 1566 left their mark on the Sticht:
there were Reformed services in the countryside and in the city in
August, and the city's four parish churches had their images broken. 
The inability of the Estates and the city council to deal effectively 
with these outbreaks, and the leniency of the agreement they made with 
the Reformed, were the main charges brought by the Council of Troubles 
under Alva.(l) The impact of the events of 1566-1567 was, however, 
largely confined to the city, although some villages were affected: in
January 1567, for example, the priest and congregation of Nigtevecht,
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in the extreme north of the province, turned Protestant: the priest
was killed at the siege of Naarden, and the village was later ravaged 
by Spanish troops.(2)
Protestantism disappeared, or at least went underground, for the 
next ten years: outwardly, Utrecht was among the most Catholic of
provinces, though a Reformed congregation 'under the cross' in the 
city did survive the persecution of the Spanish regime.(3) The changed 
political circumstances created by Utrecht's adherence to the 
Pacification of Ghent - even though the Estates entered into it 'salva 
religions Catholica'(4) - and, more importantly, by the Satisfaction 
with Orange in October 1577, gave the Reformation its chance. It is 
significant that the Satisfaction as it was signed was by no means as 
explicitly anti-Catholic as its original draft: Orange promised only
'not to hinder or prevent...the Roman religion as it has been observed 
and maintained from time immemorial until the present'.(5)
The first signs of the Reformation in the city became visible 
about this time, deriving not from the underground Reformed 
congregation, with its separate small groups meeting in private 
houses, but from one of the Catholic parish churches, St. Jacob, and 
its priest, Hubert Duifhuis, who preached openly in 1577 against 
images and other 'abuses' of the Papacy (6) It was Duifhuis and the 
congregation of St. Jacob - 'a union of non-Catholics who did not 
belong to one of the Protestant churches'(7) - who gave the Utrecht 
Reformation its peculiar character. His assertion that 'he would 
always exhort his flock to peace and subjection to their rulers' 
strongly recommehded Duifhuis to the city council, which decided 'that
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such a preacher is exceedingly useful to this city in these dangerous 
times', and paid him a salary from January 1578 onwards.(8) After a 
short absence from Utrecht in the summer of 1578, Duifhuis was asked 
to return by the city council, and was taken under its official 
protection. From August 1578, Catholic Mass and Reformed preaching 
existed side by side in St, Jacob, and the services, which combined 
elements of both, were, it appears, well attended by many members of 
the magistracy and the Estates.(9)
The particular appeal of Duifhuis's brand of Protestantism for 
the authorities lay not in the dogma taught in St. Jacob, which in 
1581 was found to agree sufficiently closely with orthodox Calvinism, 
but in his views on church government and discipline, which he held to
be 'a remnant of the Papal yoke'.(10) St. Jacob, therefore, had no
elders or deacons, and no consistory: indeed, Duifhuis was officially 
forbidden to establish such a body in 1579.(11) But there was also 
another Reformed community in the city whose views on church
discipline were much more stringently Calvinist than those of Duifhuis 
and his adherents. Under the leadership of Petrus Dathenus, who was 
on a short visit to Utrecht, this congregation asked the city council 
in August 1578 for a church in which to hold their services, but the 
request was refused until Archduke Mathias and the Estates-General 
should come to a decision on the proposed Religious Peace.
Nevertheless, Dathenus' followers occupied the empty church of the 
Franciscans that night, and he preached there the following morning. 
Although this congregation received no official recognition until 
January 1579, when the appointment of Wernerus Helmichius was 
confirmed, and did not hold its first communion service until March of
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that year, from then on there were two competing Protestant 
congregations in Utrecht, both increasing in numbers and employing 
more ministers to cope with their needs.(12)
While Reformed Protestantism was on the advance, Roman 
Catholicism was being forced into retreat. In January 1578, the 
Jesuits were asked to leave the city because of 'murmurings among the
people' and a check was made on all monasteries to prevent the 
spreading of 'treasons' by itinerant monks.(13) The Franciscans were 
expelled later in the year, in response to pressure from a crowd which 
held the Catholic clergy responsible for Duifhuis's temporary absence: 
besides, in the autumn of 1576, there had been rumours of close 
contact between the Franciscans and the Vredenburg garrison.(14) This 
left the Franciscan church available for Reformed services.(15) The 
five chapter churches and other ecclesiastical institutions were also 
on the defensive in that year, being forced to give up many of their 
valuables to be melted down for the gemene zaak or the fortification 
of the city.(16) Furthermore, in April, the first of a series of 
expulsions from the city took place, of men (including the dean of 
St. Pieter, Willem Veusels, and two canons of Ste. Marie) who were 
suspect for political reasons, and were also staunch Catholics.(17)
The Roman clergy's increasingly feeble efforts to resist Reform 
were closely bound up with the political resistance of some of them to 
the Union of Utrecht (see Chapter II, pp. 29-30 above). Cuynretorff, 
the leader of the anti-Union movement, warned his fellow canons 
against Mathias's Religious Peace, which would, he thought, open the 
gates to Reformed Protestantism in Utrecht.(18) To begin with, the
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five churches firmly opposed the scheme put forward by the city 
council for a 'union' with those of the 'allegedly reformed religion' 
but three weeks later they agreed to enter into negotiations with the 
magistrates.(19) The chapters' feeling of powerlessness in the face of 
hostile political and religious developments can be seen in the record 
of their meeting of 1 January 1579, when they resolved to request 
Cuynretorff's release 'with all civility'. If they could not resist 
such a serious violation of their clerical immunity from lay 
jurisdiction as the arrest of one of their number, how much less were 
the canons able to prevent the publication, on 11 January, of 
Utrecht's first 'religious peace'.(20)
The preamble to this document (which was issued on the city 
council's own authority, without reference to the Estates or the 
central government), attributed the growth of Protestantism to the war 
against Don John of Austria and his supporters after the Pacification: 
this had forced the Estates-General to implore 'many lords and 
surrounding provinces and a great multitude of foreign soldiers to 
come into these lands, who were almost all of other religions than the 
Roman, which has caused a great change in all things, and principally 
in the said obedience to His Majesty and the state of the Roman 
religion'. Its purpose was to remove discord by regulating the
relations of the two religions within the city: it granted the
Protestants the free use of the St. Jacob and Franciscan churches,
with which they were to be satisfied; no insults or injuries were to 
be committed on religious grounds, and no worship of either kind was 
to be hindered.(21) The clergy's main objections, naturally enough, 
were to the provisions requiring them to pay excise taxes like laymen,
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and to observe all ordinances and statutes of the magistrates, a point
which was particularly resented in view of Cuynretorff's 
imprisonment.(22)
It is hardly surprising that the 'peace' did not last long,
however 'politic' it may have been.(23) The Dominican friars were the 
next focus for popular dislike: on 2 June 1579 they were forbidden to
preach, in the interests of public order. An appeal to the city
council against this decision, by a Catholic deputation, who asked
that 'everyone might be left free in his religion', provoked fighting 
between Catholics and Protestants just outside the town hall.
According to the official record, bloodshed was narrowly averted; to
pacify the angry Protestants, the Dominicans and a number of other
'suspect' persons were asked to leave the city. This, the most
serious religious riot so far, coupled with the iconoclasm which
followed in three of the city's churches, including that of the
Dominicans, frightened the five chapters into asking the city council 
to revise the religious peace 'according to the circumstances of the 
time,...for the peace and welfare of the inhabitants of the city, both 
clerical and lay, of both religions'.(24) The new agreement was 
published, in haste, on 15 June, five days after the riot; it granted 
the Reformed the use of an additional two churches (including the 
Dominicans') for their services, and exhorted everyone to keep the 
peace.(25)
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For the next nine months, Roman Catholicism, 'consistorial' 
Reformed Protestantism, and the hybrid religion practised in St. 
Jacob existed, somewhat uneasily, side by side in the city. Elsewhere 
in the province, the Reformation had not made such rapid progress, 
although the images of the principal Amersfoort churches were broken 
immediately after the siege in March 1579, and again in June: two
churches were taken over for Reformed worship and two predikanten 
appointed•(26)
The final blow to Catholicism came in March 1580, with the news 
that Count Rennenberg, the Stadholder of Groningen and Friesland, had 
joined the side of Spain, and that Protestants had been ill-treated 
and killed in Groningen. In Utrecht, as in Friesland and Overijssel, 
the religious peace collapsed: a crowd attacked the Pom, hitherto
unaffected by iconoclastic outbursts.(27) The burgerhoplieden urged
the city council to introduce a Protestant programme, involving the 
Reformation of the orphanage and the Latin school, the prohibition of
public Catholic worship and the exclusion from the Estates of all
Catholics, with an end to the meetings of the chapters.(28) The
clergy's protests to the Estates that they had always upheld the
religious peace, and their appeals to Orange for support, were futile: 
the city council resolved to forbid the public exercise of Roman 
Catholicism within its jurisdiction,(29) Orange did his best to secure 
two churches for Catholic worship, and to preserve the last remnants 
of the religious peace, but in vain; three months later, on 18 June, 
Catholic worship was finally forbidden in the city and its 
environs.(30) The last public display of Catholicism took place on
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30 August, at the funeral in the Dorn of Archbishop Frederick Schenck 
van Toutenberg, when some of the onlookers sang the Protestant 
battle-song. Psalm 130 ('Out of the depths have I cried unto thee, 0 
Lord') much to the displeasure of the Catholic clergy present.(31)
Again, the rest of the province followed, rather slowly, where 
the city led. After iconoclasm in Wijk, the church was taken over for 
Reformed services in March 1580; shortly afterwards, the magistracy 
appears to have opposed public worship for Catholics by stating that 
it was 'not at all advisable to introduce two different religions'.
In October, the town council arrived at an amicable agreement with the 
clergy of Wijk's chapter church, St. John the Baptist.(32) In 
Amersfoort, Roman Catholic worship was also stopped, following more 
image-breaking, although, to begin with, this was seen as a purely 
temporary measure.(33) In Rhenen, the efforts of the magistracy to 
introduce Reform met with considerable opposition from the priest of 
the beguine convent, who was, in the end, expelled from the town.(34) 
(Montfoort, which as usual differed from the other towns, will be 
discussed at more length below.)
Outside the towns, the progress of the Reformation was slower 
still. The city council insisted that Catholicism should be prohibited 
in the countryside as well, but the Estates did nothing to this end 
for a year.(35) The placard was finally published in August 1581, but
later violations necessitated its renewal at fairly frequent 
intervals,(36) The measures taken to introduce Protestantism to rural 
districts did not, however, meet with the approval of the Calvinist
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predikanten in the city, who feared that the Reformation 'would not be 
introduced in the right way and according to the rule of the Holy 
Gospel'.(37) It is clear that the Estates themselves distinguished 
between, on the one hand, ministers who were genuinely 'of the 
Reformed religion' and, on the other, ex-priests who adhered to the 
placard of August 1581, gave no offence to the Reformed, preached 
God's word unadorned from the Old and New Testaments, and conducted 
baptisms 'according to Christ's institution'.(38) The Estates did, 
however, demand certain minimum standards of Protestant practice from 
village ministers, in the administration of the sacraments of Holy 
Communion and Baptism, 'as we do not intend to permit any priests of 
the Roman religion'.(39) The city's consistorial predikanten objected 
principally to the Estates' intention of reforming the countryside by
sending three ministers 'such as (are) in the St. Jacob church here' 
to the 'most Papist villages', in order to win the inhabitants away 
from Catholicism.(40) The authorities' lack of success in this
direction is illuminated by a report from the Marshal of the 
Nederkwartier(41): hiding in a dry ditch before dawn one morning in
the village of Maarssen, the Marshal's clerk observed the village 
priest hear the confessions of a man and a woman, before marrying them 
'in the Roman manner', in the choir of the church.
Meanwhile, in the city itself, the opposition of the five 
chapters to another aspect of the Reformation - the secularisation of 
ecclesiastical property - was being steadily overcome by the 
Ridderschap and the towns, who 'do not believe that they should let 
the property of the clergy be lost because of the obstinacy of one
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Estate'.(42) The chapters found that they could not rely on the help 
of their usual allies, the Ridderschap, when there was property at 
stake, as there was in the case of the five prebends (one in each 
chapter) vacated by the death of the Archbishop.(43) A declaration by 
the clergy that they considered the Estates' 'Order on ecclesiastical 
property' null and void was ignored, and when the colleges disregarded 
its provisions about presentation to confiscated benefices or 
prebends, their members - even the Domdeken himself - were arrested 
and held until they co-operated.(44) In the end, there was nothing for 
it but to acquiesce, however reluctantly, by promising to administer 
the chapters' property under the Estates' supervision and likewise to 
alienate nothing without permission from the authorities. Moreover, 
the other two Estates had the upper hand: to support their measures on 
ecclesiastical property, they could quote the Union of Utrecht, which 
allowed the individual provinces to 'introduce...such regulations as 
they consider proper...for the preservation of all people, either
secular or clerical, their properties and rights'.(45) And after the 
establishment of the Geeligeerden in April 1582 robbed the clergy of 
the political means to protest against such arrangements, it is not as
remarkable as one Utrecht historian thought that a decision on the 
ecclesiastical property commission should have been taken in, August of 
that year by all three Estates unanimously.(46) Perhaps the chapters 
recognised, as the towns and the Ridderschap pointed out, that they 
had no real reason to complain, considering the much more far-reaching 
measures enforced on the Catholic clergy in other provinces.(47)
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Despite these victories over Catholicism, the progress of 
Protestantism was hampered by disputes between the ministers of the 
city's two Reformed communities. The consistorial predikanten, led by 
the fiery Herman Modet, preached against the 'Latitudinarian Libertine 
church' of St. Jacob, sent spies to find faults in Duifhuis's own 
teaching, laid complaints against him in neighbouring classes, such as 
Amsterdam, Delft and Schiedam, and were offended when Orange said that 
'he did not remember he had ever heard a better sermon' than the one 
preached by Duifhuis in St. Jacob.(48) The magistrates, on the other 
hand, concluded a 'remarkable' contract with Duifhuis, whereby he was 
free to leave his post should they ever consent to religious
persecution, 'as he has stated that he can not agree to any 
persecution for the sake of conscience, so as not to make his soul
bloodstained...in the sight of God'.(49) When Duifhuis died, in 1581, 
the city council hastened to appoint a like-minded successor, 
Hermannus Elconius; he was joined in the following year by a second 
minister, and in 1585, when the St. Jacob congregation took over the 
chapter church of Ste. Marie as well, by a third.(50) Nevertheless, 
the consistorial community was more numerous, being served by four 
predikanten, in spite of a magistracy which exhibited what one 
consistorial minister called 'such great perversity, such great
contempt for pure religion, such obstinate hatred for the purer
administration of the Church'.(51) For their part, the authorities
justified their attitude by saying that the days of prayer held by the 
consistorial predikanten, to pray for the advancement of God's cause, 
were used 'to slander and abuse the Estates and the magistrates and to 
incite the congregation against them'.(52) It was no doubt for this
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reason that, when the consistorial predikanten asked the city council 
in 1584 for the salary for a fourth minister, to replace one who had 
been dismissed, they were told either to cancel some of their services 
or get help from St. Jacob. Although the salary was later granted,
and Johannes Uyttenbogaert appointed (by the magistrates, thus giving 
the predikanten another grievance), Modet and his colleagues did not 
cease to hope for what they called a 'good union' with their 
rivals - that is, one to their own advantage.(53)
Their chance came in 1586. Shortly after his arrival in the
Netherlands, the Earl of Leicester wrote that the Stichtenaars 
'begynne exceedingly to encreace in.» relygyon, who were lately the 
worst of all these provinces'.(54) Committed as he was to the cause of 
international Protestantism, his first action to promote 'the glory of 
God, the Christian religion, and the peace and unity of the churches 
and congregations'(55) was to bring about the amalgamation of 
Utrecht’’s two Protestant communities, on terms which clearly favoured 
the consistorials. The kirk session, which was to include members of 
the city council, was to look after 'all church matters', and to 
choose ministers (who were, however, still to be approved by the 
magistracy). Where Duifhuis had asked no confession of faith from 
those who attended his communion services, the agreement of April 1586 
laid down that 'no one shall be admitted to the church service unless 
he has been found by a previous examination to be suitable in his
doctrine and way of life'. The requirement that all attending the
service should sign the Confession of Faith of the Netherlands 
churches proved to be too much for one of the St. Jacob ministers, 
Taco Sybrandsz, who could not in conscience subscribe to the article
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on predestination, and was therefore forbidden to preach.(56) His two 
colleagues, however, were found to be sufficiently sound on 'Godly 
doctrine and the use of the sacraments', so that they were permitted 
to continue their work.(57) Few of the St. Jacob congregation 
attended church thereafter, no doubt because they disliked 'the 
Genevan inquisition', which had 'laid on our shoulders a new burden,
not inferior in many points, as it it generally apprehended, to that
of the Papists'.(58)
The amalgamation opened the way for an attempt by the 
consistorial predikanten to impose orthodox Calvinism throughout the 
province. In this they had the enthusiastic support of Leicester, who 
considered that the division between the two congregations had been
fostered by 'the very principal officers of all this town, and men 
seeming to favour this religion (i.e.: Reformed) to avoid suspicion
and to get authority'.(59) A month after this opinion was expressed, 
the expulsion of 60 men from the city removed a number of these 
'principal officers', along with several prominent Catholics, who were 
suspected of being in contact with the enemy, and a number of members
of the St. Jacob community, whom the Calvinist burgerhoplieden
believed to be equally dangerous, because 'they conducted themselves 
hypocritically as if of the Reformed religion, to deceive the world, 
attending services, but nevertheless having their children baptised by 
papistical priests'.(60)
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Similar developments took place in Amersfoort, where, in 1586, 
the town council ratified the kirk session's dismissal of a minister, 
whereas five years earlier the then magistrates had considered it 
unlawful for the kirk session to meet without its authorisation, and 
had angered orthodox Calvinists by an attempt to instal a 'Libertine' 
in the pulpit. The magistrates appointed by Nieuwenaar early in 1586 
had a different outlook, however, and had been praised by Herman 
Modet, 'the chiefest stickler for the Leicestrian faction'.(61)
Thanks to Leicester's influence, the Church ordinance adopted by 
the National Synod at the Hague, in the summer of 1586, was pushed 
through the Estates, although the Ridderschap accepted it only with 
the proviso that villages need not accept predikanten who subscribed 
to the ordinance unless they wished.(62) It was impossible to enforce 
the ordinance throughout the province, although during the Prouninck 
regime the Estates deprived a number of village ministers of their 
office (including Erasmus Backer, formerly of St. Jacob), replacing 
them with others more orthodox in their views.(63) The Estates also
hoped to spread Calvinism throughout the country areas through the 
influence of the schout of each village, but this scheme was thwarted 
by the fact that many schouten were 'of contrary religion', as were 
their superiors, the Marshals; the Estates realised that 'it would be 
in vain to reform the schouten if the head officers in the countryside 
are not Reformed'. One of Leicester's supporters put the problem more
forcefully: the Marshals 'and all Under-officers be meere Papists and
lewdly affected off whom a just Reformation is to be required'.(64)
— 134 —
In order to finance this increased religious activity, the 
Estates passed another ordinance for ecclesiastical property, the 
so-called Redressement op de geestelijke goederen of October 1586. 
This was an effort to tighten up the administration of the secularised 
funds, to find money for the salaries of rural ministers, sextons and
schoolmasters, particularly in those villages where an endowment of 
property formerly sufficient to maintain one priest fell far short of 
the sums required for at least two men and their families. It 
included various other provisions, such as a resolution to set up a 
seminary in the city for Reformed education, but like the Hague Church 
ordinance, it remained very much a dead letter, and the administrative 
body it established, the 'Chamber of Direction', was dissolved as soon 
as Nieuwenaar's coup in September 1588 brought back the exiles of 
1586.(65)
In the political field, the drive towards orthodox Calvinism can 
be seen in the purge of the Geeligeerden carried out in the winter of
1586-87. The militia captains pressed for the removal from office of 
anyone connected with the five chapters, 'creatures and sworn members 
of the anti-Christ', and anti-Catholicism was so strong in the city 
council that some magistrates said they would never tolerate Catholic 
clergy in the government 'even if the whole State depended on it'.(66)
One observer, however, was of the opinion that the burgerhoplieden
0
objected not to the canons personally, since most of them were married 
and professed the Reformed religion, but to their possession of 
lucrative prebends: 'lyvinges, which they (the burgerhoplieden) mean
to convert to some other uses'.(67)
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Although Helmichius denied that he and his fellow predikanten had 
advised or known of the attempt to abolish the First Estate, they did 
supply Nieuwenaar and the city council with scriptural arguments 
against the involvement of the clergy in political government,(68) to 
support the magistrates' contention that the ecclesiastical Estate 
'has no other foundation but the possession of church property by 
virtue of the authority of Papal and tyrannical decrees, contrary to 
the word of God and all political laws'.(69) English commentators, on 
the other hand, were in no doubt that Herman Modet, at least, had 
played an active part in the movement to abolish the Geeligeerden.(70) 
The scriptural arguments of the predikanten did not, it seems, apply 
to their own political activities: they saw it as their duty to speak
out on questions involving the common good, 'which concerns all 
citizens equally, and the welfare of the Republic brings with it the 
welfare of the Church'.(71) Modet's mission to England in 1587, to 
inform Leicester of the situation in Utrecht, was therefore justified, 
as was the later mission of his colleagues, Helmichius and Sopingius, 
to offer Elizabeth the sovereignty of the Netherlands on behalf of the 
Calvinist clergy of Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijssel, Friesland and 
Zeeland, in the hope of safeguarding the Reformed faith at the peace 
negotiations in Ostend.(72)
With the change in the Sticht's political climate brought about 
by the events of September/October 1588, came a corresponding change 
in the religious climate. This change was, naturally, not popular in 
some quarters: one contemporary wrote that 'the papists, having gotten
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the staff in hand, will use the same at their pleasures'.(73) And
certainly the new city government issued a plain statement of its 
views in November; the consistory might discuss Church matters and
religion as it pleased, but two members of the city council would 
attend all these meetings to ensure that there was no question of any 
interference by the consistory in politics. Nevertheless, no obvious 
action was taken, for the time being, against the consistorial 
predikanten in the city, in spite of Helmichius' preaching against the 
régime of the exiles, shortly after their return.(74) Rather, the 
Estates concentrated on providing ministers for the rural parishes, 
taking steps against overtly Catholic priests or outspoken Calvinists, 
and installing replacements of whom they approved. Some villages, 
however, - Soest, for example - objected to the dismissal of their 
predikanten; 'now we can see what these new arrivals are trying to do: 
to introduce libertine religion everywhere and suppress discipline', 
to quote the Amersfoort town council, which had not yet been changed 
by the Stadholder.(75)
It was not until late 1589 that the city council was forced to
act by pressure from the members of the former congregation of St. 
Jacob, who were agitating for the restoration of their church's 
separate position. The council was of the opinion that a return to 
the situation as it had been before 1586 would only exacerbate 
religious divisions in the city. Instead, it chose to dismiss all 
four consistorial predikanten, on the grounds that their presence and
activities were hindering the full union of the two Reformed 
communities.(76) The burgomaster, Dirk Canther, was perhaps nearer the 
truth when he said, ten years later, that Helmichius and his
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colleagues had been dismissed, not because of any 'wrongdoing or 
faults in (their) doctrine or lives, but purely for political 
considerations'.(77) The members of the consistorial congregation, 
however, did not welcome the new moderate ministers imported from
Holland by the city council, with Oldenbarnevelt's help, and stayed
away from church. They preferred to attend secret conventicles, or to 
travel to Ysselstein (a nearby independent lordship held by the Orange
family, and ecclesiastically a part of South Holland) to hear what 
they considered to be true Reformed preaching.(78) They took their 
grievance to Maurice of Nassau, the new Stadholder, but the Estates 
advised him to refuse the request of 'some calling themselves elders 
and deacons of the Reformed Church in Utrecht'. According to the 
authorities, the new ministers were known to be upright in their 
personal lives and to preach the true Christian religion, which the 
magistrates had solemnly sworn to maintain. Any objections to these 
ministers, therefore, 'spring not from Christian zeal, but from
obstinacy'. In fact, at least two of them, Johannes Gerobolus and 
Gerard Blockhoven, were hardly orthodox in their views.(79)
The installation of these amenable new ministers was evidence of 
the Estates' intention to assert their authority once and for all over 
the Reformed Church in the Sticht. Their chosen instrument was the 
Church Ordinance of 1590, which put the power to call ministers and to 
appoint elders and deacons entirely into the hands of the Estates, the 
magistrates of the towns and lay patrons in the countryside. Meetings 
of the kirk sessions and the appointment of schoolmasters were 
similarly placed under secular control. Finally, no meeting of a 
classis or synod was to be held without the Estates'
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authorisation.(80)
At the same time, and in the same spirit, the Estates and the 
city council issued a number of placards against illegal religious 
services, showing how seriously they regarded such widespread flouting 
of their authority by those who attended the conventicles.(81) In 
1593, the discontented consistorial congregation appealed for help to 
the synod of South Holland. This resulted in an invitation from the 
city council to Johan Uyttenbogaert and Franciscus Junius, known for 
their moderate opinions, (though the former had been dismissed with 
his consistorial colleagues in 1589), to act as mediators. Although 
Uyttenbogaert clearly disapproved of Gerobolus' doctrinal position, he 
counselled the Utrecht congregation to behave with modesty and 
prudence for the time being.(82) Uyttenbogaert and Junius were able to 
achieve a compromise in one provision of the 1590 ordinance; the call 
to a new minister was thenceforward to be made by a committee of four 
magistrates and four ministers or elders of the Reformed Church, and 
not by the secular powers alone. Thanks to their efforts, many people 
were reconciled to the established Church, but 'no small number' 
remained outside the fold. Two predikanten from the Palatinate, 
presumably strict Calvinists, were called to Utrecht to serve these 
hard-liners, who were the most ready to respond to the appeal of 
Counter-Remonstrant1sm in the early seventeenth century.(83)
To fulfil their responsibility to the Church outside the towns, 
the Estates appointed a commission in 1593 to report on the state of 
religion in the countryside. Its members belonged to the 
'latitudinarian' wing of the Utrecht Church: besides the ministers
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Gerobolus and Blockhoven, the lay commissioners were Hendrik Buth and
Frederick van Zuylen van Nyevelt, respectively prominent members of
the Geeligeerden and the Ridderschap. Their findings show how little 
success the efforts of the authorities to spread the Reformation had 
enjoyed. Of a total of forty-eight clergymen in the villages of the 
Sticht, only twenty were approved by the commission; eight, including 
one who baptised in the Lutheran manner, were prepared to adopt 
Reformed teaching and practice; six would have to be allowed to 
continue in their posts for want of anyone to replace them; and 
fourteen - that is, nearly 30 percent - were wholly unsuitable. These 
last ranged from a Flemish friar in the village of 't Goy who wished 
'to keep to the old ways and the oath he had taken to his bishop', to 
a Catholic exorcist at De Meern, who claimed to have given up
preaching after two or three sermons. Even the approved ministers 
were competing in many cases with priests who conducted Catholic 
marriages and baptisms and held Mass in secret. In Abcoude there 
were still candles on the altars, and in the notoriously Catholic 
district of the Proostdij of St. Jan, the Reformed inhabitants of 
Wilnis had to cross the border into Holland to attend services.(84)
Ten years later, Sasbout Vosmeer, the Catholic vicar-apostolic, was
pleased to report that Catholic services were taking place in broad
daylight, and in full view of the Reformed ministers, while in the 
early 1600s, dozens of people went on an annual pilgrimage to the 
Virgin Mary in Kockengen. Nor was this the case only in the 
countryside; from the 1630s onwards, the Catholics of Wijk were served 
by a Jesuit priest of the local gentry family of Rhede van Amerongen, 
despite all efforts to drive him out of the town.(85)
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Yet Reformed Protestantism in the Sticht was very slow to 
organise itself to combat this threat, partly because the spirit of 
Hubert Duifhuis lingered on, and partly because of the Estates' 
determined opposition to the idea of Calvinist organisation. The 
first provincial synod, which was not held until 1606, was actually 
summoned by the Estates, and was attended by a delegation of four on 
their behalf. By that time, at least, there were thirty-five active 
Reformed ministers in the province, although the synod still deplored 
the continued prevalence of Catholicism in the towns and much of the 
countryside, and called on the secular authorities to improve the 
situation.(86) The Sticht was not divided into classes, to compare 
with other provinces, until August 1619, in the aftermath of the Synod
of Dordrecht, when the Counter-Remonstrant Calvinism of those who had 
supported Modet and his colleagues triumphed over the Remonstrant 
heirs of Duifhuis.(87)
The developments outlined above had profound implications for the 
province's political life, and were a constant source of conflicts 
between and within the different political communities, as well as 
between the civil authorities and institutions of both religions. The 
city council, for example, struggled to assert itself against the kirk 
sessions and the consistorial predikanten, by affirming its right to 
appoint and dismiss ministers. The magistrates failed, however, in 
December 1584, to dismiss Herman Modet, always a disturbing element in 
the body politic, on the ostensible grounds of his age and 
indisposition (he was perhaps 64, although there is considerable doubt 
about his date of birth and he may have been much younger[88]). This
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failure no doubt reinforced the city council's Erastian views, which 
were fully expressed in the Church ordinance of 1590.
For their part, the predikanten looked to the 'godly magistrate' 
to 'uphold the true worship of God and to prevent and root out 
idolatry and false religion, and to overthrow the kingdom of the 
anti-Christ'.(89) To achieve this end, they could use popular
agitation to put pressure on the Estates and the city council; indeed, 
each stage along the route to the exclusive domination of
Protestantism was marked by the authorities' declaration of the need 
to maintain public order.(90) The 'libertines' of the city council
found this excuse turned against them, when the ardently Reformed 
burgerhoplieden justified the expulsions of July 1586 by saying that 
they had acted to 'remove the causes of the misunderstandings,
bitternesses and dissensions that were about to be sown among the 
citizens'.(91)
On the other hand, the threat 'that some commotion by the people 
in the city might take place' could be a useful tool for the city 
council in their efforts to subdue the five chapters' resistance to, 
for example, the ordinance on ecclesiastical property.(92) There can 
be no doubt that the authorities seized the opportunity given by the 
Reformation to put an end to the legal immunities still enjoyed by the 
members of the chapters; henceforward, for instance, they would have 
to keep watch on the city walls like ordinary citizens, or pay someone 
to take their place. No longer were the five colleges to occupy a 
special position, as a 'state within a state'.(93) They were even 
forced to pay 1,400 guilders a year, to maintain the city's Reformed
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ministers, from the money previously used to provide wine, oil and 
candles for the Mass, because 'no one had any advantage or profit from 
this, nor was God served by it'. The canons protested that wax, wine 
and oil cost them no more than 900 or at most 1,000 guilders each 
year, but in vain; indeed, the Prouninck régime forced them to double 
this contribution to the furtherance of the Reformation.(94)
The appointment of relatives of members of the Ridderschap and 
the city council to prebends which fell vacant through death or 
confiscation was another method of keeping the chapters in line, as 
well as a means of ensuring a sufficient supply of suitably qualified 
Reformed Protestants for the Estates' service.(95) It must be said, 
however, that these new canons did not always fulfil the conditions 
laid down in August 1580 for the admission to prebends; one man was 
admitted to St. Pieter, for example, 'provided he shall renounce the 
Roman religion', in spite of the Ridderschap's opinion that he was 
unsuitable and politically suspect. Other prebends were awarded to 
boys under the age of eighteen - the nephew of a canon of the Dorn, and 
the son of a leading member of the Ridderschap, for instance - whose 
potential political service to the Estates lay very much in the 
future.(96) Under the Prouninck régime, however, a determined effort 
was made to ensure that prebends were conferred only on men of 
orthodox Protestant views and the correct political allegiance.(97)
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The presentation to prebends was one form of patronage that could 
be used to further the Reformation; the ius patronatus laicalis (that 
is, the right held by local lords to appoint ministers in the 
villages) posed other problems for the Estates, of which the village 
of Maarssen is a good example. Here the Estates came into conflict 
with Gerrit van Zoudenbalch, lord of Urk, a prominent member of the 
Ridderschap (among other things, he was dijkgraaf of the Lekdijk). In 
1583, without the Estates' permission, he appointed a minister who had 
left his previous living because he did not have the Estates'
approval. The Standing Committee, who were responsible for the 
appointment of ministers, provisionally allowed this man to preach in
Maarssen over Easter 1583, but were later informed that his doctrines 
did not conform to the placard which stipulated how the Scriptures 
were to be expounded. A replacement, one Pieter Daemsz, was appointed 
by the Standing Committee: at this point, Urk took possession of the
keys of the church, to prevent Pieter Daemsz from preaching there. 
The Standing Committee ordered the deputy Marshal of the 
Nederkwartier, in which Maarssen lay, to use whatever means necessary
to open the church door, so that the villagers might hear the Gospel; 
Urk was told to let Pieter Daemsz preach in peace. The former 
minister remained in the neighbourhood, however, baptising children 
and turning the villagers against the new incumbent, to such an extent 
that the supporters of the rival ministers came to blows, and at least 
one man was seriously wounded. The Marshal, it appears, succeeded in 
restoring order, and Pieter Daemsz continued to preach at Maarssen 
until he was suspended from his post by the Standing Committee in 
1587, because he was not Calvinist enough for the Prouninck
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government's more stringent standards.(98) When Urk returned from 
exile in 1588, he promptly installed another minister, who later 
refused to submit himself to the Estates' examination on doctrine.(99)
The report of the 1593 commissioners shows clearly how many of 
the 'unsuitable' ministers in the countryside had been appointed by 
lay patrons, or by the five chapters in the many villages where they
held the rights of patronage. Yet even in the strictly Calvinist 
atmosphere of 1587, the Estates preserved the appearance, at least, of 
presentation by patrons, allowing them to put forward candidates for 
vacant livings, who must then be approved by the Estates - and not by 
the consistory. This decision naturally outraged the Calvinist 
predikanten in the city, who accused the lay authorities of 'usurping' 
too much authority over the Church: the ius patronatus was 'unsound
and instituted by Papists', and 'directly contrary to the word of God 
[and]...the Church ordinance of these provinces' (that is, the Hague 
ordinance of 1586).(100) Nevertheless, the limited rights of patrons 
remained in force for the time being, and the series of clerical 
appointments in the spring of 1589 wed a complete return to the 
powers previously enjoyed 'by lay patrons: so much so, that the Estates 
declared in January 1590 that town magistrates should have patronage 
rights equivalent to those possessed by lords in the country.(101)
The Estates were quite willing to allow the town councils to 
appoint their own ministers: on the other hand, they did not wish them 
to administer the ecclesiastical property within the towns' 
boundaries. The long-running dispute on this question provides an
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illustration of one way in which the side-effects (so to speak) of the 
Reformation divided the political communities in the Sticht.
The issue was first raised in February 1579, following the Union 
of Utrecht, which provided for the maintenance of monks and nuns who 
left their religious houses, from the funds of those institutions. 
The city council was quick to assume responsibility for this task, and 
warned the Estates not to interfere.(102) Shortly afterwards the city 
council received the support of the town council of Amersfoort, after 
the siege which compelled it to sign the Union.(103) Thereafter, the 
towns claimed the right to administer all the property of all
religious houses (except the five chapters) situated within their
jurisdiction: indeed, the city council began to exercise this right
even before the Union, with the sale of the moveable goods of the 
expelled Franciscans: again, this was done to prevent disorder and
looting.(104)
The other two Estates, however, argued that since the greater 
part of all ecclesiastical property was actually situated outside the 
towns' jurisdictions, in the countryside, its administration ought to 
be the responsibility of the Estates.(105) They had sound practical 
reasons for this attitude: if the Sticht towns succeeded in achieving
control over their ecclesiastical property, other towns, in other 
provinces, might follow suit and secularise property within their 
boundaries which belonged to Utrecht's religious houses, and the
Estates would thus lose a great deal of potential revenue.(106) This
fear perhaps explains the severe measures, including seizure of the 
personal property of the magistrates and citizens, which the Estates
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threatened to take against the town council of Wijk, if it did not 
co-operate over the property of the chapter of St. John the 
Baptist.(107) To gain their ends, the Estates tried to play the city 
off against the small towns, but ecclesiastical property was one of 
the few issues where this was not possible, since all the towns were 
equally determined to resist the Estates' encroachments.(108) 
Amersfoort, in particular, angered the first two Estates by calling on 
outside authorities, such as Orange or Leicester, for support: in
1582, for example, Paulus Buys, acting for Orange, appointed one 
Herman Jansz as the steward of convent property in the town, and gave 
him a commission which, the Standing Committee contended, had been 
'surreptitiously' obtained from the Stadholder without the Estates' 
knowledge or consent: the property ought to come under the
administration of the Estates' commission for ecclesiastical
property.(109) Even the appointment of a member of the Amersfoort town
council as steward of the province's ecclesiastical property did not
sway the rest of the magistrates, who remained firm in their 
determination to keep the town's religious houses under their 
control. In this they had Leicester's support, since the 
ecclesiastical property revenues were one of the few financial
resources the Estates would not hand over to the 
Governor-General.(110) Nor did the situation change after 
September 1588: Amersfoort still refused to let the Estates take over, 
and there was very little the Estates could do about it.(Ill)
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The Amersfoort magistrates were, however, divided among
themselves on the policy to be followed with regard to the Reformation 
of the municipal orphanage. The majority, who were 'of the Reformed 
religion', decided that the children should be made to attend Reformed 
services every Sunday, but this decision was opposed by a vocal 
minority of the council, whose spokesman 'thinks that no one should be
forced [to go] to the service, but everyone should be left with 
freedom of conscience'.(112) In this case, the 'libertine' section of 
the magistracy appealed to the Estates for support, but without 
success. Instead, the Estates backed the majority, and the orphans 
were sent to church willy-nilly, even though that entailed the
dismissal of the orphanage superintendents.(113)
A more striking illustration of the Reformation's effects on 
relations between the Estates and one of their component parts is 
provided by Montfoort. In the early stages of Protestantism's
advance, the Catholics in Utrecht looked to the Burggraaf as their 
natural leader, although he could not prevent the Calvinists from 
being given a church, and expelled priests were 'none too welcome' 
even in this Catholic refuge.(114) Yet the town's peculiar position, 
and the prestige and privileges enjoyed by the Burggraaf as the 
Sticht's first noble, enabled Montfoort to resist the Reformation with 
a great deal of success. Both the Estates and the Calvinist
predikanten in the city were alarmed about Montfoort's spiritual 
state, while the Estates also resented the ease with which one town 
could thus evade their authority. As the Standing Committee put it; 
'it is too great a scandal that only one town in all the united
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Netherlands should allow the exercise of the Roman religion'.(115) 
Neither the Burggraaf nor the magistracy responded to orders from the 
Estates to dismiss a 'chaplain' who was holding Mass daily in the 
town; the Marshal of the Montfoort quarter was reluctant to stamp out 
the Catholic services, complete with candles and images, which were 
being held in the town's church.(116) In 1586, one sympathiser with 
Leicester described the people of Montfoort as 'open Papists and ill 
enclyned'; even by 1588, it appears that there were not enough 
respectable Protestants to fill the town council: the Standing
Committee asked Nieuwenaar to appoint men of the Reformed religion 'or 
at least those who are not its enemies'.(117)
The Calvinist clergy were no more successful in introducing 
Reform to Montfoort. One of the first ministers to be called there 
was rumoured to be a Lutheran; another, of whom Modet and his 
colleagues approved, deserted his flock, and 'exposed them as the prey 
of the wolf'. In place of this Mathias Dijckman, the Estates 
preferred one Henricus Bulckius, who was quite unacceptable to the 
predikanten; he had been recognised as a heretic in Holland, and 
Helmichius called him a Pelagian.(118) The next predikant, Abraham 
Jansz, was so unpopular that a number of the inhabitants attacked his 
door at the beginning of Lent because he would not drink with them to 
honour Bacchus.(119) In 1593, the incumbent at Montfoort was described 
as 'a person who has not only been publicly expelled as a rotten 
member of the body of Christ's community here in Utrecht, for his 
continual and incurable godless evil life (which has never been 
tolerated in any Church, not even by Papistry), but also still behaves 
as a common vagrant, to the great scandal and disparagement of the
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government of this province'.(120) Given the poor quality of the 
Reformed clergy, and the town's reluctance to pay them a full salary, 
it is hardly surprising that as late as 1606 there were only thirty 
Reformed communicants in Montfoort.(121)
At the same time as the Estates were putting pressure on the 
towns to advance the Reformation, they were themselves under similar 
pressure from outside. Their resentment of Holland's interference in 
the Sticht's religious affairs is described below (Chapter VI, pp.
176-177). Likewise, the Estates opposed a move by their allies 'east 
of the Maas' to alter article 13 of the Union of Utrecht to the effect 
that religious changes could be made by one province only with the
consent of the others. And the Estates were not prepared to impose
the penalty of banishment, suggested by the allies, on those who would 
not take the oath to maintain the Union stipulated by articles 24 and
25 for all office-holders in the United Provinces: they feared the
trouble which would arise 'if we wished to force those of the Roman
religion, of whom there are still many in the province, to swear
against their conscience to uphold the Union'.(122)
This resolution displays two aspects of the Estates' approach to 
the Reformation: their determination to keep it under their own
control, and their comparative tolerance towards the Catholic 
population. Provincial governments had an essential role to play in 
the spread of the Reformation, since the decisions of even a national 
Church synod had no force until they had been ratified by the Estates 
of the individual provinces. In fact, the civil authorities were
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virtually in a position to decide Christian doctrine (123), and in 
Utrecht they resented any interference, whether it came from 
neighbouring provinces or their own consistory. The government in 
Utrecht was by no means alone in its Erastian attitude towards the 
Reformed Church: even in Holland, the civil authorities rarely gave
the Church their fullest support.(124) In their religious policy, the 
Estates tried to steer a middle course between the available 
extremes. There seem to have been few zealous Catholics in positions 
of authority, or even in the five chapters.(125) Certainly, as early 
as November 1576, no profound respect for the Archbishop's office
hindered the Estates from commandeering nearly 42,000 guilders in cash 
from his palace and some 20,000 guilders worth of his silver, to 
rescue them temporarily from their financial difficulties.(126) This 
middle course also involved a certain tolerance towards Catholics, 
unless they represented a positive political danger, or unless popular 
pressure to take action against them became too great. The 
predikanten naturally, and probably correctly, attributed this 
tolerance to a lack of genuine Protestant conviction in the members of 
the Estates: 'among all the nobles, there is not one who makes proper
profession of the Religion, and for the most part they are its 
enemies'.(127) Between 1586 and 1588, however, the Calvinist Church 
and the civil authorities worked together to impose orthodox Calvinism 
on the Sticht, but two years were not long enough to make much headway 
against the province's general indifference to Calvinism, in spite of 
the absence in exile of most of the leading parishioners of St. 
Jacob. When the exiles returned, they were determined not to let 
themselves be governed by the 'new monks' under Modet, 'a Pope of 
Geneva, not of Rome'.(128) This determination was expressed in the
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Church ordinance of 1590, and in the six articles drawn up by the city 
council in the same year, governing baptism, communion and marriage, 
examination, discipline and preaching. All ministers were ordered to 
sign these articles, which committed them to the pursuit of the 
Reformation very much in the spirit of Duifhuis and St. Jacob.(129) 
Once again, official policy was what has been called 
'de-Catholicisation' by degrees, rather than 'Calvinisation' by 
edict.(130) The relationship of Church and State was dominated by the 




The Estates and the outside world 
VI.i Utrecht and the central institutions
On 23 January 1579, delegates of the Estates of Utrecht were 
among those, along with representatives of Holland, Zeeland, 
Gelderland and the Oramelanden of Groningen, who signed the Union of 
Utrecht with the avowed intention of strengthening the alliance 
established in 1576 by the Pacification of Ghent. Henceforth, the 
signatories of the Union were known as the 'Provinces of the Closer 
Union' (Nadere Geunieerde Provincien), or, more simply, as the 
'allies' (bondgenoten). But, for all its good intentions, the Treaty 
of Union encapsulated the essential paradox which bedevilled relations 
between the provinces for over 200 years; article 1 states that 'the 
aforesaid provinces shall ally, confederate and unite - and are 
allying, confederating and uniting herewith - to hold together 
externally as if they were but one province...however, this is agreed 
without prejudice to the special and particular privileges, freedoms, 
exemptions, laws, statutes, laudable and traditional customs, usages 
and all other rights of each province, and of each town, member and 
inhabitant of those provinces'.(1) The story of Utrecht's relationship 
with its fellow United Provinces is a pointed illustration of the 
difficulty of reconciling the common cause with provincial interests.
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Since coming under Habsburg rule in 1528, Utrecht had always 
emphasised that it was different from the 'patrimonial' provinces 
(Holland, Zeeland, Brabant, and so on) which Charles V had inherited 
from his Burgundian grandmother.(2) Under the Habsburgs, Utrecht and 
the other non-patrimonial provinces, such as Overijssel and 
Gelderland, defended their autonomy against the Brussels government as 
far as possible, sheltering behind their remaining privileges.(3) Not 
surprisingly. Orange's instruction as Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland 
and Utrecht in 1559 reminded him always to 'bear in mind that 
[Utrecht] is newly acquired'.(4) This sense of a separate identity 
continued to influence the Estates' thinking: the Sticht entered into
the negotiations for the Pacification of Ghent only on condition that 
Utrecht retained its 'right to be considered and counted with the 
other newly-acquired provinces', and even after the Estates had signed 
the Pacification, they protested to the Estates-General against being 
treated on the same basis as the rest of the provinces.(5) Later 
still, Utrecht's separate status was a useful argument against the 
acceptance of the Duke of Anjou as sovereign lord.(6)
Nevertheless, the Sticht's adherence to the Pacification and the 
Union of Brussels, its acknowledgement of William of Orange as 
Stadholder, and its signing of the 'Closer Union' of Utrecht, meant 
that the province's fate was bound up with that of its allies. By the 
same token the Estates were required perforce to take part in the 
business of the Estates-General, and all the various bodies that were 
created to conduct the government of the provinces in the late 1570s 
and 1580s: the College of the Closer Union and its successor the
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Landraad, as well as the various Councils of State.(7)
From its earliest dealings with these bodies, Utrecht's attitude 
to them was ambivalent. At times it seemed as if the price for the 
help and support to be gained from union with the other provinces was 
too high. The Estates-General had hardly met in the autumn of 1576 
before they wanted money from the Sticht; the Estates of Utrecht were 
'amazed' at a request for a Hundredth Penny tax, similar to that 
levied by Alva, and it seemed as if the Estates-General would give 
nothing in return.(8) Despite Utrecht's frequent appeals for money to 
pay off the German and Walloon troops in the city and to carry on the 
siege of the castle of Vredenburg, the Estates-General did nothing but 
raise the soldiers' hopes with false promises they were not prepared 
to fulfil.(9) In the months after the Pacification, the correspondence 
between the Estates and their representatives in Brussels showed the 
angry disillusionment felt in Utrecht at the central government's 
neglect: the Estates-General 'pay no attention to what is far away
from them, but are interested only in what is before their eyes' - so 
much so that to point out the Sticht's plight was 'like knocking on a 
deaf man's door'.(10) Most wounding of all, perhaps, the delegates to 
the Estates-General would merely shrug their shoulders in response to 
Utrecht's pleas and say, 'it's a great pity'.(11) If Utrecht wanted 
help from Brussels, it must first introduce the new 'general tax' 
(generale middelen)(12). Nor did the Estates-General and the Council 
of State provide the political guidance which Utrecht sought on the 
question of the Satisfaction in 1577 (see pp. 15-16 above).
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Notwithstanding its initial disappointments about the benefits of 
alliance with the other provinces, Utrecht took an early part in the 
preliminary negotiations for a Closer Union in the summer of 1578. 
Indeed, the very phrase 'as if they were but one province' in the
final text was derived from a memorandum drafted by Floris Thin, the
oEstates' advocate, and a delegation from Utrecht was instrumental in 
persuading the Landdag of Gelderland to favour the negotiations.(13) 
As already mentioned in Chapter II, however, support for the Closer 
Union was far from unanimous within the Sticht's political community. 
First of all, Jacob Cuynretorff and his fellow conspirators had to be 
detained until the treaty was signed. Then, in March 1579, Amersfoort 
had to be forced to accede to the Union by John of Nassau's siege, 
which was not likely to inspire wholehearted support for the new 
order, and in any case led to a dispute about whether the Estates or
the town would defray the expenses of the siege.
Relations between Utrecht and the Provinces of the Closer Union 
did not improve with the years. Demands from the central government
for money became increasingly urgent as the war progressed and the 
contributions received from Flanders and Brabant fell drastically. 
These demands were the more resented because they sometimes seemed to
ignore the time-honoured rights and privileges which had been
guaranteed by the Union of Utrecht: even in 1579, for instance, the
Provinces of the Closer Union, in an effort to find 600 cavalry for 
Count Rennenberg, renounced, for the provinces and their inhabitants 
'excuses and all other exceptions, favours, privileges, reliefs and 
assistance of laws' which might stand in the way of the efficient
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collection of the required sums.(14) Moreover, the College was 
prepared to use whatever methods were necessary to constrain unwilling 
provinces to pay up.(15) The Estates' records are full of protests to 
the effect that they simply could not produce the sums demanded of 
them, while if they did consent to 'allow the revenues raised here to 
go out of their own hands', it was always on condition that the other 
provinces did likewise. Nor would they ever consider increasing their 
contribution to the gemene zaak unless their allies did the same.(16) 
Since the rest of the provinces made similar stipulations, it is not 
surprising that delays in collecting the quotas were frequent.
There was one exception to this general rule, however: the
Landraad to the east of the Maas, which was set up in 1581, at the 
time of the Abjuration of Philip II, to act as the executive in the 
absence of Anjou. After a year's bargaining, the Estates gave their 
support to the establishment of this latest Council, though originally 
Gelderland, Utrecht and Overijssel had urged that a quite separate 
government should be set up for the eastern provinces: they argued
that since the war was now being fought as much in Friesland, 
Gelderland and Overijssel as in Brabant and Flanders, there should be 
a government resident in the north-east, to co-ordinate the war effort 
and to ensure that the Sticht's money was not spent only in defence of
the south.(17) Orange's threat to resign finally persuaded the three 
eastern provinces to agree to a single Landraad, whose jurisdiction 
was divided at the Maas, but the Estates' preference for a separate 
authority was confirmed by the news of the French Fury at Antwerp in 
January 1583.(18) Despite occasional doubts about the accuracy of the 
Landraad's accounts, Utrecht was the only province to come to its aid
- 157 -
September 1583, with a much-needed loan of 3,000 guilders.(19) The 
Estates' generosity went unrewarded, however: seven years later, they 
were still pressing for the repayment of the loan, and indeed claiming 
that the Generality owed them between 60,000 and 70,000 guilders on 
the Landraad's behalf.(20)
Apart from financial demands, the bodies of central government 
made other claims on Utrecht's time and resources. The 
Estates-General continually urged the Estates to send their deputies 
'with full powers and absolute authorisation' to decide and resolve 
matters 'without its being necessary to write back or receive a fuller 
commission from you'.(21) The practice of ruggespraak, or referring 
back for authorisation to vote, is perhaps the most outstanding 
example of the practical problems forced upon the United Provinces by 
the very liberties for which they were fighting.(22) Like their 
fellows in the other provinces, the Estates of Utrecht usually 
insisted on the observance of ruggespraak by their delegates to the 
Estates-General, particularly where money was involved. At the same 
time, within the Sticht, the representatives of the three individual 
Estates insisted on consulting their principals in their turn. Both
at provincial and national level, this helped to protract the 
proceedings and reduce the effectiveness of all organs of government. 
Only very occasionally would the Estates empower their delegates to 
take decisions without reference to themselves, as they did just 
before Leicester's arrival in November 1585.(23) Even in moments of 
national emergency, the Estates were very wary of letting their 
delegates off the leash: in the confusion following Orange's
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assassination in July 1584, they responded guardedly to a call from 
Holland to strengthen the bond between Holland, ' Zeeland and Utrecht, 
by sending plenipotentiaries to a meeting in Delft. At first the 
Estates said that it would not be suitable to give anyone powers to 
decide on the government of the country, especially since 'nobody of 
intelligence could be found in the said province who would wish or 
would dare to accept such absolute power'.(24) A week later, however, 
the Estates did grant their four deputies 'absolute and complete 
power', with the proviso that 'if time allows', the deputies must 
still consult their masters.(25) The Estates thought that the need for 
full powers was further reduced when the Estates-General took up 
permanent residence in the Hague, only '11 miles' from Utrecht, so 
that communication became quite easy.(26) In fact, letters from the 
Hague could take three or four days to reach Utrecht, and presumably 
took as long in the opposite direction, not counting the time occupied 
by the Estates' deliberations, so that ruggespraak could mean delays 
of up to two weeks in the Estates-General's business.
But the Estates could only insist on consultation with their 
deputies when they had actually sent deputies in the first place, and 
very often they were reluctant even to do that. It was expensive to 
maintain permanent representatives on the various governmental bodies : 
hence, for example, the Ridderschap's objections to the Sticht having 
a representative at the Landraad to the west of the Maas, and the 
reduction from two men to one of Utrecht's delegation to the Landraad
on its own side of the river in 1584.(27) Furthermore, the members of 
the Estates were frequently unwilling to serve on these bodies for 
long periods, and would refuse to accept the Estates' commissions.
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protesting their unworthiness for the responsibility or stating that 
they would not serve alone. If they did grudgingly agree to represent 
their province, it would usually be for a maximum length of time, 
sometimes one month, sometimes three.(28) This reluctance can be 
understood in some cases, depending on the destination involved: the
Estates' representatives at Nieuwenaar's funeral in Arnhem in 1589 
were told to take their own precautions against capture by the 
enemy.(29)
On the other hand, not all the Estates' deputies were like
Frederick Uten Eng, who wrote from Brussels in November 1577, asking
for his recall on the grounds that he had not brought his winter
clothes with him when he arrived at the beginning of October.(30) 
Several members of the Estates served as officials of the central 
authorities: the lord of Brakel, for example, was the first
receiver-general of the Provinces of the Closer Union, and Johan van 
Renesse, lord of Wilp, was their commissioner-general in charge of 
arms and ammunition.(31) Floris Heermale, one of the most regular 
delegates to the Estates-General, occasionally even received payment 
for his services.(32)
Membership of the Estates-General and the Union of Utrecht also 
entailed maintaining their troops and suffering from the depredations 
of unpaid companies. For much of the period, indeed, it seems as if 
the Estates spent more time and effort in trying to free the province 
of their own side's troops than in trying to resist the enemy. The 
higher authorities continued to billet large numbers of troops on the
— 160 —
province, despite protests that the army treated Utrecht's rural 
population worse than the Spaniards had.(33) The Estates used the 
billeting of troops to justify reductions in their contribution to the 
gemene zaak as compared to other provinces which did not presently 
suffer as much in this way and had not been equally devastated in the 
1570s.(34) A similar resentment was an important element in the 
Sticht's relationship with its eastern neighbour, Gelderland, which 
was considered too poor to make any regular contribution to the 
central finances. Amersfoort, in particular, situated close to the 
frontier with Gelderland, and subject to much the same conditions, 
complained bitterly of losing its trade and industry to lower-taxed 
places across the border, and frequently petitioned, without success, 
to be freed from its obligations to the central treasury.(35)
In general, the Estates believed that the central authorities did 
not understand or sympathise with Utrecht's circumstances. This 
feeling is reflected in the recurrent attempts, particularly from 1586 
to 1588, to induce the Council of State to move its seat to towns 
nearer the front line than those of Holland and Zeeland, such as 
Deventer, Arnhem, or Utrecht itself, where the Council could better 
appreciate the military situation and at the same time be removed from 
Holland's influence.(36) Part of the Landraad's attraction for the 
Estates undoubtedly lay in its practice of meeting in Utrecht or other 
suitable venues such as Wageningen. (37) What is more, the 
Estates-General met in Utrecht in April and May 1586, in deference to 
Leicester.(38) But, for the most part, the Estates' attitude was 
indicated by their comments on the 1588 instruction for the Council of 
State, which laid down that it shoüld meet wherever was best for the
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good of the provinces; the Estates expressed their disapproval of the 
advantages accruing to Holland from the Council's permanent residence 
there.(39) This feeling had existed before the Prouninck regime 
(immediately after Orange's death in 1584, the Estates did not think
Delft a suitable location for a council to direct the war) and it 
lasted beyond Prouninck's fall in 1588, when the Estates were still 
reluctant to send deputies to the Council of State unless it moved 
nearer the fighting.(40) In 1590, the suggested meeting places 
included Harderwijk, Wageningen, Amersfoort and Wijk; if the Council 
did not act on this suggestion, the Estates threatened, Utrecht and
its neighbours would have to take defence measures of their own. 
(Gelderland, for instance, clearly shared the Sticht's sense of 
neglect.[41]) Yet at the same time, the Estates were quite prepared, 
on the one hand, to connive at the Overkwartier's secret evasion of 
the Estates-General's placard forbidding the payment of protection 
money to the enemy, while on the other they assured the world that 
they intended to do nothing without the Estates-General's knowledge 
and consent.(42) After all, since 1576, the Hague was not likely to be 
devastated by the enemy.
In short, Utrecht strongly resented interference of any sort from 
above, even when it came from Orange in his capacity as Stadholder: he 
had no more success than the Estates-General in persuading the Estates 
to part with delegates or money. Moreover, his efforts to influence 
two important provincial appointments in 1579 aroused ill-feeling in
the Sticht, especially as the Satisfaction laid down that offices in 
the Stadholder's gift should be conferred only with the advice of the 
Estates.(43) In the first case. Orange won: his nominee, Willem de
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Kidder van Groenesteyn, was made Marshal of the Overkwartier, despite 
the Estates' preference for Frederick van Zuylen van Nyevelt, who 
eventually received the post in 1595.(44) In the other case, however, 
the Estates' candidate (their secretary, Willem van Lamsweerde) was 
appointed steward of the domains, notwithstanding sustained pressure, 
from Orange and the Archduke Mathias, in favour of Thomas Sosius, a 
member of the provincial Hof.(45) The Estates went so far as to order 
the Sticht's administrative divisions to recognise Lamsweerde and to 
ignore any instructions they might receive from the Hof in support of 
Sosius.(46) By January 1581, Lamsweerde was being referred to as the 
steward (rentmeester), and later in the same year Orange tacitly 
admitted defeat by suggesting that Sosius should become President of 
the Hof, instead.(47)
Not all aspects of the relationship between Utrecht and the 
higher authorities were negative, however; the province accepted the 
arbitration of delegates from Orange or from the Council of State in 
internal disputes, and appealed for help in possibly awkward dealings 
with foreign governments, such as the Duke of Cleves, or neighbours 
within the Union, like the Count of Culemborg.(48) Even the Prouninck 
regime, normally at odds with all institutions based in Holland, 
occasionally found it expedient to work through the proper 
Estates-General assembly, whether it was to prevent a reduction of 
Leicester's authority or to object to the proposed peace talks with 
Parma.(49) Nor must it be forgotten that the Sticht did contribute to 
the gemene zaak - albeit grudgingly and usually late - a proportion of 
its income which approached 80 percent.(50) And the Estates could
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never forget that Utrecht, 'being a small province and situated in the 
middle of the said [united] provinces, could not maintain itself 
without them'.(51)
A reasonable working relationship thus seems to have existed 
until November 1586, when a serious break occurred in the relations 
between Utrecht and all governmental bodies except those connected 
with Queen Elizabeth and the Earl of Leicester. This was the 
Estates-General's famous refusal to admit Gerard Prouninck van 
Deventer as Utrecht's delegate, on the grounds that he had been 
unlawfully appointed burgomaster of the city by Leicester. In this 
instance, the Estates-General posed as the champion of provincial 
privileges according to the Union, in order to exclude one of 
Leicester's most dedicated adherents from their assembly.(52) The 
consequent wrangles within the Sticht over Utrecht's representation in 
the Estates-General lasted until early in 1587, when two new 
delegates, Gerard van Dompselaer and Johan van den Berg, took their 
seats. Although these men were, as far as can be established, loyal 
supporters of the Prouninck régime, the Estates seem to have kept them 
on a tighter rein than usual, except for granting them full powers to 
deal with the new English ambassador. Lord Buckhurst; the Queen must 
not be offended by any delays on Utrecht's part.(53)
At the same time, the Sticht made several attempts to circumvent 
the Estates-General proper, by bringing the eastern provinces closer 
together to discuss their common problems of defence and the security 
of the borders at meetings held in Utrecht.(54) Although Holland and 
Zeeland did not for the most part respond to the invitations sent to
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them, the unoccupied sections of Gelderland and Overijssel sent 
delegations (in spite of some support for reconciliation with the king 
among clerical circles in Overijssel). IVhat is more, Dordrecht in 
Holland and Oostergo in Friesland were known to be in correspondence 
with Prouninck.(55) The Estates-General reacted angrily to the form of 
address used in Utrecht's letters; 'the deputies of the 
Estates-General of the United Netherlands provinces', and pointed out 
that they, and they alone, were the proper forum for the discussion of 
such problems. They then took action by arresting Hessel Aysma, the 
President of the Hof of Friesland, for allegedly treasonable dealings 
with Prouninck.(56) Fears of an alternative assembly persisted for 
several months, and the eastern provinces were again in separate 
communication a year later, in the spring of 1588, when the enemy had 
invaded the Sticht as far as the gates of Amersfoort.(57)
Whether or not this activity can be ascribed, as Bor surmised, to
Prouninck's desire to be revenged on the Estates-General for his 
exclusion, there can be no doubt that it gave some contemporary 
observers grounds for their fears that Utrecht would break away from 
the Union, and indeed go over to Spain, however much the Stichtenaars 
might protest their preference for an honourable death on the city 
walls to dishonourable life under the enemy's yoke.(58) Thomas Wilkes 
reported in December 1586 that 'all men of judgement here are of 
opinion' that the abolition of the Geeligeerden would take Utrecht in 
the direction followed by Groningen and Nijmegen - extreme Calvinism 
followed by a Catholic reaction - and 'hazard the losse of the towne 
and consequently the whole province'.(59) Yet, a year later, the 
picture could appear reversed; in February 1588, Sir Henry Killigrew
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commented that Utrecht was devoted to the Queen, and that it was 
Holland and Zeeland 'that seek to disjoin themselves from the 
rest' - by governing through the Estates-General without reference to 
England.(60)
Despite a temporary improvement in the spring of 1587, brought 
about by mediation from the Council of State and the
Estates-General,(61) relations deteriorated again over the next year,
reaching new depths early in 1588, when the Estates-General's support 
for the exiled Utrecht gentry completed the Prouninck regime's 
disillusionment with all institutions based in Holland. Both the 
Estates and the city council attacked the Estates-General in 
comprehensive terms: contrary to the Union of Utrecht, its sessions
were becoming permanent; it was usurping the authority given to the 
Council of State under the Treaty of Nonsuch; the Estates demanded
that all placards should include a statement that Utrecht had not 
consented to their publication; the Estates would order the 
inhabitants of the Sticht to disregard all orders coming from the 
central government, although they did not intend to withdraw from the 
Union.(62) The city council summed up its opinion as follows: the
Estates of the province of Utrecht 'have sovereign government no less 
than other provinces, so that no one, and therefore not even the
Estates-General, has authority over them, or the right to introduce
laws, except in matters with which they [the Estates-General] were 
expressly charged by the united provinces, after lawful convocation, 
deputation and commission: and they [the city council] do not
recognise the Estates-General since they lack such instructions'.(63)
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This theory of provincial sovereignty, however vehemently 
expressed, could not prevail at a time when Oldenbarnevelt was 
concerned to defend the sovereignty of the Estates-General even over 
that of the Estates of Holland.(64) In any case, the change of 
government achieved by Nieuwenaar's coup d'état in 1588 reversed 
Utrecht's attitude to the Estates-General and the Council of State, as 
it did so many other elements of the Sticht's affairs. In contrast to 
their previous refusal to co-operate, 'the Estates of Utrecht will 
accommodate the Estates-General in all things'; they even paid the 
expenses for Hendrick Buth, one of the disputed delegates to the 
Estates-General in 1586 to 1587.(65) Similarly, the Estates were now 
prepared to submit to the Council of State their dispute with Holland 
over the jurisdiction of the town of Oudewater, whereas before they 
had maintained that such cases should be decided by the individual 
provinces.(66)
Nevertheless, the Estates still insisted on a substantial amount 
of consultation with their delegates to the Estates-General, 
especially in financial matters, and proceedings in the Hague were 
still being held up for lack of Utrecht's resolutions.(67) Moreover, 
although the Sticht was now willing to recognise the Council of State 
as the government of the provinces, it was not until February 1590 
that Niclaes van Berck was actually delegated as Utrecht's 
representative on the Council, and his reluctance to accept the 
commission shows that the attitudes of individuals, at least, to 
central government bodies had not changed.(68) In the 1590s, it seems 
that Utrecht's representatives were likely to use the Estates-General
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and the Council of State to promote the province's own ends, contrary 
to their oath of office.(69) Fears of Utrecht's separatist tendencies 
had not entirely disappeared, but after 1590, the danger that it would 
pursue an entirely separate course from its allies was gone.(70)
VI.ii Utrecht and its 'allies'
The Estates' relations with their neighbours were not confined to 
those conducted through the Estates-General. Indeed, central
governmental institutions played only a minor role in Utrecht's
dealings with one of its closest neighbours, the county of Culemborg
and the Count, Floris van Pallant. This can to some extent be
explained by Culemborg's status outside the Union of Utrecht: the
Count had signed the Treaty in April 1579, but only for some of his 
other lordships, not for the county itself. Relations between him and 
the Estates had never been friendly: indeed, during the Regency of
Margaret of Parma, only her intercession with the king had saved 
Culemborg's lordships on the Archbishop's territory from being taken 
over by the Estates.(71) Despite the Count's rather fulsome
protestations of friendship soon after the Pacification, the quarrel 
continued throughout the 1570s and 1580s.(72) Several distinct issues 
were involved, of which two (the questions of the River Lek and the 
village of Honswijk) were long-standing disputes.
Both the Sticht and Culemborg, as well as Gelderland, claimed
sovereign rights over the stretch of the River Lek that formed the 
boundary between their respective territories,(73) with the result 
that whenever the Count had a breakwater built, projecting into the
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river, the Estates would order its demolition, claiming that it would 
cause damage to land on the Utrecht bank. The Count would then 
rebuild his breakwater, whereupon the Estates would again demolish
it. This happened at least four times in 1580-81, until the Count
seized property belonging to Stichtenaars in the Nederbetuwe district 
of Gelderland, and the Estates replied with an order that goods 
passing along the Lek to Culemborg were to be seized and taken to 
Wijk,(74) After a settlement was apparently reached in January 1582, 
the area of dispute shifted to the village of Honswijk, situated on 
the north bank of the river opposite Culemborg itself. The village 
had been in the possession of the lords of Culemborg since the 
fourteenth century, and since 1443, it had involved them in quarrels 
with the bishops, and then the Estates, of Utrecht.(75)
The Estates did not dispute the Count's claim to the high, middle 
and low jurisdiction in Honswijk, but they maintained that the village 
was on Sticht territory, paid Sticht taxes (including contributions to
the generality, from which Culemborg was free) and should therefore
not be subject to the billeting of troops.(76) Ifhen the Drost of 
Culemborg stationed cavalry in Honswijk, the village complained to the 
Estates about the troops' extortions, and the Estates gave orders for 
the troops to be put back across the river, by force if 
necessary.(77). The following year, the Count complained that Utrecht 
was exercising high jurisdiction in Honswijk, and took the matter to 
the Council of State.(78)
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The ill-feeling already in existence was exacerbated in June 1586 
when the Count and his son were arrested and held for fifteen days in 
Utrecht, apparently on Nieuwenaar's orders, because the Count would 
not admit a certain company of cavalry to Culemborg; the Standing 
Committee was afraid that if he and his son returned home, they would 
join the enemy,(79) improbable though this may seem for such an ardent
Calvinist and rebel as Floris van Pallant. After this insult, it is
hardly surprising that the Count supported the opposition to the 
government which had arrested him: he had always had a leaning towards 
England, and he became one of Leicester's most devoted adherents.(80)
Moreover, the Count was said to have had a hand in stirring up the
dispute which paralysed the Estates in the winter of 1586-87, and he 
certainly sheltered Prouninck and his fellow-exiles after 
September 1588.(81)
Nevertheless, it was during the Prouninck régime in Utrecht that 
the next stage of the quarrel began, with an order from the Estates to 
Captain Meetkerken to collect the money his men were owed by Honswijk, 
no matter what the Count might say. In return, Culemborg arrested 
three citizens of Utrecht in Buren; Utrecht then arrested citizens of 
Culemborg and their livestock in the Sticht. The danger of bloodshed 
led the Estates to call in Nieuwenaar, whose intervention brought 
about a temporary agreement, reached on neutral territory at 
Vianen.(82) The Count continued to arrest inhabitants of the Sticht, 
however, including official messengers (boden) of the Estates and the 
Hof, who (according to the Estates) were allowed to deliver legal 
summonses in Honswijk.(83) At the beginning of 1590, the Estates had
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the horses of a Honswijk man sold to pay off tax arrears, taking no 
notice of the Count's objections.(84) He took the next step by 
ordering the seizure of certain tithe crops situated in the county and 
belonging to the chapters of the Pom, Oudmunster and St. Jan, 'whom 
he calls Papists'.(85) After fruitless attempts at mediation by the 
Estates-General and the Council of State (not even Elbertus Leoninus 
could secure concessions from either side in the dispute [86]), the 
Estates authorised the chapters to collect an equivalent amount of 
grain from Honswijk, and sent a military escort to help in the 
collection of this grain, at the Steenweerd, a small island in the Lek 
between Honswijk and Culemborg. In their accounts of the ensuing 
events, each side blamed the other for precipitating the violence 
which followed; the Estates said their men had merely defended
themselves against artillery and musket fire from over the river and 
inside the Steenweerd farmhouse; the Count asserted that his tenant's 
farm had been burned down, even though his men were ready to parley,
and that 'those of Utrecht were worse enemies to him than the
Spaniards'.(87) Apart from the deaths on both sides, the treatment of
two of the prisoners taken by Utrecht in the affray stood in the way 
of a truce for some time (they complained that they were likely to die 
of cold after 28 weeks' imprisonment). Meanwhile, the Estates-General 
took Utrecht's side, and ordered Culemborg to allow the chapters full 
possession of their tithes.(88) By August 1592, it appears that both 
sides were at least prepared to negotiate, but the issue was not 
finally resolved until 1615, when the Count's son, Floris II van 
Pallant, yielded his claim to Honswijk to the Estates, in return for 
the addition to his county of the same Steenweerd, and a substantial 
annuity for himself.(89)
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Culemborg was a special case, where long-standing quarrels came 
to a head in the 1580s. It was impolitic for Utrecht to be on such 
bad terms with all its neighbours all the time, and the Estates' 
disputes with Gelderland and Friesland, for example, were on a much 
smaller scale, being limited to heated arguments with Friesland's 
deputies in the Estates-General's assembly about precedence on the 
forthcoming embassy to France: the question was decided, in Utrecht's
favour, by the drawing of lots. (90) As far as Gelderland was 
concerned, there were minor economic disagreements about the taxation 
of peat and beer;(91) apart from these, and the Sticht's resentment at 
the duchy's comparative freedom from taxation (see above, p. 160), the 
raids of troops back and forth between the two provinces were a more 
or less permanent irritant, which could not be alleviated by promises 
from the Estates or Gelderland's Landdag.(92) In contrast to the 
Estates-General and the Council of State, Gelderland had offered 
Utrecht help against the Vredenburg garrison in 1576, and during the 
1580s the Sticht's tendency towards the east became increasingly 
apparent: Holland recognised this fact when it tried to use Utrecht's
influence with Gelderland to persuade the duchy to adhere to the Union 
of Utrecht after Orange's death.(93) The same inclination is shown in 
the Estates' choice of Nieuwenaar, already the Stadholder of 
Gelderland and Overijssel, as their Stadholder, in preference to 
Maurice of Nassau, who held the same office in Holland and Zeeland. 
It was not only during the Leicester era that Gelderland, Utrecht and 
Overijssel took joint action; in November 1580, they held separate 
discussions about the forthcoming establishment of the Landraad, and
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in August 1581, they resolved to ask Anjou to appoint a deputy to 
Orange as Stadholder to administer justice and conduct the war in the 
three eastern provinces.(94) Gelderland and Overijssel shared the 
Sticht's distrust of the Holland-dominated Estates-General, and in 
fact were even more reluctant to send delegates to the Hague: 
Overijssel was completely unrepresented in the Estates-General 
throughout 1585 and 1586.(95)
The strongest bond between Utrecht and its eastern neighbours was 
their common danger from the enemy and their common problem of 
defence. Most of the meetings between representatives from Utrecht 
and Gelderland met to discuss action against Parma's forces: this was
the subject of the talks with Gelderland and Overijssel in 1587, for 
instance (see above, p. 164). The frequency of commissions like the 
one on which even Amersfoort was represented argues that they were not 
very effective,(96) and indeed all three provinces remained extremely 
vulnerable to the enemy, though the Sticht's position was improved by 
Maurice's victories in the 1590s.
Despite these links with the east, the Estates could never ignore 
the even stronger bonds which connected them to Holland. It was,
after all, the more densely populated and fertile western district of 
the province which shared a boundary with Holland, whereas the border 
with Gelderland ran through the sparsely peopled sandy regions north 
and south of Amersfoort. Moreover, while the Sticht had suffered
considerably until 1543 from the wars between the Habsburgs and the
dukes of Gelderland, it had been under one government with Holland
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from the Union of Toledo of 1534 until 1572. From then on, however, 
Holland and Utrecht were actually at war, and the west and south-west 
of the Sticht, particularly the land of Montfoort, had undergone raids 
and devastation at the hands of the Beggar garrisons in Gouda, 
Oudewater and Woerden.(97) Utrecht had entered into the Pacification 
of Ghent in 1576 under pressure from Holland (and Zeeland), but had 
received only limited help from them for their most serious problems, 
the siege of Vredenburg and the payment of the troops in the city. 
Although the Estates of Holland advanced a loan of 14,000 guilders, 
and the Noorderkwartier one of 20,000, a deputation from the city of 
Utrecht to Amsterdam returned empty-handed, and relations between the 
two provinces were not improved by Utrecht's failure to repay these 
loans at the proper time.(98)
As with Gelderland, there were economic disputes with Holland, 
for instance about the toll levied at Schoonhoven on peat being 
transported down the Lek from Utrecht into Holland, or the tax imposed 
by the Sticht on beer produced in Delft.(99) Where Utrecht resented 
Gelderland's comparative freedom from the Estates-General's taxes, 
Holland for its part objected to the lower rates of taxation in force 
in Utrecht, and repeatedly urged that the generale middelen should be 
levied at the same rate in all the contributing provinces. The 
Estates refused even to consider this question, on the grounds that 
the Sticht could not afford it, nor would they ever increase their 
quota in the monthly contribution to the gemene zaak, whatever Holland 
or the Estates-General might say.(100) It is hardly surprising, in 
these circumstances, that Holland sometimes felt that the Sticht was 
not pulling its weight in the communal war effort.
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Relations between Utrecht and Holland were further strained by 
disagreements over jurisdiction in the border areas, particularly the 
claims made by the town of Oudewater over the inhabitants of certain 
districts in Utrecht in its immediate vicinity. Oudewater had 
originally been in the Sticht, having received its town charter from 
the bishop in the thirteenth century, but since the fourteenth century 
it had belonged to Holland. The town appears to have been strongly 
anti-Utrecht in the years that followed: this feeling was doubtless
intensified when Hierges' troops razed Oudewater to the ground in
1575.(101)
There were two issued involved in the dispute: first, could
Oudewater claim jurisdiction over the inhabitants of districts such as 
the Langeweide and Ruigeweide, and were these people obliged to pay 
levies imposed by, for example, the bailiff (baljuw) of Oudewater? 
Secondly, were farmers from Utrecht who took refuge behind Oudewater's 
walls still liable for provincial taxes on the land they continued to 
use in the Sticht?(102) Both the town and the Estates arrested and
held people from the other side, pending payment of the sums claimed;
while the Estates of Holland were willing to submit the dispute to a 
higher authority, and ordered the magistrates of Oudewater to release 
the Stichtenaars they were holding, it was not until after the change 
of government in Utrecht in 1588, and yet more arrests, that the 
Estates agreed to arbitration from outside.(103)
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In the early 1580s, Utrecht had a rather variable political 
relationship with Holland and Zeeland. Holland, it would appear, was 
eager to strengthen its ties with Utrecht by elevating William of 
Orange from his present position as Stadholder to the status of 
hereditary lord with 'high authority' (hoge overheid) over the three 
provinces. This question was first raised soon after the Abjuration 
of Philip II, and in 1582, the Estates were prepared to offer the high 
authority to Orange, with some limitations on his powers (it must be 
remembered that they had not acknowledged the Duke of Anjou as their 
lord).(104) A year later, however, they had changed their minds, 
partly because they suspected that Holland's additional proposal to 
make Orange its Count would constitute a breach of the Union of 
Utrecht, and that the same would be true of stronger bonds between 
Holland, Zeeland and the Sticht which would alienate the eastern 
provinces, Gelderland, Friesland and Overijssel.(105) The issue of the 
double elevation of Orange was delayed throughout 1583 by internal 
differences in Holland; but at a meeting of delegates from Holland, 
Zeeland and Utrecht in November 1583, the Sticht expressed its 
approval of Holland's determination to offer Orange the Act of 
Presentation as Count, but was still very cautious about making any 
changes in Utrecht's own status quo, in view of the dangerous 
situation in Flanders. In general, Utrecht viewed its collaboration 
with Holland and Zeeland as a basis for the rest of the allies to 
join: any separate councils for these three provinces would probably
alienate the others.(106) The assassination of Orange (still 
officially neither Count nor 'high authority') in July 1584, roused 
the Estates into renewed negotiations with Holland and Zeeland (see
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pp. 157-158 above) but the pendulum of the Sticht's primary loyalties
soon swung away from the west. The first sign of a short-lived
attempt to 'go it alone' was the choice of Villers as Stadholder, and 
it is significant that Holland tried to delay the Estates-General's 
confirmation of his appointment.(107) What is more, at the time of 
Nieuwenaar's election as Stadholder, the Estates of Holland issued a 
document requiring Utrecht to rejoin the government of Holland and 
Zeeland immediately. The Estates of Utrecht replied that they had no 
intention of putting themselves under the same government as the other 
two provinces; for the time being, the pendulum had swung towards the 
east.(108)
Holland's attempts to influence the Sticht were not confined to 
the strictly political sphere. Utrecht resented its neighbour's 
interference in its religious life as well: the notoriously Catholic
district of the Proostdij of St. Jan, situated between the two
provinces and enjoying certain protective privileges, evoked several 
expressions of disapproval from Holland, especially when the priest at 
Kudelstaart preached in support of a conspiracy by certain
'malevolent' persons in Holland.(109) Similarly, Holland accused the 
Estates of being 'too lax' . in furthering the Reformation in 
Montfoort. In February 1583, this interference went too far for the 
Estates' liking, when over twenty soldiers disturbed a Sunday service 
at Hagestein, a village on the south bank of the Lek which belonged 
jointly to the chapters of the Pom and Oudmunster. They robbed the 
congregation of their coats and arrested the ministers (who had always 
preached in accordance with the placard on acceptable Reformed 
doctrine, according to witnesses) - all this, somewhat improbably, in
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the name of the Prince of Orange. The Standing Committee pointed out
to the officers of the company involved that any religious unorthodoxy
in Hagestein was a matter for the Estates of Utrecht, and for no other 
body, to decide. Even when the two provinces were politically in 
agreement, the Reformed Church in Holland protested in 1601 to Prince 
Maurice and to the Estates-General that 'abuses and Papist
superstitions' were crossing the border from the Sticht, and that 
ministers who had been disciplined in Holland could find employment in 
Utrecht.(110)
The Sticht's sometimes latent, sometimes overt dislike and
distrust of Holland were not appeased by expressions of friendship 
such as a letter from the city council of Amsterdam, protesting that 
Amsterdam and Utrecht 'have long been as two souls in one body in the 
common defence of the provinces and resistance to the enemy'.(Ill) On 
the contrary, in the midst of the crisis of 1586-88, when Holland gave 
shelter and support to the exiled opposition to the Prouninck régime, 
the Utrecht towns made their views quite clear: they would rejoin the
first two Estates only on condition that 'it shall be declared by a 
solemn everlasting resolution that the government of this Sticht is a 
separate government, and that no lawful union, agreement or usage is 
recognised whereby Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht should be ruled by one 
Governor'.(112) English observers, who were also suspicious of the 
Holland regents, were convinced that the Estates of Holland, in 
collusion with Nieuwenaar and Count Hohenlohe, who were disenchanted 
with Leicester's rule, would use all means 'by hook and by crook' to 
win Utrecht away from its English loyalties and safely into Holland's 
orbit.(113)
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Yet, at a lower level, farmers from both sides of the 
Holland/Utrecht border could unite in occupation of the St. 
Maartensdijk to resist the passage of cavalry and wagons across their 
lands, forcing the Estates to send the troopers to another part of the 
Sticht.(114) The following year (1588), some villages of the Sticht, 
together with farmers from Hilversum and the surrounding district of 
Gooiland, put up armed opposition to increases in taxes proposed by 
Utrecht. In such circumstances, the Estates of Utrecht had no
hesitation in appealing to their colleagues in Holland for help, in 
the name of the Closer Union. Holland responded with a prohibition of 
any seditious communication between its farmers and those of 
Utrecht.(115) Threats from inside or outside would drive the Estates 
to assure their neighbours of their own devotion to the common cause, 
and their willingness to share a common fortune with the other 
provinces, as a prelude to an appeal for help.(116)
Thus, even when the Sticht was politically on very bad terms with 
Holland, mutual need and dependence bound the two provinces together. 
None of the other provinces could answer Utrecht's appeals: Friesland
and Zeeland were too far away; Gelderland could not afford to defend 
itself, far less its neighbours. Holland was the Sticht's only hope. 
And Holland, for its part, could not forget the dangerous military 
establishment maintained by Alva in the city and province of Utrecht.
The Estates knew that they could use these memories: on one occasion,
when Parma was advancing ever closer to the Sticht in 1586, the 
Estates pointed out that the fortification of Wijk, Amersfoort and 
Rhenen, which they could not afford themselves, would be of particular
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benefit to Holland, 'whose bulwark we are'.(117) No matter how
strained political relations between the provinces might become, 
Holland would usually take steps to protect its own frontiers, as it 
did when the imminent fall of Antwerp threatened to shift the main 
theatre of war to Gelderland, and, by extension, to Utrecht.(118)
The years after 1588 saw a distinct rapprochement between Utrecht 
and Holland, signalled in minor ways, such as co-operation in the 
guarding of areas of mutual concern, like Gooiland, and in major 
matters like the choice - albeit not without opposition - of Maurice 
of Nassau as Stadholder of Utrecht in February 1590, with the
stipulation that he was to govern the Sticht as a separate 
province.(119) Yet to all intents and purposes, the Union of Toledo 
was restored, and the uncompromising assertion of the Prouninck 
government that 'Holland and Utrecht had nothing in common' was 
forgotten - to such an extent that a seventeenth-century commentator 
could declare that 'the Province of Utrecht has of old been, and is at 
this day, the most faithfull ally of Holland'.(120)
Vl.iii Utrecht and foreign princes
The Estates' relations with the outside world did not stop at the
borders of their immediate neighbours, whether to the east or the
west. Sometimes, like their allies, they looked beyond the confines 
of the Netherlands for help in the struggle against Spain, admitting 
that 'these provinces cannot defend themselves without help from a 
foreign lord or ruler'.(121) While Utrecht had never backed Orange's 
pro-French policy, it seems to have shared, in some meaure, the
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preference felt in other provinces, especially Gelderland and 
Flanders, for certain German Protestant princes, in particular Gebhard 
Truchsess von Waldburg, the Elector-Archbishop of Cologne.(122)
In the early 1580s, Truchsess married, turned Lutheran, and 
seemed about to establish a Protestant principality of great 
international significance in the Rhineland. This was contrary to the 
Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555), which ordained that Catholic 
spiritual princes must abdicate if they converted to Protestantism. 
Accordingly, from January 1583 onwards, Truchsess was at war with his 
Catholic rival for the electorate, Ernest of Bavaria, who was 
supported by the Emperor, the duke of Bavaria, and, more importantly,
by part of Parma's army from the Netherlands, which played a decisive 
part in the eventual Catholic victory.(123) Nieuwenaar, whose own 
lands were nearby, was one of those German Protestant nobles who 
persuaded Truchsess not to abdicate on his marriage, and he, John of 
Nassau and John Casimir of the Palatinate were among Gebhard's 
earliest supporters.(124) Soon after the war began, Nieuwenaar 
appealed to the Estates of Utrecht to give the Elector and his allies 
financial support, on the grounds that they were of the same religion,
and that 'this cause will in a short time be a common cause with that
of the Netherlands'. In order to keep on good terms with Nieuwenaar,
the Estates decided to advance him, and the Elector, as much as
possible of the 6,000 guilders he requested. Later, they endorsed the 
decision of Orange and the Estates-General to assist the Elector's 
impoverished war-effort, in recognition of the services rendered by 
Truchsess's men to the defence of the Netherlands.(125) Despite this 
somewhat meagre Dutch subsidy (100,000 guilders), the Protestant cause
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achieved little: Nieuwenaar's castles fell into Catholic hands;
Truchsess and his wife were forced into exile in the Netherlands; and
Ernest of Bavaria was recognised as Elector of Cologne several years
before the last of the Protestant garrisons surrendered in 1589.(126)
Although Nieuwenaar continued to wage war in the ex-Elector's 
name, and the Estates continued to contribute to his personal
expenses, Gebhard made no further direct impact on the Sticht until 
Leicester's arrival, at the end of 1585, with instructions to advance 
his cause.(127) Truchsess became one of Leicester's close advisers, 
mediated in some of his disputes with Dutch leaders, and was an
eye-witness of much of the party struggle in Utrecht; he was, for 
example, invited to the banquet given to welcome Lord Buckhurst in
April 1587.(128) Indeed, according to Bor, he helped to avert a
'terrible bloodbath' when the troops in the city mutinied against 
Nieuwenaar's authority, in May of the same year.(129) In return,
Leicester thought very highly of Truchsess: he praised 'his wisdome,
his behaviour, his languages, his person' and his 'verie noble
mind';(130) on a practical level, he authorised the city of Utrecht to 
pay Gebhard's debts from its ordinary taxes, as a contribution to the 
gemene zaak. Even after Leicester had finally left the Netherlands, 
the city still used the generale middelen for this purpose.(131)
An exiled Elector, whose debts the Estates had to pay, was 
scarcely the foreign ruler to whom they looked for help in their 
difficulties. The Estates' relationship with Cologne was therefore of 
minor importance; the same can be said of their involvement with
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France, which they kept, whenever possible, to a minimum. The Estates 
had never been eager to accept the help offered to the Netherlands by 
the Duke of Anjou, brother of Henry III of France: as early as
February 1580, they had expressed their preference for William of 
Orange, a preference shared even by the canons of the five chapters, 
who might have been expected to incline towards the Catholic 
Frenchman.(132)
The Sticht's distrust of Anjou was not overcome by the 
Estates-General's treaty with him in September 1580, which the Estates 
thought was contrary to the Union of Utrecht, so that they were not
obliged to sign it. Their reluctance to acknowledge Anjou as their
lord was partly financial, since his arrival in 1581 increased the 
ordinary quota to pay for his troops.(133) Nor could the Estates be 
swayed by emotional appeals from the Council of State to recompense 
Anjou 'as you hold dear your freedom and the welfare and protection of 
your wives, children and descendants' for the expenses incurred in the 
capture of Cambrai. Even Orange's eulogy of Anjou and his enthusiasm 
for the Netherlands' cause - 'we should think ourselves fortunate and 
praise God that it has pleased Him to grant us such a prince and 
champion' - could not persuade them to entrust their resources 
willingly to the Duke.(134) Although the Estates did agree, in the 
end, to pay the usual tenth of Holland's share in the sums granted to
Anjou, it was only because Utrecht was 'bound to the other provinces
by virtue of the Union'. Moreover, the Sticht's representatives were 
authorised to take the general oath of submission to Anjou only as far 
as the war was concerned.(135) In short, throughout the early 1580s, 
the Estates consistently maintained that they had entered into no
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agreement or contract with Anjou, and were therefore not obliged to 
send delegates to his Council or contribute against their will to his 
finances. Even the Estates-General recognised this distinction 
between Utrecht (and Gelderland) and the other provinces: a
distinction which enabled the Sticht to dissociate itself, a trifle 
smugly, from the Estates-General's troubled debates about Anjou 
following the French Fury in January 1583.(136)
After the death of both Anjou and Orange, however, the Estates 
were prepared, somewhat reluctantly, to negotiate with King Henry III, 
on condition that any French Governor-General of the Netherlands would 
be a Protestant: if not, they would enter into no treaty with France.
In fact, the question did not arise, since Henry III refused the 
United Provinces' offer of sovereignty in the spring of 1585. Shortly 
afterwards, the Estates disavowed eveything their delegates had 
negotiated in France, and, like the rest of the provinces, turned 
their attention to the prospects of a treaty with England.(137) Nor 
were the Estates any more eager in 1589 to conclude an agreement with 
Henry IV, the new king of France, despite his Protestant faith. Even 
in the disillusionment with England which followed the Leicester era, 
the Estates were unimpressed by the argument that 'the cause of France 
[i.e. Henry IV's war against the Catholic League, assisted by Parma] 
is a common cause with [that of] these provinces'.(138) Once again, 
the problem was financial: as Utrecht could not afford to meet its
ordinary obligations, it refused to pay its share of the funds 
promised to Henry IV by the Estates-General, unless the Sticht was 
freed from enemy exactions. Since that was impossible, in 1590 the 
other provinces assumed Utrecht's quota in the debt, which amounted to
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no more than 6,000 guilders.(139)
Utrecht had always been much more enthusiastic about negotiations 
with Protestant England than it was about dealing with Catholic, and 
probably treacherous, France. As early as 1584, the Estates declared 
their belief that England was better able to help the Netherlands than 
France, and their preference for negotiations with Queen Elizabeth if 
Henry III should prove unreasonable.(140) They were willing to concede 
much greater powers to a representative of the Queen than to a French 
Governor-General: during the talks with France, the Estates stipulated 
that the provinces should, if at all possible, appoint their own 
'Governors, councillors and principal officers', whereas they wanted 
Leicester to choose part of his own Council of State without reference 
to the provinces.(141)
The Sticht's relationship with England was at its most obvious 
during the years of the Prouninck regime (1586-1588), but it began 
when Utrecht joined the other provinces in offering the sovereignty to
Elizabeth in 1585, and - in marked contrast to the earlier discussions 
with Anjou - went so far as to offer her any of the towns in the 
Sticht as security for the projected treaty, if she wanted them.(142) 
Any delay in the ratification of the Treaty of Nonsuch was not, 
therefore, caused by Utrecht's reluctance to share with Holland and 
Zeeland the risks involved in granting England a cautionary town, as 
A.M. van der Woude claimed.(143) It is true that the Estates debated 
the Treaty the day after their deputies should have been in the Hague 
to ratify it, but the decision to endorse the agreed terms was taken 
surprisingly quickly, considering that the Estates had several other
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pressing problems on their hands at the same time: the burgerhoplieden 
were clamouring for Nieuwenaar's appointment as Stadholder; the 
province was in the middle of a serious financial crisis; and 45 to 50 
companies of unpaid soldiers were on the loose in the towns and 
villages of the Sticht.(144)
Undeterred by Elizabeth's refusal of the sovereignty in 1585, the 
burgerhoplieden, the city council and the small towns resolved to 
repeat the offer to Her Majesty of 'the absolute Government of the 
provinces...without any restrictions or limitations...preserving the 
true Christian religion, the provinces' privileges, the glory of God 
and Her Majesty's authority'.(145) The burgerhoplieden's attempt to 
gain the support of the Gouda schutterij failed, but later in 1586 the 
Estates themselves urged the Queen to accept the sovereignty of
Utrecht alone, if not of all the provinces, on much more generous
terms than those originally proposed by the Estates-General.(146) 
Overijssel and Friesland both supported this offer, and pressure (for 
example, by the Utrecht burgerhoplieden) was exerted on the English 
ambassador, Buckhurst, to persuade Elizabeth to accept it.(147) After 
Leicester's resignation as Governor-General, the Estates declared that 
'the state of monarchy is the best, indeed the only, means to remove 
all confusion and disorder and to preserve these provinces'. In line 
with this conviction, the Estates sent another envoy to England in the 
summer of 1588.(148) All these efforts were to no avail, however: the 
Queen remained fixed in her resolve not 'to intermedle with the 
souveraintie', and the Estates had only alienated their fellow 
provinces by violating article 10 of the Union of Utrecht, which
forbade the conclusion of separate alliances by individual
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provinces.(149)
Despite Elizabeth's repeated refusals of the sovereignty of the 
Sticht, a definite relationship did exist between the province and the
Queen. Utrecht was fully aware of its dependence on her help: if they 
were abandoned by her Majesty, wrote the city magistrates, they could 
find no lord, ruler, or prince upon the earth who had both the will 
and the power to take up their cause.(150) The Estates wrote to 
Elizabeth that they desired to live and die at her feet. For her they 
would even send deputies to the Estates-General, so that her 
ambassador would have no cause to report to the Queen that Utrecht 
intended to withdraw from the Closer Union or from the Treaty of 
Nonsuch.(151) Indeed, the Estates under Prouninck saw themselves as 
the only true adherents of the Treaty among the provinces, and did 
their best to shield it against attacks such as the 1588 instruction 
for the Council of State.(152) For her part, Elizabeth knew that it 
was in her interests to have a provincial government in Utrecht which 
was so well-affected towards her: she therefore strongly recommended
that Prouninck be reappointed burgomaster in the autumn of 1588.(153) 
Moreover, the Queen took the side of the Sticht in its dispute with 
Holland, and urged that the quarrel should be submitted to her for 
settlement under the terms of the Treaty, calling on the Council of 
State to stop Holland 'persecuting' Utrecht, on pain of losing her 
support.(154)
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This special relationship made Elizabeth's efforts towards peace 
with Parma particularly painful to the Sticht. Although the 
negotiations had already been secretly under way at the time of 
Leicester's triumphal progress through the Netherlands early in 1586, 
and although the city council had forbidden the spreading of all 
rumours of peace at the end of that year, the Estates still displayed 
confidence that the Queen would never negotiate anything to the 
Netherlands' disadvantage.(155) In their opposition to peace, if in 
nothing else, the Estates were at one with Holland and the 
Estates-General.(156) Yet, when it became clear that Elizabeth was 
determined to go ahead with the peace conference at Ostend, the 
Estates reluctantly agreed to send representatives, from Utrecht, 
Gelderland and Overijssel, with or without the consent of the other 
provinces: these delegates were to fight for the inclusion in any
peace treaty of points such as the establishment of the Reformed 
religion to the exclusion of all others, and the maintenance of all 
the provinces' privileges and rights. And the Estates further 
maintained that no matter what Elizabeth might do, the provinces 
should not enter into any agreement with Henry of Navarre without her 
knowledge.(157) In the end, however, they were not forced to take part 
in distasteful peace talks, since the Ostend conference was rendered 
meaningless by the arrival of the Spanish Armada in the summer of 
1588. In the face of this threat to their most powerful ally, the 
Estates were prepared - rather late, as usual - to advance 
10,000 guilders to fit out ships for Elizabeth, despite Utrecht's 
chronic shortage of funds.(158)
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The unruly English troops in the Sticht represented a more 
immediate aspect of Utrecht's relationship with England. Even before 
Leicester arrived, the Estates had to pay these troops to prevent 
damage to property and livestock; all the same, the soldiers committed 
excesses and pillaged the leper house at Zuylen and the village of 
Maarssen; they minted counterfeit money and drew their weapons against 
some of the Amersfoort magistrates.(159) Yet the Prouninck regime was 
anxious to keep the English garrison, which helped to maintain it in 
power.(160) (Buckhurst recognised that it was in the interests of 
Holland and Zeeland to keep the English garrison out of
Utrecht [161]). Indeed, in 1588, the city gates were kept locked to
stop the garrison leaving; the troops were refused transport to
Bergen-op-Zoom, which was under siege by Parma; and both the city and 
the Estates paid the troops out of their own pockets. As one English 
officer phrased it: 'we have nothing but what the burgers of Utrecht
will lend us...for love of Her Ifejesty and His Excellency
[Leicester]'.(162) All attempts to recover this money - from 
Leicester's treasurer, from Norris or Willoughby, or even from 
Elizabeth herself - were unsuccessful.(163)
By the time of Nieuwenaar's coup in September 1588, however, it 
appears that most of the English garrison had left the city to take 
part in the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom. Whether or not this had any 
influence on the events of 25-26 September, the new city council was 
found to be 'in a rather worse humour against the English than 
before'.(164) Similarly, the Estates sent a deputation to 'divert' 
Elizabeth's new ambassador. Sir John Norris, from coming to Utrecht,
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by assuring him that the Sticht's internal disputes had all been 
resolved without reference to the English. The delegates were also 
instructed to secure the reduction of the English garrison to 300 men, 
on the grounds that the previous figure (650 in January 1588) was 
unnecessarily high, and had been maintained by the members of the
former government purely for the safety of their own persons.(165) Yet 
some of the personal loyalty felt in the Sticht to Leicester and 
England must have remained: by November 1588, after Leicester's death, 
the Estates had still not published the announcement of his
resignation from the post of Governor-General.(165) Otherwise, the 
special relationship between the province and the Queen was at an end; 
and henceforward the Estates had no separate dealings with Elizabeth. 
They would seem to have tacitly endorsed the policy of Oldenbarnevelt 
and the Estates-General in the 1590s: grateful acceptance of English
military and financial assistance, coupled with a refusal to make




The Estates in crisis 1586-1588
The two years between 1586 and 1588, the 'Leicester era', have 
attracted more attention than any other comparable period in Utrecht's 
history during the Revolt. The reason for this is quite clear: during 
these two years, events in Utrecht had an important bearing on 
developments elsewhere in the Netherlands and even beyond. For once, 
the Sticht occupied the centre of the stage, and observers commented 
freely on its performance. The comparatively greater volume of 
historical analysis has created its own problems, however, since this 
attention has largely been directed, naturally enough, towards the 
effects produced by Utrecht on the rest of the provinces, and has 
followed the tradition, established by Bor, of hostility to Leicester 
and his adherents in the Sticht.(1) The Earl himself has been the 
target of a good deal of abuse from historians. Fruin called him 'a 
haughty, hot-tempered foreigner, without understanding of men or 
affairs', while Rogier described him as 'the dictator of a Calvinist 
totalitarianism'.(2) Contemporary opinions were divided, however; 
Joris de Bye, the Estates-General's treasurer, probably spoke for his 
masters when he wrote that Leicester was 'better suited to England's 
monarchical government than to a republic'. The city council of 
Utrecht, on the other hand, eulogised the Earl in 1587 as follows; 'if 
there have ever been God-fearing, good-natured, kind, sincere, 
religious, dedicated, magnanimous rulers, princes or Governors in this 
country. His Excellency [Leicester] should indeed be recognised as one
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of them'.(3)
Controversy about Leicester has tended to obscure the activities 
of his adherents in the Sticht itself, although P.L. Muller 
acknowledged that their leader, Gerard Prouninck van Deventer, was 
without doubt a sincere patriot and a man of talent, who displayed 
more honesty and firmness of character than his patron.(4) As 
burgomaster of Utrecht, Prouninck played a leading role in the drama, 
which was centred, perhaps even more than usual, in the city itself. 
Yet no aspect of provincial life remained unaffected by the series of 
crises which shook the Sticht between 1586 and 1588: internal politics 
and administration, the composition of the Estates and the municipal 
councils, the province's relations with its neighbours and with 
England, its religious life and financial arrangements - all suffered 
upheavals which seemed fundamental, but proved in the end to be 
temporary disturbances only.
Like the rest of the United Netherlands, in the autumn of 1585
Utrecht had high hopes of the new Governor-General, and his
determination 'to rule others and not to be ruled...to make laws for
others on what they should do, and not to accept laws, as he is a lord
who has come here not to gain money or property, but out of pure zeal 
for the true Christian religion, and to free these provinces from the 
tyranny of the Spaniards'. Such a strong man was to be welcomed in 
the chaos prevailing after the fall of Antwerp.(5) The city's bells 
were rung for joy at the news of Leicester's acceptance of the wide 
powers - in theory as great as those enjoyed by the Governors-General
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under Charles V - which were conferred on him in January 1586 by the 
Estates-General.(6) Leicester lost no time in trying to exercise these 
powers in the Sticht: in January, he asked the town council of
Amersfoort to postpone the annual renewal of the magistracy until he 
reached Utrecht and could attend to it himself. In fact, the council 
was changed on 7 March, two weeks before Leicester arrived in the 
city, by the Stadholder, Nieuwenaar.(7)
The Earl"s triumphal entry into Utrecht, in March 1586, was 
marked by lavish celebrations, during which a representative of the 
city council expressed the province's expectations, in a poem 
addressed to Leicester:
Repos, tranquillité, secours allégément 
Trouverons vraiement, par sa prouesse.
Désiré sans cesse, avons longuement
Voir ici présent, sa très noble hautesse 
DROIT ET LOIAL, muer en aage en sagesse.(8)
These prophecies of peace and tranquillity were not fulfilled, 
however. The Estates-General soon regretted vesting such generous 
powers in the Earl, and Queen Elizabeth regarded his exalted title as 
an insult to herself. Very shortly after Leicester's arrival in 
Utrecht, there arose one of the major dilemmas of his period in 
office, an early indication of the divergence in attitudes between the 
Sticht and its western neighbours, Holland and Zeeland. The occasion 
was the publication on 4 April 1586, of the placard forbidding all 
trade which might benefit Spain or her allies. Whereas this measure
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angered the trading interests of the maritime provinces, the Estates, 
and particularly the city, of Utrecht, on the other hand, feared that 
the provisions allowing for the payment of 'convoy-money' were not 
stringent enough, and would still permit a certain amount of trade 
with the enemy. Not until Leicester had assured deputations from the 
Estates of Utrecht and the Hof of Gelderland (which shared the
Sticht's fears), that his decree was designed to prevent all
foodstuffs from reaching the enemy, would the Estates consent to the 
publication of the placard, some ten weeks after it was originally 
issued.(9)
To clamp down on the evasion of these trading regulations,
Leicester set up, on his own authority, a separate Chamber of Finance, 
and asked Paulus Buys, among others, to serve upon it. Buys, the
former provincial advocate of Holland, had long been a leading member 
of the pro-English party in the Netherlands, and had in fact helped to 
negotiate the Treaty of Nonsuch. Leicester had chosen him, as a 
native of Amersfoort, to represent the Sticht in the Council of
State. Since then, however. Buys had become an outspoken critic of 
Leicester's government, and he refused to take office under the head 
of the Chamber of Finance, Jacques Reingout, a southerner from Brabant 
with a dubious past (he had been Requesens' clerk).(10) This provoked 
Leicester into abusing Buys as 'a devill, an atheist, and the onlie 
boulsterer of all papists and ill men', 'a most lewd man as ever lived 
and a most hated man to all sorts here'. But, the Governor-General 
promised himself, 'his head shall pay'.(11)
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The day after Leicester left Utrecht for the Hague, 9 July 1586, 
Buys was arrested by the city's burgerhoplieden. According to Bor, 
they acted on instructions from Leicester's agent, Thomas Webbes, and 
Jacques de Pottere, a schepen of Utrecht. This account of the
incident, coupled with the Earl's known dislike of Buys, has often 
been taken as proof of his responsibility for the arrest.(12)
Leicester certainly denied any prior knowledge of the arrest, 
admitting however that he did not regret it: perhaps Fruin was right
to surmise that the burgerhoplieden probably knew they were acting in 
accordance with his wishes, though not actually with his consent.(13) 
In any case, they thought it necessary to justify their action to 
Leicester at some length, listing the reasons which had convinced them 
of the need to arrest Buys: among these were the illegality of his
appointment to the Council of State (he had not been nominated by the 
Estates); his lukewarm religious views and his opposition to the 
election of Nieuwenaar as Stadholder of Utrecht; his alleged sympathy 
with those who wanted to make peace after the enemy's victory at 
Amerongen in 1585; his attempt to retain a Catholic magistracy in
Amersfoort; and, most important of all, the incriminating evidence of
high treason in his secret correspondence (Buys was believed to have 
been intriguing with the king of Denmark).(14) As no mention was made 
of orders having been received from any higher authority, this 
apologia would seem to cast doubt on Leicester's involvement in the 
arrest.
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Whatever may be the truth of the matter, the fact remains that 
the arrest of Buys, leading to his six months' imprisonment, marked 
the next stage in the estrangement between Utrecht on the one hand, 
and the Estates-General and the Estates of Holland on the other. The 
Estates of Holland and the towns of Amsterdam, Gouda and Leiden were 
outraged, and demanded the immediate release of Buys (who had been 
pensionary of Leiden before becoming Advocate of Holland in 1572).(15) 
The Utrecht city council ignored these repeated protests, however, and 
refused to release the prisoner, although examination of his papers, 
which were confiscated at the time of his arrest, sealed in a chest 
and entrusted to Nieuwenaar for safe-keeping, showed that the seals 
had been broken and the damaging documents removed.(16) Meanwhile, the 
burgerhoplieden, who had not long before attempted to dictate trading 
policy to Amsterdam, were indignant at such uncalled-for interference 
in Utrecht's internal affairs: according to them, they had never
meddled in Holland's business.(17)
Although there may be some doubt about Leicester's role in the 
arrest of Paulus Buys, the Governor-General was responsible for the 
expulsion from Utrecht, shortly afterwards, of 'a very good number of 
Papists, or those in the [public] eye, for evil-doings among the 
people'. Rumours had reached England of correspondence between the 
enemy and Catholics and 'malcontents' in Utrecht, and Leicester sent 
Nieuwenaar to the city council with instructions to rid the city of 
this internal menace, in order that 'the enemy's hopes should be 
frustrated'. The original list of those to be expelled, nineteen in 
number, included the city's Schout, Niclaes van Zuylen van Drakenburg;
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Floris Heermale, one of the Geeligeerden and frequently a delegate to
the Estates-General; Willem van Lamsweerde, the steward of the 
provincial domains and a former secretary of the Estates; two other 
prominent members of the city magistracy, Johan Robbrechtsz van
Druenen and Albert Foeck; and Adriaan van der Burch, the secretary to
the provincial Hof. This list was then augmented at the request of 
the magistrates and the burgerhoplieden until a total of sixty was 
reached. The later additions, for the most part, were less important 
politically (they included, for example, a tailor, two millers, and a 
former militia captain), except for the last name on the list, that of 
Floris Thin, the Estates' advocate, who played a vital part in all
their business. The city's dislike and distrust of the chapters is
illustrated by the inclusion of sixteen canons and ten other clergy, 
who were obvious targets for a purge of possible 'Papists'. (18) 
Orders to leave the Sticht before sunrise for 'neutral places' were
sent to the houses of all of these men; neutral places being defined
as small states outside the Netherlands such as Cleves or Munster.(19)
This order could not be enforced. It is not possible to trace the 
movements of all the expelled men, but some of them certainly did not 
retire meekly to Cleves. Thin, Niclaes van Zuylen and Johan van 
Druenen went first to Montfoort, from where they immediately appealed 
to the Estates of Holland for help. The nobles and the towns of 
Holland responded with a formal protest to Leicester, now in the 
Hague, and a testimony to the loyal services rendered to the country
by the leading exiles, in which they received the support of Maurice
and the Council of State. At the same time, they granted the exiles
permission to enter Holland, and offered them hospitality in
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Gouda.(20) Thin took his case directly to Leicester himself, in the 
Hague, and incidentally secured the release of his baggage, which his
wife had sent after him from Utrecht, and which had been seized by the
Montfoort garrison.(21) Towards the end of July, the Estates-General 
offered the exiles all possible assistance. Thin and his fellows 
appealed to Leicester to cancel the order for their expulsion, which 
he denied having authorised; under pressure from all sides, the Earl 
took the five foremost exiles (Thin, van Zuylen van Drakenburg, Foeck,
van Druenen and Robbrecht van Honthorst) under his personal
protection, though they were still unable to return home.(22) When, in 
August, the banished men were again ordered to leave the United 
Provinces, on pain of confiscation of their property, the Estates of 
Holland sent a distinguished deputation to protest in very strong 
terms to the Utrecht city council, and then promised thé exiles 
compensation from the property of Stichtenaars situated in Holland. 
It appears that for once the burgerhoplieden were within their rights 
to complain that the Estates of Holland were meddling in something 
which did not concern them, since this promise of compensation had 
only a very dubious legal foundation.(23)
Meanwhile, the positions made vacant by the expulsions had to be 
filled. The manner in which these new appointments were made paved the 
way for later political dissènsion in the Sticht. The most
objectionable of them was the replacement of the exiled Schout, van
Zuylen van Drakenburg, by Karel van Trillo, an ardent adherent of
Leicester from Brabant. Initially, the city council would not
recognise him; a month later, however, the annual renewal of the
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magistracy was carried out by Count Culeraborg and Lord North, acting 
on a special commission from Leicester, while Nieuwenaar was in 
Germany, raising troops.(24) Sixteen (out of forty) new members of the 
city council were appointed, foremost among them the new burgomaster, 
Gerard Prouninck, called van Deventer, who was to become the 
undisputed leader of the Leicestrian party in Utrecht, and the moving 
spirit behind many of the attempts at radical change in the provincial 
government over the next two years.(25) The new magistracy immediately 
installed Trillo in the office of Schout, granting him burgerschap a 
month later for appearances' sake.(26) The first two Estates, however, 
and particularly the Ridderschap, still objected strongly to this, and 
to Leicester's other appointments iri the Hof, such as Hendrick 
Agylaeus, a compatriot of Prouninck's from den Bosch, who had left for
the north when Parma captured Maastricht in 1579.(27) The Geeligeerden 
and the gentry claimed that all these appointments had been made 
without consulting them, so that Leicester had exceeded the powers 
given to him as Governor-General, and violated the province's 
privileges, which had been guaranteed in the Treaty of Nonsuch. In 
order to remain on good terms with the city and the towns, which had 
no objections to the appointments, the first two Estates agreed to 
accept the new members of the Hof, for this once only. And in spite 
of a request to Leicester 'not to infringe the privileges of the 
province for one individual', who did not even hold property in the 
Sticht, Trillo remained, de facto, in office.(28)
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It proved very difficult, however, to maintain good relations 
between the first two Estates and the Third. On 28 October, for 
example, when the Geeligeerden and the Ridderschap refused to submit 
complaints about infringements of the privileges to Leicester, to be 
settled 'by his authority', the representatives of 'the city and the 
towns, who were displeased, stood up and walked out of the [Estates'] 
meeting'.(29) Thus the three Estates could not present a united front 
to attacks from outside, such as the Estates-General's refusal, on 
1 November, to admit Prouninck as one of the Sticht's delegates: 'a
day and hour which the country will bemoan and lament', to quote 
Prouninck himself. Holland, as might have been expected, took the 
lead, backed by Zeeland and Friesland.(30) Before his departure for 
England, Leicester demanded an explanation of this treatment of his 
protégé (and while he was in England, he denied that the appointment 
of Prouninck was illegal). The Estates-General replied that it was 
their duty to uphold provincial privileges, which had been violated by 
Prouninck's appointment as burgomaster, since he came from Brabant 
(den Bosch, to be precise), had not been a burger of Utrecht for
sufficiently long, and owned no property in the Sticht. Moreover, he 
was still in debt to the generality from his days as receiver-general, 
and, worst of all, he was said to have threatened 'bloody heads' for 
members of the Estates of Utrecht who defended the privileges.(31) 
Prouninck's impassioned denial of these charges: 'to maintain the
privileges is a fine thing, but to use them as a cover for conflict, 
postponement, misunderstanding and disunity...when we have so many 
thousands of unhappy widows and orphans to protect...seems to me 
entirely senseless' was to no avail. The Estates-General would not
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admit him as Utrecht's legitimate representative, although they had no 
objections to the pensionaries of Dordrecht and Amsterdam, who also 
came from the southern Netherlands.(32) In this case, however, the 
anti-Prouninck party cited a privilege granted by king Philip II in 
1555, to the effect that no one born in a province which excluded 
Stichtenaars from office (as Brabant did) should be admitted to office 
in Utrecht.(33)
Although Leicester expressed the rather optimistic hope that the 
ensuing dispute between Utrecht and the Estates-General could be 
settled in half an hour, in fact it took two years before amicable 
relations were restored.(34) The city and the towns refused to 
acknowledge the Estates-General's proceedings until Prouninck was 
permitted to take his seat, and deplored the time wasted on this 
relatively unimportant matter when the provinces ought to have been 
offering the sovereignty to Elizabeth. At the same time, the Third 
Estate wanted to recall from the Hague the Sticht's other two 
deputies, Hendrick Buth and Bartholomeus de Wael, lord of Moersbergen, 
who had not protested against Prouninck's exclusion. While supporting 
the city's demand for Prouninck's admission to the Estates-General, 
the Geeligeerden and the Ridderschap considered that such a gesture of 
protest would only cause further bitterness and dissension. It was 
only at 'the earnest insistence and urging of the magistracy of 
Utrecht and the burgerhoplieden, together with the [representatives] 
of Amersfoort' that the first two Estates agreed to the recall of Buth 
and Moersbergen, which was not, however, carried out for two and a 
half months. Until February 1587, therefore, only two Estates were 
represented in the Estates-General, on Nieuwenaar's wishes.(35)
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Meanwhile, the city renewed its attack on the Geeligeerden in such a 
way as to paralyse the workings of the Estates until the Stadholder 
negotiated a compromise in February 1587.(36)
The proposed abolition of the First Estate precipitated the next 
major crisis in Utrecht's internal politics. On his return from the 
Hague, Prouninck pointed out to the city council that such a step 
would be inexpedient at that juncture, because disunity in the Sticht 
would dissuade Elizabeth from accepting the sovereignty. There were 
other reasons for postponing constitutional upheavals, said the 
burgomaster; before his departure for England, Leicester had 
particularly admonished Prouninck to allow no changes to be made in 
Utrecht during his absence; the Estates-General, already on bad terms 
with Utrecht, would be yet further alienated; the enemy would not fail 
to take advantage of the opportunity to exploit internal division; 
and, finally, Prouninck did not want it to be said that he had 
abolished the Geeligeerden 'to revenge himself on those in the Hague 
who had done him the injustice which is known to all'. Ignoring these 
warnings, the city council declared the First Estate abolished, 
whereupon the Ridderschap refused to attend the Estates' meeting to 
hear Prouninck's report on his experiences in the Hague, unless the 
Geeligeerden were also present.(37)
The Estates-General's immediate reaction was to send Nieuwenaar 
to Utrecht, to try to pacify the dispute; in December 1586, he was 
joined by the vrijheer van Hohensaxen, governor of Venlo, the lord of 
Brakel, Adolf van Meetkercken, president of the Flanders Hof, and
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Leicester's confidential representative, Jean Hotman, who was sent to 
warn the burgerhoplieden of Elizabeth's displeasure. Although in the 
Hague it seemed that 'there is somme hope and good issew expected', in 
fact the efforts of these gentlemen met with no success: the city
council would not do business with the Geeligeerden, and continued to 
urge their abolition, believing itself to be supported in this stance 
by the Queen and Leicester, thanks to a letter from William Herlle, 
Elizabeth's ambassador in the Netherlands.(38) The magistracy 
professed itself willing, however, to agree with the Ridderschap 'on 
all reasonable, fair matters': if the gentry were truly concerned for 
the public welfare, they could do nothing but accept this offer of 
co-operation.(39)
The provincial government was, in effect, at a standstill. 
Between 15 November 1586 and 4 January 1587, the Estates did not meet,
and the city council still refused to send delegates to the first
session of the New Year unless Buth and Moersbergen were recalled from 
the Estates-General. Since this condition was not met, the council 
made a separate statement, in answer to the Estates' summons to 
discuss the repair of breaches of the privileges and the Treaty with 
England: in the council's opinion, no such breaches had taken place in 
the Sticht. Rather, the fault lay in the limited powers granted to 
Leicester: without 'sovereign temporal authority', he could do nothing
to settle 'the quarrels and disputes which have arisen or will arise
among the provinces on account of the sovereign government belonging 
to each of them'.(40) The remaining Geeligeerden and a substantial 
number of the Ridderschap promptly closed ranks, and declared that if 
the city council would not attend the Estates' meetings, it was not to
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be informed of the resolutions taken there.(41) Two days later, on 
8 January, all those magistrates who were present at the time entered 
the Estates' chamber, where they found the dean of St. Jan, two 
members of the Ridderschap and the Estates' secretary, whom they 
informed of their determination to read the records of the session of 
the Estates between 4 and 6 January. When their request was refused, 
the magistrates 'had a hole made [by the city locksmith] in the door 
of a small room where they understood the resolutions were kept', 
removed the minute concerned, attached it, with the Estates' own seal, 
to the record of their own deliberations, and took both documents away 
for consideration at their leisure.(42)
In reply to this challenge, the first two Estates swore an oath 
of mutual support and assistance, and resolved to meet outside the 
city, at Wijk, where they would be free from further interference. 
The city council immediately put a stop to this scheme by forbidding 
anyone who attended such a meeting to return to his residence in the 
city afterwards.(43) This was deadlock: there was nothing for it but
for the Geeligeerden and the Ridderschap to appeal to Nieuwenaar for 
mediation. Finding that they received no sympathy from the Council of 
State, to which they sent a full account of the whole affair, and that 
the towns alone could not claim to function properly as the Estates, 
the city magistrates agreed to negotiate, still on condition that Buth 
and Moersbergen were recalled.(44)
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On 4 February, the representatives of the city and the towns 
returned to the Estates, and a settlement of the dispute was finally 
reached four days later, with a compromise which, in theory at least, 
removed several of the towns' most pressing grievances (45): the
number of Geeligeerden was reduced to five who met with the city's 
approval; the first two Estates would not interfere with the 
appointment of magistracies in the city or the towns; there was to be 
no political union between Holland and Utrecht (46); henceforward the 
Estates' advocate was not to attend the Estates' meetings (as Floris 
Thin was in exile, this presented no immediate problem); and notice of 
meetings would henceforward be given by the Standing Committee instead 
of the Domdeken. Thereafter, the Estates met and carried on their
business, apparently normally, until the autumn of 1587, although the 
Ridderschap's grievance about breaches of the privileges had not, in 
fact, been redressed.
Meanwhile, relations between the Sticht and the Estates-General 
had deteriorated still further after the letter's order for the 
release of Paulus Buys, on 25,000 guilders bail. Since the order was 
sent to the deputy schout in whose custody Buys was, and not to the 
city council or the burgerhoplieden, who had originally arrested him, 
the release was just as illegal as the arrest had been.(47) The city 
council's vehement protest to the Estates-General at what it called 
the Insult of this prison-break was unanimously echoed by the Estates 
when they discovered that Buys had resumed his seat on the Council of 
State, as Utrecht's representative: a position for which, they
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insisted, they had never nominated him.(48) In March, the province's 
distrust of the Estates-General was increased by the return of Philip 
Rataller (the new secretary of the Hof) and Herman Modet from England, 
where they had been sent to inform Leicester of the situation in 
Utrecht. They brought with them a copy of the Estates-General's 
famous letter of 4 February 1587 (NS), summing up all their grievances 
against Leicester's régime, and accusing him of complicity in the 
betrayal of Deventer to Spain in January. Shocked at such
ingratitude, the Standing Committee denied all previous knowledge of 
this letter, which had undoubtedly been sent by the Estates-General 
without reference to the provincial authorities of Zeeland, Friesland 
or Gelderland. It seems very probable that Utrecht indeed knew 
nothing of the letter: the Sticht's official delegate to the Council
of State, Brakel, was not in the Hague when the letter was composed, 
and the Estates were out of touch with the Estates-General throughout 
January 1587. When Utrecht was once more represented in the
Estates-General, in April, the denial was repeated, and echoed by 
delegates from Gelderland, whose masters had also been kept in 
ignorance of the Estates-General's attack on the Earl.(49)
It was clear to the city magistrates that the only remedy for the 
situation was the immediate return of the Governor-General: they
begged him to follow 'the example of that great captain and leader of 
the Israelites, Moses, and the king and brave warrior, David' and lead 
the Queen's true servants out of their difficulties.(50) In
Leicester's continuing absence, the Sticht turned to the new
ambassador from England, Lord Buckhurst, in the hope that he would
persuade Elizabeth to accept the sovereignty of the Netherlands.(51)
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Buckhurst proved to be a broken reed, however: not only did he refuse 
the sovereignty, he also demanded that the exiles be allowed to return 
to Utrecht. In fact, he took the part of Oldenbarnevelt and the 
Estates-General, thereby alienating Elizabeth who was still angry at 
the letter of 4 February (NS). Buckhurst also refused to have 
anything to do with Prouninck's scheme for an alternative assembly of 
provincial representatives.(52)
Although, in the spring and early summer of 1587, there was a
comparative lull in the crises which affected the Estates, this time 
was marked by a good deal of uncertainty in the position of the 
Stadholder, Nieuwenaar. Once a loyal adherent of Leicester - he had 
suggested further expulsions in July 1586, for instance - Nieuwenaar 
had gradually withdrawn his allegiance, to the point where 'forgetting 
all the honours and favours done him by your Lordship [Leicester]', he 
'publickly in his drincke used speeches in disgrace of our nation 
[England]'.(53) Nor was he as zealous as Prouninck wished in securing 
the abolition of the Geeligeerden, with the result that what
Leicester's secretary called 'ye best sorte' grew to hate the 
Stadholder as much as they had formerly loved him.(54) Nieuwenaar 
resented the city council's issuing orders for the movement of troops 
without his knowledge, and, at the same time, became involved in a 
quarrel with Herman Modet, the city's leading Calvinist minister. It 
appears that Modet tried to undermine Nieuwenaar's authority, and may 
even have tried to have him replaced as Stadholder by the Englishman,
Lord North, whose well-known Puritan convictions and devoted support
of Leicester made him highly esteemed in the Reformed community of
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Utrecht. Things came to a head on 26 May 1587, when Nieuwenaar tried 
to have Modet arrested, the citizens resisted, and a massacre was 
averted only by the mediation of the Elector of Cologne and Sir John 
Norris.(55) In the end, Modet was suspended from preaching for a few
weeks, and then reinstated at the insistence of his fellow
predikanten. Relations between him and Nieuwenaar improved, but the 
Stadholder remained on bad terms with Captain Cleerhagen, the
Leicestrian commander who had tried to transfer his men into the 
city.(56)
Nieuwenaar was not satisfied. As one observer noted, he was
'awaiting the opportunity to take his revenge' and assert his
authority as Stadholder.(57) He began early in 1587 by trying to win 
over the burgerhoplieden, but was only half successful, as four out of 
the eight remained loyal to England and thus to Prouninck.(58) Later 
in the same year, the renewal of the city council on 1 October seemed 
to offer him his chance. The council itself thought otherwise, 
however, and sent a list of eighty names to Leicester, who had 
recently arrived in the city, for him to choose forty men to serve on 
the magistracy for the year 1587-88. Nieuwenaar's protests, made by 
his representative Engelbertus van den Berch, were futile, as were his 
appeals to the provisions in the Satisfaction for the renewal of the 
magistracy by the Stadholder. Leicester, said the city council, was 
Nieuwenaar's superior as well as its own; the Satisfaction was now 
irrelevant, since Orange was dead and the municipal government no 
longer Catholic.(59) Nor did the Estates-General's support benefit 
Nieuwenaar; Leicester thought their arguments 'ill-informed'; he was 
in Utrecht 'in person, to instal the magistracy, as the privileges and
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praiseworthy customs of [the city] permit'. And that is what he did, 
retaining twenty-six of the members of the previous year's council; 
Prouninck was still burgomaster.(60)
Leicester's presence in Utrecht seemed to offer the Ridderschap 
the opportunity for which they had been waiting. During the summer of 
1587, they had made several attempts to enlist support from the 
Estates-General and the Estates of Holland for their campaign on 
behalf of the provincial privileges, and in September, these efforts 
met with a favourable reception; Nieuwenaar and deputies from the 
other provinces were to remonstrate with the Governor-General on this 
question.(61) Eight members of the Ridderschap then determined to lay 
their grievances before Leicester himself, but before putting 
anything in writing, they canvassed the Geeligeerden and the remaining 
nobles individually for their opinion. The response to this question 
(which was put in the presence of a notary and witnesses) varied; 
three Geeligeerden gave their support - as Johan Rengers said, the 
provinces had originally taken up arms in defence of their 
privileges - but the other four members of the Ridderschap led by 
Reynier van Aeswijn, lord of Brakel, took the view that redress of the 
privileges was unnecessary, and, in any case, the eight nobles had no 
right to speak for the Second Estate as a whole. The minority 
formally dissociated themselves from the majority's remonstrance, and 
asked the Estates to suppress it, or to disqualify the eight nobles 
from attending the Estates' meetings.(62)
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Nevertheless, the remonstrance was presented to Leicester, on 
28 September 1587; it called for the dismissal from office of all 
foreigners (such as Trillo, the Schout and Agylaeus, the 
procuror-general of the Hof) who had been appointed by Leicester 
without nomination by the Estates; the reinstatement of the men exiled 
in July 1586; a return to the composition of the First Estate as laid 
down by the Landraad in 1582; an end to interference in politics by 
the Reformed ministers; the repeal of all resolutions taken under 
duress or contrary to the privileges; and better co-operation with the 
Estates-General.(63) This remained the programme of the dissident 
gentry throughout their period of exile. On the same day, Prouninck 
ordered the arrest of three of these nobles; Bartholomeus de Wael, 
lord of Moersbergen (the former deputy to the Estates-General), Willem 
van Rijsenburg, and Frederick van Zuylen van Nyevelt. That evening, 
however, Trillo, drawn sword in hand, apprehended six gentlemen as 
they sat drinking at an inn, but later released the three about whom 
no order had been given. The incident provoked unrest in the city; on 
the following day, 29 September, Leicester, angry that the arrest 
should have been made without his knowledge (though Trillo had acted 
'in the name of His Excellency') had Moersbergen and his two fellows 
released.(64)
Shortly afterwards, the majority of the Ridderschap withdrew from 
both the Estates proper and the Standing Committee, leaving the field 
for the time being to the smaller faction dominated by Brakel.(65) 
Some time in October or November 1587, they left the Sticht, to join 
Niclaes van Zuylen van Drakenburg in exile, across the provincial
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border in Holland. Before leaving, they refused to appear before the 
city magistracy in answer to Trillo's summons, on the grounds that its 
members had been illegally appointed, and, besides, were not impartial 
in the case, since the arrest of the six nobles had been a direct 
consequence of their objections to the magistrates.(66) By the end of 
November, Moersbergen and van Zuylen van Nyevelt had asked the 
Estates-General to consider their case in the absence of the Utrecht 
deputies, so that a fair decision might be reached; at the same time, 
the Estates of Holland took the exiled Ridderschap under their 
protection and "safeguard", promising that they, the nobles, might 
recover compensation for any damages sustained by them or their 
property as a result of their remonstrance to Leicester, from the 
persons or goods of any inhabitant of the city of Utrecht who was 
within Holland. (The Estates-General issued a similar document in 
March 1588, applying to all the United Provinces, and ordering local 
officials to assist the exiles in the seizure of other Stichtenaars" 
property.[67])
In December 1587, the exiles took up residence in Woerden, just 
over the Holland border from the Sticht. There they issued the 
definitive statement of their grievances against the "pretended 
magistracy" of the city of Utrecht, and had it witnessed by 
representatives of the town. The eight nobles, and Niclaes van 
Zuylen, the former Schout, declared that they were the lawful 
representatives of the Second Estate, as they formed the majority of 
those summoned in that capacity. Beginning with the expulsions of 
July 1586, they outlined all the subsequent misdeeds of the city 
council, dominated as it was by "foreigners". Although the city was
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"with the other towns, only the third and last Estate of the 
province", it had subverted the First Estate, with the result that its 
members did not dare to disregard the magistrates" wishes, "some 
because they agreed with them, some from fear that they too would be 
expelled from the city". The nobles went on to discuss the raid on 
the Estates" records, in January 1587, and their own arrest in 
September, "all for no other purpose but that the magistracy could,
through the said foreigners rule absolutely over the whole province 
and the first two Estates at their pleasure". The exiles invited the 
Geeligeerden and the small towns to join with them and hold legitimate
meetings of the Estates at a place of their choice, and finished by
saying that, if this invitation were refused, all further proceedings
of the Estates were, in their opinion, null and void.(68)
Those members of the Ridderschap who had remained behind in 
Utrecht, and the Geeligeerden, would not join the Woerden gentry"s 
protest, denying that there was any cause for complaint against the 
city council. January and February 1588 were filled with efforts to 
mediate by Nieuwenaar and two members of the Council of State, Jacob
Valcke and Elbertus Leoninus, which met with no success, and produced 
only a much longer and more detailed protest from Woerden. The exiles 
now accused the city council of "unchristian, inhuman, unnatural and 
unreasonable" conduct, in submitting the province to "oppression, 
tyranny and barbaric government by foreigners".(69) Despite all this 
diplomatic activity, there was no hope of a reconciliation between the 
two sides, since the Woerden Ridderschap"s case was based on the 
contention that the magistracy had been appointed illegally and had
acted illegally in arresting several nobles; a charge to which
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Prouninck and his colleagues would never admit. They, for their part, 
continued to regard the exiles as private individuals (and not as a 
duly constituted Estate of the province), who had tried to conspire 
against the provincial government under cover of preserving the
privileges.(70)
This impasse continued for several months, with both sides 
refusing to yield an inch. If anything, their attitudes hardened,
particularly after the Estates-General"s "letters of reprisal" in
March 1588 showed the remnant of the Estates how little support they 
had from elsewhere.(71) Recent events had not favoured Leicester's 
party anywhere in the Netherlands: a conspiracy to take over Leiden in 
Elizabeth's name had failed, in October 1587.(72) Leicester's
resignation at the end of February 1588 increased the Sticht's sense 
of isolation, especially when renewed efforts to persuade Elizabeth to 
accept the sovereignty of Utrecht were unsuccessful. The new Council 
of State seemed to ignore the Treaty of Nonsuch entirely, despite 
Utrecht's protests.(73) In the spring of 1588, the last outpost of 
support for Leicester fell, when Diederik Sonoy, commander of 
Medemblik in the Noorderkwartier of Holland, submitted to Maurice 
after a siege of the town.(74)
This feeling of isolation perhaps made Utrecht's provincial 
government slightly "milder of mind" with regard to its differences 
with Holland, but it would still not tolerate interference from the 
Estates-General in the Sticht's internal disputes. This interference 
had now extended to aiding and abetting the German general, Count 
Hohenlohe - always an enemy of Leicester, and now Nieuwenaar's
- 213 -
drinking companion - in his military occupation of the fortress at 
Brakel in Gelderland, belonging to the leader of the minority 
Ridderschap faction. When Hohenlohe"s men behaved badly, Brakel 
thought that the exiled gentry were behind the insult to him. In 
June 1588, after much urging from Utrecht, the Council of State 
ordered Count Hohenlohe to evacuate the castle, at a time when 
Leoninus and Valcke were making another attempt at mediation. They 
came to the conclusion that a major concession - the cancellation of 
the "letters of reprisal" - was necessary to induce the Estates of 
Utrecht to send a deputy to the Council of State and to pay their
quota in both ordinary and extraordinary contributions.(75) This 
concession was not made, however, and the Sticht remained
unrepresented in the Council of State.
So far, the events discussed above were centred in the city: the 
rest of the province was, apparently, relatively unaffected. But 
under the surface, discontent was on the increase, and in June 1588 it 
showed itself in the open, when a market boat on the Vecht was held up 
and robbed, by men from Westbroek, one of several villages in the
Nederkwartier which refused to pay the increased consumption taxes, 
introduced to meet the greater war expenses of Leicester's régime. 
The villagers also declared that they would deduct from their normal 
payments compensation for the cost of maintaining the troops billeted 
on them. This was outright defiance of the Estates" authority, 
compounded by an alliance, dating back to December 1587, between these 
Sticht farmers and the inhabitants of Gooiland, a nearby district of 
Holland.(76) The Estates-General were sufficiently alarmed to send 
Nieuwenaar post-haste to restore order, since reports had reached him
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of 3,000 peasants under arms, encouraged by Parma"s governor in 
Deventer, Count Herman van den Berg, who was said to be amassing 
forces for an attack on Gelderland and the Sticht.(77) Although the 
number of farmers involved was actually much lower - between 300 and 
600 from Gooiland and perhaps 300 from Utrecht according to 
interrogations made afterwards, though even these estimates seem 
rather high - Nieuwenaar and his troops met armed opposition in 
Westbroek. Some soldiers and some farmers were killed, and several 
houses burned. The rebellion lasted only a few days at most, however, 
and the farmers soon sued for pardon. In view of the serious military 
danger in which the Nederkwartier stood, they were treated with 
leniency, and were permitted to keep their weapons, to protect 
themselves against enemy raids, provided that they cancelled all 
alliances with other villages, promised never again to flout the 
Stadholder's authority, and co-operated with all provincial officials 
in the future.(78)
Although this rural unrest had been suppressed, the remainder of 
the Sticht"s internal problems were still unresolved, and the enemy 
was growing more dangerous. Utrecht made a final appeal to Elizabeth 
for help: apart from the deputation of the ministers in 1587, Captain
Niclaes van Meetkerken was sent to England in July 1588, to obtain 
permission to raise troops from, and at the expense of, the Dutch in 
England, to protect the vulnerable eastern provinces from Parma. At 
the same time, the burgerhoplieden sent one of their number, Frans
Gerritsz, to England, ostensibly to collect money advanced by the 
Estates on behalf of English troops, but in reality to ensure the 
continuation in office of a sympathetic provincial government.(79)
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Both Elizabeth and Leicester urged Nieuwenaar to re-appoint Prouninck, 
although he himself wanted to be relieved of his responsibilities as 
burgomaster.(80) Leicester's death, in late September, robbed 
Prouninck of his last outside source of support, except for the Queen 
herself.
There was thus nothing to stand in Nieuwenaar's way. He began by 
asking for the authority to exact obedience from the English troops in 
the city, and on 19 September he ordered all but three companies, one 
of which was English, to leave.(81 ) Two days later, there was a 
demonstration against Prouninck outside the town hall, and the 
burgomaster was warned that the Stadholder was planning to arrest him. 
Captain Cleerhagen (whose company was still in Utrecht) and other 
leading supporters of Leicester. When taxed with this, the Countess 
of Nieuwenaar neither admitted nor denied the truth of the charge, but 
simply said, 'A man who does not feel guilty has nothing to fear from 
my husband, who will do nothing for which he cannot answer.' These 
words made Prouninck foresee 'a greater disaster than I can 
express'.(82)
As the time for the renewal of the magistracy approached, the 
city's burgerhoplieden were ready for trouble. Nieuwenaar's 
adherents, who included former militia captains, were also prepared, 
and kept guard independently in the streets. On the night of 
25 September, rumours were circulating that the Stadholder intended to 
restore the hereditary council and hand the city over to the 
Hollanders. Fighting broke out, artillery was brought into use, and 
the remaining troops were prevented from reaching the town hall to
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guard Prouninck and his colleagues. Cleerhagen, Nieuwenaar's old 
opponent, was seriously wounded, and taken prisoner, whereupon his men 
surrendered, and were sent out of town on peat boats. The other 
companies acknowledged Nieuwenaar's authority. Prouninck, Trillo, and 
Frans Gerritsz were arrested; their supporters saw which way the wind 
was blowing, and submitted to the Stadholder, who 'thus became master 
of the city'.(83)
The following day, 26 September, Nieuwenaar delivered his 
ultimatum to a joint meeting of the city council and the Estates' 
Standing Committee: 'to avoid the trouble and bloodshed which was
likely to arise in the city, because of the assembly of the 
citizens...[the Count] knew no way...to make the people go home and 
lay down their weapons', unless he was permitted to instal the new 
magistracy by the method laid down in his 1585 instruction. There was 
nothing for it but to agree. The new council contained twenty-one 
men - more than half - who had not held office at all under 
Prouninck. Seven new burgerhoplieden were also appointed; two days 
later, since 'the previous banishment took place against the wishes of 
the majority of the magistracy', the new council agreed to the 
reinstatement of Niclaes van Zuylen van Drakenburg as Schout.(84)
Over the next few days, the other exiles returned, and took up 
their positions in the provincial government again. On 17 October, 
'the Estates of the province of Utrecht, restored by God's grace to 
their first and proper state', resumed normal meeting.(85) Their first 
task was to cancel all 'illegal' appointments made during the past two 
years, from the procurator-general of the Hof to the schout of a small
— 217 —
village, and either to re-appoint the previous office holder, or to
instal a right-minded successor. Even then, however, there were 'many 
vehement words between the nobles and the deputies of the city and the 
towns', when the former called for the dismissal of Johan Strick, the 
Estates' secretary, who had co-operated with the Prouninck régime, 
while the latter thought he should be continued in office.(86) Various 
other measures introduced under Prouninck were also reversed, and 
relations with the Hague improved immediately: the new city council
even cancelled the 25,000 guilders owed by the Estates-General as bail 
for Paulus Buys.(87)
The victorious exiles now attempted to exclude from politics all
those who had driven them out in 1586 and 1587. Brakel's faction was
prevented from sitting in the Second Estate, and he himself was 
accused of financial peculation (as early as March 1588, one observer 
considered that 'Brakel and Deventer [i.e. Prouninck] respect their 
particular profit too much').(88) Trillo was tried for his share in 
the arrest of the nobles, and the other breaches of the privileges, 
but was released after three months as he could produce authorisation 
from the city council or some other higher authority for all his acts 
as Schout.(89) The charges against Prouninck were much more detailed, 
referring to everything from his alleged correspondence with Reingout 
to his approval of the demolition of the Oudmunster church. But no 
drastic steps could be taken against him if the Sticht wished to 
retain Elizabeth's favour; she wrote to the city council on
Prouninck's behalf and sent an envoy to the Estates to further his
release, while Essex urged Nieuwenaar to treat Leicester's protégé 
with leniency, for the late Governor-General's own sake. In the end,
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a sentence of banishment was pronounced, on 11 July 1589. Prouninck, 
forbidden to hold office ever again in Utrecht, left for Culemborg, 
and finally for England.(90)
Several historians have seen Prouninck, his associates, the 
burgerhoplieden and their followers in the citizen militia as 'a 
people's party' (Fruin), or as 'democrats' (Geyl), working to bring 
about a 'Calvinist democratic theocracy' (Wilson).(91) More recently, 
it has been recognised that the word 'democrat' must not have too many
modern notions attached to its use.(92) Oosterhoff's neutral phrase 
'the opposition movement' is probably the most appropriate description 
of the alliance of certain forces which already existed within the 
Sticht.(93) Calvinism was undoubtedly one of these forces - the 
citizens declared in 1586 that the true religion 'is the only cause of 
the war' - but their Calvinism was more political than religious in 
its inspiration.(94) A long anti-clerical tradition, natural enough in 
Utrecht with its many clergy, coupled with resentment at the 
privileged position of the five colleges, and a real fear that the 
crypto-Catholic clergy would act as a fifth column for Parma, made 
most of the citizens anti-Catholic, rather than positively Reformed 
Protestant, in their attitude. Nor is it advisable, as Oosterhoff 
points out, to call the movement 'democratic' (or even 
'anti-aristocratic', to quote Vijlbrief): it was nothing so
definite.(95) Rather it was the expression of a long-standing and 
continuing opposition to the government of the province and the city, 
which was by no means confined to the two years of Leicester's 
régime. It is true, however, that the Earl's arrival, and his wish to
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govern without the delays and restrictions inherent in the 
Estates-General's system, gave the opposition movement a chance to 
make more effective protests than usual. The movement was thus far 
from being 'a blind tool' in Leicester's hands, as Broersma called it: 
indeed, sometimes it appears that the opposition used the 
Governor-General rather than the other way around.(96) Although 
Prouninck and his associates genuinely wished to advance Leicester's 
interests and increase his powers, they were also able to take 
advantage of his presence and support for their own ends, for example, 
to reduce the Stadholder's influence on appointments. Under 
Prouninck's able leadership, the opposition movement strove to 
strengthen the central government, in the person of the 
Governor-General, while at the same time advocating provincial 
autonomy when it was in their own interests. Both these points of 
view posed a threat to the position of the Estates-General, and 
particularly to its domination by Holland (which under Oldenbarnevelt
could also put forward contradictory arguments about provincial 
sovereignty to suit its own book).(97) The Estates-General and Holland 
therefore took up the cause of the exiles, and thereby contributed 
greatly to the defeat of the opposition movement.
By 1589, the Estates had weathered a period of severe crisis and 
upheaval, and had emerged virtually intact, except for the enforced 
absence of a few members of the Ridderschap from their meetings. Yet j
the previous two years had left their mark, and not only in cosmetic j
procedural changes. The Stadholder, for example, had reasserted his |
powers of appointment, though Nieuwenaar himself lived long enough to |
use them only once more. For their part, even before the coup of !
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September 1588, the Estates had suppressed the claims to political 
power made by the Hof which Leicester had tried to use as a rival 
governmental institution, by filling it with southern exiles who 
supported him.(98) After 1588, the city's first burgomaster was always 
at the same time a member of the Ridderschap who might be expected to 
sympathise with the first two Estates. The opposition movement did 
not cease to exist: it emerged again on to the political scene in 1610 
and 1618, but the events of the latter year confirmed the patrician 
magistracy in its hold on government. Meanwhile, the men who were 
restored to power in 1588 were now aware of several potential dangers 
to their position, and, perhaps most important of all, had realised 
that a rapprochement with Holland was the best way to maintain the 
stability they had so recently achieved.
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Chapter VIII 
The Estates and the Revolt of the Netherlands
The province of Utrecht has not been entirely neglected by
historians of the Dutch Revolt. In 1579, after all, it was the scene
of the signing of the Closer Union of Utrecht, the 'founding charter' 
of the Dutch Republic. It has also attracted some attention as the 
'headquarters' of the Earl of Leicester between 1586 and 1588.(1) And 
while Amersfoort is usually mentioned simply as the birthplace of 
Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, one of the United Provinces' greatest
statesmen, the city of Utrecht was the site of one of his last
reverses, at the hands of Maurice of Nassau in 1618. But, on the 
whole, these are rare exceptions to a rule which has been aptly stated 
by H. Wansink; "Dutch history itself has often been 'Hollandized' and 
as a result the contributions of the other provinces to the history of 
the Republic have been overlooked". The preponderance of Holland, 
which was fully recognised by contemporaries in the years after 1588, 
is hardly surprising in view of its overpowering political and
financial contribution to the Revolt, and its later commercial 
wealth.(2) Yet, however small, however insignificant the activities of 
the 'allies' may seem in comparison, it must be remembered that 
Holland did not represent the norm, and that 'every province, even 
every town, to a large extent constituted an autonomous system, each 
with its peculiar socio-economic and political structures'.(3) The 
preceding chapters attempt to describe these political structures for 
the Sticht.
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It has been generally recognised that the Dutch Republic was a 
Stândestaat, but the nature of the Stdnde has been less frequently 
examined. Variety was the main characteristic of the constitutional 
picture in the mid-sixteenth century Netherlands, a country which, it 
has been well observed 'could boast not only of both two-chamber and 
three-curial systems in its different provinces, but also of 
unicameral ones and of all sorts of others, as well as of a 
States-General'.(4) So wide was this variety that Utrecht was, in 
fact, the only one of the eventual seven United Provinces to have an 
assembly of the traditional Three Estates; clergy, gentry and towns. 
In the maritime provinces, individual towns each had one vote (in 
Holland, after 1572, there were eighteen voting towns; in Zeeland, 
six) with a token representative of the nobility, nor did any of the 
other 'northern' provinces include the clergy in their assemblies. 
Even in the 'southern' provinces, which fell back under Spanish rule, 
there was no ecclesiastical Estate in Flanders until 1598; as far as 
composition is concerned, Brabant and Artois offer perhaps the closest 
parallel to the Sticht elsewhere in the Netherlands.(5) It is 
therefore not strictly accurate to say, as one historian has done of 
the period before the Revolt, that 'the provincial Estates which chose 
the deputies to the Estates-General were mostly composed of nobles, 
clergy and towns in the usual way'.(6) On the other hand, it is 
equally misleading to apply the post-1572 constitutional formation of 
Holland to all the United Provinces.
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This latter practice has led to a generally accepted picture of 
'regent oligarchy' as the typical form of Netherlands political life; 
a picture which, in reality, fits Utrecht only slightly better than it 
fits Friesland or Gelderland.(7) Again, because of Holland's 
supremacy, 'regent oligarchy' in the voting towns, as justified in 
Franchois Vranck's famous 'Short Exposition', became the dominant form 
of political life, simply because the representatives of the other 
provinces in the Estates-General usually allowed themselves to be 
persuaded by the urban oligarchy of Holland and their advocate, 
Oldenbarnevelt. In this connection, it is unfortunate that there 
seems to have been little or no awareness within the Estates of 
Utrecht of the contemporary debate on sovereignty which has so 
interested modern historians.(8) Although Gerard Prouninck proclaimed 
the sovereignty of the people (as against the sovereignty of the 
Estates) to reinforce his efforts towards a stronger central 
government under Leicester, his victorious opponents found no need to 
articulate an alternative theory when they returned from exile in 
1588. Rather, without formal theoretical acknowledgement, the
Estates, like their fellows in the other provinces, gradually assumed 
the provincial sovereignty which became the foundation of the Dutch 
Republic's somewhat vague constitution.(9)
Indeed, the political life of the Republic can be properly 
understood only in the light of this provincial diversity. To quote 
Wansink once more, 'as there was an interaction between the provinces 
and the Union, so there was one between the parts of a province and 
the whole of it'.(10) Utrecht provides a good illustration of these
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interactions, as well as of the problems caused both by provincial 
particularism and by the individualism of a province's component 
parts. In the years after the Pacification of Ghent, the Estates of 
Utrecht appear to present a picture of factionalism and disunity. At 
one time or another, each Estate was divided against itself; the 
chapters over the Satisfaction and the Union of Utrecht; the 
Geeligeerden and the Ridderschap over the alleged violation of their 
privileges under Prouninck; the Third Estate by age-old differences 
between Utrecht and Amersfoort, and by more recent conflicts within 
the city itself. The province of Utrecht was far from unique in this; 
at times it must have seemed that each of Holland's eighteen voting 
towns had its own ideas as to the policies which the Estates of 
Holland should adopt; and the disputes between the city of Groningen 
and the Ommelanden, and among the quarters of Gelderland, were 
notorious.
Yet in the Sticht, as elsewhere, there was more to this picture 
than mere factional in-fighting. Genuine religious and political 
differences added an extra dimension to these quarrels. Much of the 
recent historiography of the Revolt has drawn inspiration from the 
work of Dr. J.J. Woltjer, beginning with his book on Friesland in 
Hervormingstijd (1962) and continued in articles such as 'Kleine 
oorzaken, grote gevolgen' (1975) and 'De Vredemakers' (1976). In 
these he divides political forces in the Netherlands into those of 
'the left', 'the right' and 'the centre'- respectively, a small. 
Reformed Protestant minority who wanted independence from Spain; a 
small, Counter-Reformation Catholic minority on the other side; and 
the great majority of the rest of the population, caught between these
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two extremes, and including those leading moderates who hoped to
pursue a conciliatory policy towards the other provinces while still 
maintaining 'due and limited obedience' to the king.(11) This 
explanation is clearly applicable to the situation in Holland, 
Zeeland, Friesland, and many of the southern provinces such as 
Artois. Although it has been suggested that ifc has little or no 
relevance to Gelderland, with slight modifications it does illuminate
the course of events in Utrecht, particularly when Dr. Woltjer's 
other concept - of a difference in timing between 'the north' and 'the 
south' - is taken into account.(12) Indeed, not only was there a 
time-lag between the 'developed' south and the 'backward' north in the 
crisis of 1566-1567, there was also a chronological difference in the 
later development of the Revolt in 'the north', between the maritime 
provinces and the landward ones, such as Utrecht and Friesland.
Although the events of the autumn of 1576 are widely regarded as 
a turning-point in the history of the Netherlands - indeed, as the 
inception of a 'Third Revolt' - they were apparently not perceived as 
such in the province of Utrecht. Peace with the other provinces, both
'rebellious' and 'loyal' was undoubtedly a significant step, but it 
did not, in November 1576, mean war against the king or his 
representative, Don John. The Sticht was driven into adherence to the
Pacification of Ghent by its fear of the army in the city and the 
garrison in Vredenburg, because the alliance meant that help would be 
available, from Holland and elsewhere, but it was an act of 
expediency; Utrecht still saw itself as a loyal subject of Philip II. 
After nearly ten years of Spanish occupation, a change of attitude in 
the Sticht could begin only with the fall of Vredenburg and the final
■ 1
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departure of the royalist forces in the spring of 1577. Much more 
important than the Pacification in Utrecht's development towards 
fully-fledged membership of the United Provinces was the Satisfaction, 
by which the Sticht placed itself under the governorship of William of 
Orange, the unquestioned leader of the Revolt. And, to begin with, 
this was perhaps as far as a large section of the political community 
was prepared to go. But events were moving too fast for these 
moderates: the progress of the Protestant Reformation (even in its
diluted Duifhuisian form), the resumption of open war against the 
Spanish forces and the consequent demands on the provinces for money: 
all these forced the Estates to abandon the Pacification and the 
Satisfaction as their point of reference. Soon appeals to their terms 
(especially their guarantees for the maintenance of the Catholic 
religion) were being made only by the remnants of the 'centre', and 
'the right'.
It is, of course, very difficult to pinpoint the moment at which 
the Estates moved from loyalism to outright revolt against their 
lawful sovereign: in many ways there was no such moment ; it was a
gradual process. For the two years after the Pacification, what might 
be called the 'centre-right' played an important part in Utrecht's 
political life: it was personified in, for example, many members of
the chapters of Oudmunster and Ste. Marie, the Burggraaf of Montfoort 
and the pre-1579 Amersfoort magistracy. But, with the failure of the 
'conspiracy' against the Union of Utrecht in 1578-1579, the initiative 
passed decisively to the 'left', in the persons of men like Floris 
Thin and Adriaan van Zuylen, the dean of St. Jan, who were convinced 
supporters of Orange and - as far as can be ascertained - only
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moderately Reformed in their religious views. This move was confirmed 
by the banning of Catholic worship after Count Rennenberg's defection 
to Spain in March 1580. Thereafter the 'right' gradually withered 
away as a political force, partly through voluntary exile, partly 
through the occasional 'purging of some bad patriots and suspect 
persons', but, until 1586, this policy was not pursued with genuine 
vigour.(13)
In that year, however, Utrecht took a lurch to the 'far left', 
mainly under the leadership of men from outside the province (it was 
notorious that Prouninck and Agylaeus came from Brabant, and though 
Brakel was born in the Sticht, his family origins were in 
Gelderland). Their uncompromising devotion to the Revolt, and their 
determination to extirpate Catholicism, pro-Spanish feeling, and 
moderate religious attitudes which they saw as nothing but Catholicism 
and pro-Spanish feeling in disguise-, their belief that the war should 
be conducted by stronger central direction without the delays inherent 
in the Estates-General's cumbersome workings: all these led them to
jeopardise, for a short while, the fragile unity which was the
provinces' only chance of survival. But circumstances worked against 
the 'far left', as they had defeated the 'far right', and, by 1590, 
Utrecht was back in the 'moderate left' fold, so firmly that even the 
death of Floris Thin in that year did not disturb the Sticht's 
new-found stability, particularly as he lived long enough to see 
Maurice of Nassau accepted as Stadholder.
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The years between 1576 and 1590 were thus a decisive period for 
the Sticht, in much the same way as the years from 1566 to 1580 were 
for Holland, Zeeland and the southern provinces.(14) It was during 
this time that lasting lines of political and religious division were 
drawn. Moreover, these were formative years for the Estates as an 
institution: an institution which, in the midst of upheavals all
around it, still possessed an inbuilt resistance to change. A certain 
innate conservatism is indicated by the Estates' first concern in the 
new era: they wanted to recover the right to summon themselves which
they had lost under the Habsburgs. Simply because of the upheavals of 
these years, however, the Estates had to adapt in order to survive. 
This process of adaptation to changing circumstances was normally 
fairly gradual, except for the two-year long aberration between 1586 
and 1588, which did not, in fact, reorganise the institutional 
structure, although it did temporarily alter the balance within that 
structure. It cannot be denied that changes did take place in all 
aspects of the Estates' life: there were procedural changes, such as
the development of the Standing Committee; structural changes like the 
replacement of the chapters by the Geeligeerden; fiscal changes to 
cope with the ever-greater financial burden on the province; changes 
in the Sticht's relationship with its neighbours; and, finally, a 
transfer of sovereignty (perhaps still not consciously admitted in 
1590) from Philip II as lord to the Estates themselves. Yet none of 
these changes went further than was strictly necessary at the time: 
even the Estates' religious policy was designed to follow a middle way 
between doctrinal extremes. In short, the Estates would very probably 
have endorsed the dictum of the Duke of Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief
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of the British Army three centuries later: 'There is a time for all 
things: there is even a time for change; and that is when it can no 
longer be resisted'.(15)
It has become a commonplace to point out that every province in 
the Netherlands had its own Revolt, just as every province had its own
form of government. It is thus extremely difficult to synthesise the 
history of a country which could not even agree about the date: from
1582 until 1700, after all, Holland and Zeeland (having adopted the 
Gregorian calendar) were ten days ahead of their allies. It may 
eventually prove possible to write a fully comprehensive history of 
the Dutch Revolt, but the example of Utrecht suggests that it will be
neither short nor simple.
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Appendix I
The Estates and the Abjuration of Philip II
On 26 July 1581, the Estates-General approved the text of what is 
generally knoxra as the Plakkaat van Verlating, an edict declaring that 
the king of Spain had forfeited the government and sovereignty of the 
Netherlands. The final paragraph ordered the authorities in all the 
member provinces of the Union of.Utrecht to put this edict immediately 
into force, and to administer a new oath of allegiance to the 
Estates-General against the king of Spain and his followers. In many 
ways, this was no more than a formal recognition of a situation which 
already existed: as Kossmann and Mellink point out, Philip II had
clearly lost his sovereignty well before that date.(l) But while the 
passage of the resolution may have been a routine matter for the 
Estates-General, it caused a good deal of doubt and difficulty 
elsewhere in the Netherlands.(2)
During the Estates-General's debate on the Abjuration in 
June 1581, Utrecht's deputies stated categorically 'that neither the 
name nor the seal of the king should be used any longer...and that 
each province should, for the time being, use whatever other seal it 
pleases'.(3) Nevertheless, it was several months before measures to 
this effect were actually taken in the Sticht: in August of the same
year, the Estates resolved to follow in the footsteps of Holland and 
Gelderland, which had by that time officially 'abjured the king and 
abandoned his name and seals'.(4) As usual, however, the issue had to 
be referred to the individual Estates, and as usual this proved to be
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a recipe for delay. In October, the city council set forth a lengthy 
account of the Sticht's particular case against the Icing, covering all 
the wrongs done to the province and the city in Philip's name over the 
previous fifteen years - from the refusal of the Confederates' 
Request, to the arrival of the Duke of Alva, the depredations of his 
troops, the tyranny of the Tenth Penny and the destruction of the 
privileges of both the Estates and the city; in short, said this 
document, the Icing had violated all the terms of the treaty by which 
the Estates had accepted his father the Emperor, and then himself, as 
their lord. Consequently, the Estates and all the inhabitants of the 
Sticht declared themselves no longer bound by their oath of loyalty to 
him, since he had ipso jure forfeited his sovereignty over Utrecht.(5) 
Although the city council adopted the draft of this proclamation, the 
provisions were never executed, and the Estates-General's own Act of 
Abjuration was not published in the Sticht until December 1581, 
because the Estates had to exert considerable pressure on the small 
towns, particularly Montfoort, to induce them to consent to such a 
radical measure. (Montfoort hoped to insure itself against the 
possibility of royal retribution by waiting until the edict had been 
published in the other provinces and the other towns of Utrecht, and 
added that the Abjuration should not infringe upon freedom of 
conscience - i.e., in Montfoort, freedom of Catholic conscience.) Only 
a threat to inform Orange and the Landraad of the towns' contumacy and 
recalcitrance did the trick.(6)
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Perhaps surprisingly, no resistance to the Abjuration came from 
the clergy of the five chapters, who declared that they had no right 
to oppose a decision taken by the Estates-General, the Ridderschap and 
the city council. Ste. Marie, usually the most conservative of the 
five, resolved to conform with the decision of the other chapters; 
St. Jan's vote in favour of the Abjuration was passed by six of the 
chapter's Orangists, in the absence of four others who had attended 
the previous day's meeting.(7)
Amersfoort, however, was not so docile, especially when it came 
to the new oath of allegiance to the Estates as the provincial 
government; in the spring of 1582, eight members of the town council 
refused to take the oath unseen, and each demanded a copy of its 
terms, notwithstanding 'several methods of persuasion' which were 'put 
before them'. 'Great confusion and disorder' then arose in the town,
because those 'good men' who did take the oath would have no part in
the government of Amersfoort until the 'defaulters' had either been 
forced to swear allegiance to the Estates, or had been replaced in
office. Since no further mention was made of this issue in
Amersfoort's records, it would seem that the town council's intention 
to charge the defaulters for any costs incurred by the delay in
business was sufficient to change their minds. It is interesting,
however, that six of the defaulters did not reappear on the 1583 town
council, and at least two of them were still considered to be of
doubtful loyalties in 1585.
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In the minds of the Estates-General, the corollary to the 
Abjuration of Philip II was intended to be the acceptance of the Duke 
of Anjou as the Netherlands' lord. But since Utrecht, like Holland 
and Zeeland, did not acknowledge Anjou, the Estates were placed in an 
awkward position. After the removal of the higher power in whose name 
they acted, the Estates tried, at first, to confer this power 
elsewhere. Despite Utrecht's initial support for the Landraad, such a 
body could never fill the gap, and the 'high authority' which the 
Estates considered granting to Orange was encumbered with conditions. 
Nor would Queen Elizabeth accept the unconditional sovereignty of the 
Sticht which the Estates were so eager to offer her during the 
Prouninck régime.(9)
The Estates thus found themselves compelled to act on their own 
authority. In some areas, the transition was painless enough; in
October 1581, for example, the new city council took its oath of
office 'in the name of the Estates of Utrecht'.(10) Yet in other 
matters, the Estates could not bring themselves to assume the 
sovereignty completely; in 1583-1584, during their dispute with Rutger 
van den Boetzelaer over his claim to the high jurisdiction in 
Langerak, the Estates authorised the Marshal of the Nederkwartier to
arrest the murderer in the case, and assert the jurisdiction of the
Estates of Utrecht 'as representing the sovereign lord'.(11) Even in 
1589, the Estates still regarded themselves as being only in temporary 
possession of the high authority and still claimed only to 'represent' 
a sovereign who did not in reality exist. Nevertheless, they 
exercised this authority in fact, even if they would not admit it in
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name, in matters ranging from jurisdiction over tax cases (to be heard 
by the Estates, not by the Hof) to ecclesiastical appointments 
formerly in the gift of the bishop or the Pope.(12) Imperceptibly, and 




Biographical notes on persons mentioned in the text
Note; abbreviations explained on pp. 064-266
Johan van Abcoude van Meerthen 1529 or 1530 - 1595
Schepen of Utrecht 1576-1581; burgomaster 1581-1582. Thereafter
attended the Estates as a member of the Ridderschap.
1581 Nominated to represent Utrecht in the Landraad.
1582 Nominated to represent Utrecht in the Council of State.
1587 Quarrelled with Maximilian van Baexen.
Remained in Utrecht with the minority faction of the 
Ridderschap.
1588 After the return of the exiles, omitted from the 
Ridderschap summons.
Hendrick Agylaeus 1533-1595
Active as a Protestant in den Bosch, where he organised a consistory in 
1566. Banished in 1568; returned to den Bosch, 1577.
1579 After helping to secure the adherence of den Bosch to the
Union of Utrecht, left Brabant for the northern Netherlands.
1585 (November) One of the delegates sent by the Utrecht 
burgerhoplieden to the Estates-General to protest against 
Amsterdam's trade with the enemy.
1586 (October) Appointed Councillor and Procurator-General of the 
Hof of Utrecht. Closely associated with Prouninck.
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1589 Dismissed from his post in the Hof. Left Utrecht for England. 
BNB, I, 135-138.
Goert van Reede, lord of Amerongen 1516-1585
Member of the Ridderschap. Regular attender at the Estates from 1577 
to just before his death.
1581 Deputed to represent Utrecht in both the Estates-General
and the Landraad.
Erasmus Backer
Minister of the Reformed Church 
1579 Called to St. Jacob, Utrecht, to join Hubert Duifhuis.
1581 City council granted him 'protection'.
1582 Resigned from St. Jacob. Became minister at Breukelen.
1587 (March) Suspended from preaching by the Standing Committee.
1589 'Reformed' predikanten petitioned the Estates that he 
should not be allowed to preach.
Maximilian van Baexen 7-1606
Member of the Ridderschap. Regular attender at Estates 1578-1587 
and 1588 onwards.
1583 Deputed to represent Utrecht in Estates-General at Middelburg
1584 Appointed Marshal of Eemland.
1587 Quarrelled with Johan van Abcoude van Meerthen. A member of
the exiled Woerden group of the Ridderschap, 1587-88.
1588 Attempt by the city council to deprive him of the office 
of Marshal.
1590 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General.
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Niclaes van Berck ?“1618(?)
Canon of St. Jan. Member of the Geeligeerden 1582-1587; 1588 onwards. 
From 1583, receiver of oudschildgeld, Archbishop's tithes,
consumption tax, etc.
1587 (February) Omitted from the five Geeligeerden installed 
by Nieuwenaar.
1588 (October) Reinstated in Geeligeerden.
1590 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Council of State.
Johan van den Berg 7-1609
Canon of the Pom. Member of the Geeligeerden 1587-88. Regular 
attender at Estates 1577-81, on behalf of the Dom.
1587 (February) Installed as one of the five Geeligeerden
by Nieuwenaar.
1587-88 Represented Utrecht in Estates-General.
1588 Not continued in Geeligeerden after the exiles' return:
they refused to do business with him.
1600 Elected dean by the"chapter, but never recognised
by the Estates.
Gerard Blockhoven
Minister of the Reformed Church. Preached in Gouda and Heusden, but had 
differences with these consistories and with the provincial synod of 
South Holland.
1590 Called to Utrecht by the city council.
1593 A member of the commission inquiring into the Church
in rural areas.
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1601 Before the provincial synod of South Holland, confessed
to teaching unsound doctrine and to improper behaviour while 
in Utrecht. Promised to reform.
Rutger van den Boetzelaer, lord of Asperen, Langerak, etc. 1534-1604.
Signatory of the Compromise. Close associate of William of Orange.
1587 Became lord of Langerak after transfer from one Hendrik 
van Zuylen.
1588 In dispute with the Estates over sovereignty of Langerak.
NNBW, VIII, 161.
Maximilian de Henin, Count of Bossu 1542-1578
Stadholder of Utrecht 1567-1573
1567 Temporarily appointed to replace William of Orange as
Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and Friesland.
1573 Captured by the Beggars.
1576 Released after Pacification of Ghent. Became commander 
in the Estates-General's army.
1577 Took part in siege and capture of Vredenburg. Problems 
over payment of his troops.
NNBW, IX, 90.
Hendrick Both
Schepen of Amersfoort 1580-1585. Attended the Estates for Amersfoort
1581-1585.
1583 Imprisoned in Utrecht for Amersfoort's tax arrears.
Attended meetings of Standing Committee; acquired a knowledge 
of political affairs.
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Reinier van Aeswijn, lord of Brakel 1544-1620
Member of the Ridderschap. Burgomaster of Utrecht 1580-1581.
1579 Signed the Union of Utrecht on behalf of the Ridderschap.
Appointed receiver-general for the Provinces of the Closer Union.
1580-81 Deputed to represent Utrecht at the Estates-General.
1583 Represented Utrecht in the Landraad
Accused by the citizens of Utrecht of misuse of funds designated for 
troops in the Estates' pay. His request to resign was not granted 
because his appointment had been endorsed by the Provinces of the 
Closer Union and the Landraad.
1585 A member of Leicester's Council of State.
1586-88 Closely associated with Prouninck. Leader of the
minority faction of the Ridderschap which stayed in 
Utrecht 1587-1588.
1588 (October) Faced serious allegations of financial
peculation from the returning exiles. Excluded from Estates.
1590 Petitioned the Estates-General to allow him to put his case
(and that of Johan van Abcoude van Meerthen and Lubbert van Parijs van 
Zudoort) to Maurice of Nassau, the Stadholder.
1610 Leader of the uprising in Utrecht against the Estates 
and the city council.
1611 Banished by the restored magistracy.
NNBW, VI, 54.
Johan van Bruhesen 1527-1600 
Canon of the Dom. Domdeken
1567 Appointed treasurer of the chapter of the Dom.
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1572 Secretly elected Domdeken, in opposition to the
Hof's wishes.
1577 Fled Utrecht, to escape the citizens who held him
responsible for the opposition to Orange as Stadholder. Went to Cologne, 
where he lived until his death.
Appointed Bishop of Groningen and then Archbishop of Utrecht, but 
never took either seat.
NNBW, II, 264.
Lambert van der Burch 
Dean of Ste. Marie
1579 Forced to sign the Union of Utrecht for his chapter
1585 Expelled from Utrecht
1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht ,
Hendrick Buth
Canon, and later treasurer, of Ste. Marie. Member of the Geeligeerden 
1582-1587; 1588 onwards.
Attender at Estates 1577-1581, on behalf of Ste- Marie.
1583 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General
1586 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General
1586-87 One of the deputies (with Bartholomeus de Wael van
Moersbergen) at the centre of Utrecht's dispute with the Estates-General 
Recalled from the Hague. Left the Estates-General February 1587.
1587 (February) Omitted from the five Geeligeerden
installed by Nieuwenaar.
1588 (October) Reinstated into the Geeligeerden.
1592 Resigned his prebend.
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Paulus Buys 1531-1594
Pensionary of Leiden; then advocate of Holland, 1572-1584. Born in 
Amersfoort.
1577 Negotiated on Orange's behalf with the Estates about the
Satisfaction.
1579 Negotiated with Amersfoort on behalf of the Union of Utrecht.
A leading member of the pro-England party c. 1584-1585. Quarrelled 
with the Earl of Leicester.
1586 (July) Arrested and imprisoned in Utrecht.
1587 Released on the orders of the Estates-General, who
chose him to represent Utrecht in the Council of State.
NNBW, I, 519
Dirk Canter 1545-1616
Schepen of Utrecht 1575-1577; Burgomaster 1588-1590.
1590 Active in passing the Estates' Erastian Church ordinance.
Excluded from the city council.
1610 Leader of the uprising in Utrecht against the Estates
and the city council. Briefly held office of burgomaster. 
Imprisoned.
1611 Exiled from Utrecht and the United Provinces.
NNBW, I, 558.
Juliaen Cleerhagen c. 1555- c. 1598
Military commander in service of Estates-General.
1587 Governor of Gorcum. Appointed by Leicester, dismissed
by Philip van Nassau. Loyal adherent of Prouninck. Quarrelled
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with Nieuwenaar.
1588 (September) Wounded and imprisoned in the fighting over 
Nieuwenaar"s coup.
1589 Recovered from his wound; went to England.
NNBW, III, 235
Floris van Pallant, count of Culemborg 1537-1598
Leading Protestant nobleman. Member of the Confederation of the Nobility.
Banished by the Council of Troubles. Returned to the Netherlands after 
Alva left.
1580-81 Dispute with the Estates over the River Lek.
Continuing dispute over jurisdiction in the village 
of Honswijk.
1586 (June) Arrested in Utrecht for refusing to admit troops
to Culemborg.
(October) With Lord North, renewed the Utrecht city council, on Leicester's 
instructions. Fervent supporter of the Prouninck regime.
1589 Offered Prouninck shelter when he was banished.
NNBW, V, 424,
Jacob Cuynretorff 2-1582
Scholaster of Oudmunster. Occasional attender of Estates on behalf of 
Oudmunster 1574-1575 and 1577-1578.
1577 One of Utrecht's deputies at the St. Geertruidenberg
negotiations.
1578-79 Instigated 'conspiracy' against the Union of Utrecht.
With Johan van Renessse, drafted 'Counter-Union'. Arrested and imprisoned 
until the Union was signed. Objected because of his ecclesiastical
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1578 (August) On a visit to Utrecht, preached in Franciscan Church.
BWPG
Gerrit van Dompselaer 
Schepen of Utrecht 1586-1588
1585 (November) One of the delegates sent by the Utrecht
burgerhoplieden to the Estates-General to protest 
against Amsterdam's trade with the enemy.
1586-88 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General,
instead of Hendrik Buth and Bartholomeus de Wael van 
Moersbergen.
Johan Robbrechtsz van Druenen ?-before October 1588
Raad of Utrecht 1576-1577; Schepen 1578-1581; burgomaster 1582-1585
1580 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General,
and again in 1581 and 1585.
1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht. With the other leading exiles
appealed to the Estates of Holland, and was taken under 
Leicester's protection.
Died in exile.
Hubert Duifhuis 1531-1581 
Minister of the St. Jacob church.
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1572 Left Rotterdam when Bossu captured it. Lived in exile in
Cologne.
1577 Called to the St. Jacob church in Utrecht. Conducted 
Catholic services, but preached in the Reformed manner.
1578 After a brief return to Rotterdam, came back to Utrecht
at the city council's request. Faced objections from the consistorial 
congregation to his doctrinal position, e.g. on baptism.
1579 Forbidden to establish a consistory in St. Jacob.
BWPG
Johan van Duvenvoorde 1530-1600
Canon and Scholaster of the Pom. Domdeken. Member of the 
Geeligeerden.
1581 Elected Domdeken on the recommendation of Ausonius 
van Galama, the retiring acting dean.
1582 Appointed to Geeligeerden.
1585 Member of the commission in the Hague which negotiated
the treaty with England.
1587 Continued as a member of the Geeligeerden.
Hermannus EIconics
Minister of the St. Jacob church,
1581 Called to St. Jacob after Duifhuis's death.
1586 Agreed to the amalgamation with the consistorial congregation.




Raad and schepen of Utrecht. Raad: 1576-1577, and 1584-1586; 
schepen: 1577-1580 and 1581-1584.
1580 Deputed to represent Utrecht In the Estates-General.
Again in 1584.
1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht. Later taken under
Leicester's protection.
1589 Utrecht's deputy in the Admiralty of Rotterdam.
Ausonius van Galama ?1524-?1584
Canon of the Dom. Vice-domdeken; acting dean 1577-1581, in the
absence of Johan van Bruhesen. Attended the Estates regularly in 1569 and
1577-1581, on behalf of the Dom.
1579 Signed the Union of Utrecht for his chapter.
1581 Asked to be replaced as dean because of age and 
failing memory.
Johannes Gerobolus 1540-1606 
Minister of the Reformed Church.
1566 Preached the Reformed gospel in Delft. Fled to Emden.
1573-1590, preached in Vlissingen, Harlingen, Deventer, 
Harderwijk.
1590 Called to Utrecht by the city council. Remained there 
until his death, on good terms with the civil authorities.
1593 A member of the commission inquiring into the Church in
rural areas.
NNBW, I, 929
Syphridus van Grovesteyn 7-1589
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Canon of the Dom. Member of the Geeligeerden 1587-1588. Attended 
the Estates occasionally 1577-1581, on behalf of the Dom.
1587 (February) Installed as one of the five Geeligeerden 
by Nieuwenaar.
1588 (October) Not continued in office.
Loef van de Haer 71540-?
Member of the Ridderschap. Treasurer of the Lekdijk 1567-1578.
Attended the Estates regularly 1574-1575 and 1577-1580, Receiver of the 
single oudschildgeld.
1583 Doubts raised about his accounts.
Floris Heermale 7-1608
Canon and treasurer of Oudmunster. Member of the Geeligeerden 
1582-1587; 1588 onwards.
Frequently deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General. Attended 
the Estates regularly 1577-1586, and 1588-1590.
1577 Negotiated the Satisfaction.
1581 Represented Utrecht in the Landraad.
1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht.
1588 (October) Reinstated in the Geeligeerden.
1592 Appointed proost of Oudmunster,
Wernerus Helmichius 1551-1608 I
Reformed Protestant minister. j
1578 Called temporarily to Utrecht. I
i1579 Appointed permanently to preach in Utrecht to the j
consistorial congregation. i
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1581 Held the first Reformed service in the Dom.
1586 Acted as clerk to the National Synod, in the Hague.
1588 (May-August) On the mission of the predikanten 
to England.
1589 Dismissed. Never preached in Utrecht again. Called 
to Delft.
BWPG
Gilles de Berlaymont, Baron Hierges 7-1579
Stadholder of Utrecht 1574-1576. Military commander in Spanish service, 
1572 Appointed Stadholder of Friesland and Gelderland.
1574 Appointed Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht.
1576 Joined the Estates-General party.
1576-77 Took part in the siege and capture of Vredenburg.
1578 Joined Don John in the seizure of Namur.
Philip, Count Hohenlohe-Langenberg 1550-1606
Military commander in the service of Orange and the Estates-General. 
Quarrelled with Leicester. Became ally of Nieuwenaar.
1588 His men occupied the fortress at Brakel. Dispute with
the lord of Brakel.
NNBW, V, 239.
Robert van Honthorst 
Canon of Oudmunster.




Minister of the Reformed Church. Quarrelled with his congregation in 
Vlaardingen and Pynacker, until the classis of Delft declared him 
unworthy to preach.
1586-87 Minister at Montfoort: a notorious drunkard.
Willem van Lamsweerde
Secretary of the Dom 1567-1582. Secretary of the Estates.
1578-79 Acted as secretary in the Union of Utrecht negotiations.
1579 Involved in dispute over the post of steward of the domains,
1581 Had to choose between secretary-ship and stewardship 
of the domains.
1582 (January) Resigned from post as secretary.
1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht.
1588 (November) Provisionally reinstated as steward of 
domains.
Roetert van Lanscroon
Schepen of Utrecht 1580-1582; 1585-1587 and 1588-1591. Raad 1582-1584,
1585-86 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General.
1588 (October) Deputed to represent Utrecht in the 
Estates-General.
Gilles van Ledenberg 71548-1618
Secretary of the Estates. Worked as clerk to Floris Thin.
1588 Appointed secretary of the Estates.




Assistant advocate of Utrecht.
1584 Appointed to assist Floris Thin.
Nicolaas van Meetkerken 1562-1591
Captain in the service of the Estates-General. Follower of Leicester.
1588 (July) Sent to persuade Elizabeth and Leicester not to
withdraw or reduce the number of English troops in the
Netherlands.
1589 Joined the Anglo-Dutch expedition to support Don 
Antonio of Portugal.
NNBW, IV, 965.
Herman Modet 71520 (or 1530/40) - 71603
Reformed Protestant minister.
1566 Active in outdoor preaching.
1567 Fled to England. Thereafter travelled in Germany.
From 1574, active in the Netherlands.
1580 Called to Utrecht, as minister to the consistorial
congregation.
1584-85 Attempt by the city council to dismiss him. He
was reinstated after protests from the consistory and the
appointment of Nieuwenaar as Stadholder.
1586 Attended National Synod in the Hague.
(December) With Philip Rataller, sent to England by the city council,
to assure Elizabeth of Utrecht's loyalty to her and to urge her to
continue to support the Reformed Church.
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1587 (March) Returned to Utrecht
(May/June) Quarrelled with Nieuwenaar. Suspended from preaching; reinstated 
after protests from his fellow predikanten.
1588 (December) Dismissed by the city council.
NNBW, III, 862.
Bartholomeus de Wael, lord of Moersbergen 7-1592
Member of the Ridderschap. Attended the Estates regularly 1577-1587 
and 1588-1590.
1579 Signed the Union of Utrecht on behalf of the 
Ridderschap.
1583 Accused (with Brakel) of misuse of funds for the
troops' pay. His request to resign was not granted.
1586 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General.
1586-87 With Hendrick Buth, at the centre of Utrecht's
dispute with the Estates-General. Recalled from the 
Hague. Left February 1587.
1587 (September) Arrested by Trillo. After his release, 
went into exile: a member of the Woerden group of the 
Ridderschap.
1588 After his return from exile, again represented 
Utrecht in the Estates-General.
Johan, Burggraaf van Montfoort 7-1583.
First Member of the Ridderschap.
Attended the Estates occasionally 1569-1570, and 1575.
1578-79 Possibly implicated in the movement against the 
Union of Utrecht.
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Maurice, Count of Nassau 1567-1625
Military commander. Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland 
and Overijssel. Son of William of Orange.
1584 (August) Appointed head of the Council of State.
1585 (November) Stadholder and captain-general of Holland 
and Zeeland.
1590 Appointed Stadholder and captain-general of Utrecht,
Gelderland and Overijssel. From 1590 onwards he had a 
string of military successes against Spain.
NNBW, I, 1315.
Adolf van Solms, Count of Meurs and Nieuwenaar 71545-1589 
Stadholder of Utrecht 1585-1589. Also Stadholder of Gelderland and 
Overijssel.
UJa1583 Supported Gebhard van Elector of Cologne, in
his war against the Catholic princes.
1584 Installed as Stadholder of Overijssel.
1585 (September) Took the oath of office as Stadholder 
of Utrecht.
1586 (January) His appointment as Stadholder was confirmed 
by the Estates-General.
(October) Angry at the renewal of the Utrecht magistracy by Culemborg ,|
and North. |
1587 Became more and more anti-English. j
■i1588 (September) Restored his authority in Utrecht by a icoup d'état. j
1
1589 (October) Killed by an explosion in Arnhem. j
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NNBW, V, 374.
Philip de St. Aldegonde, lord of Noircarmes 7-1574
Stadholder of Utrecht 1573-1574. Military commander in Spanish service.
1566-67 Governor of Hainault. Adviser of Margaret of Parma.
Captured Valenciennes, Tournai, den Bosch and Maastricht 
from the rebels.
1573 After Bossu's capture, appointed Stadholder of Utrecht.
1574 (March) Died at Utrecht, of wounds received at the
siege of Alkmaar.
BNB
Roger, Baron North 1530-1600
Close associate of Leicester.
1585 (December) Came to the Netherlands with Leicester.
1586 (October) Renewed the Utrecht magistracy with 
Culemborg
1587 Possibly involved in a plot to oust Nieuwenaar from
the Stadholdership.
Floris van den Bongard, lord of Nyenroode 71526-1602
Member of the Ridderschap. Attended the Estates regularly 1577-1588, and 
very occasionally thereafter.
1587-88 A member of the minority faction of the .
Ridderschap. Remained in Utrecht.
Nicolaes van Oostrum
Schepen and burgomaster of Utrecht. Raad 1580-1582; schepen
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1582-1585 and 1589-1590; burgomaster 1590-1591.
Lubbert van Parijs van Zudoort 7-1607
Schepen and burgomaster of Utrecht. Also member of the Ridderschap.
Schepen 1577-1578 and 1581-1583; burgomaster 1579-1580 and 1585-1586.
Attended the Estates for the Ridderschap 1586-1588.
1586 Represented Utrecht in the Estates-General.
1587 Remained in Utrecht with the minority faction
of the Ridderschap.
1588 After the return of the exiles, omitted from
the Ridderschap summons.
Jacob de Pottere 7-1586 
Schepen of Utrecht 1585-1586 
1583 Awarded burgerschap of Utrecht
1586 (March) Delivered a Latin oration on Leicester's
entrance to Utrecht.
(July) Arrested Paulus Buys
Johan Proeys 7-1585
Canon of St Pieter. Member of the Geeligeerden. Attended the Estates 
occasionally 1577-1581, and regularly 1582-1585.
Gerard Prouninck van Deventer 7-1610
Burgomaster of Utrecht 1586-1588. Born in den Bosch, active as a Protestant I
■ ithere until he left in 1579. j
1581 Receiver-general for the United Provinces. j
1586 (October) Appointed burgomaster of Utrecht, by |
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Culemborg and North. Emerged as leader of Leicestrian party in Utrecht. 
(November) Refused admission to the Estates-General as Utrecht's 
representative.
1587 (September) Reappointed burgomaster, by Leicester.
1588 (October) Arrested after rioting in the city.
Imprisoned.
1589 (July) Exiled from the Netherlands. Travelled
to Culemborg, and then to England.




Secretary of the Hof of Utrecht 1586-1588(7)
1586 Appointed secretary of the Hof.
(December) Sent to England with Modet, by the
city council, to assure Elizabeth of Utrecht's loyalty.




Financial official. Worked for Berlaymont, Alva and Requesens. Treasurer 
of the provincial council under Anjou. Left the southern provinces after 
an enquiry into his conduct. Was admired by Leicester, who proposed to 
put him at the head of his Chamber of Finance.




Johan van Renesse 1540-1619 
Canon and later dean of St. Jan.
1578-79 Involved in Cuynretorff's 'Counter-Union' conspiracy.
Arrested by the city council but soon released.
1581 Elected substitute-dean to act in Adriaan van 
Zuylen's absence.
1605 Appointed dean of St. Jan.
Johan Rengers 7-1616
Canon of St. Jan. Member of the Geeligeerden. Attended the Estates 
regularly 1582-1590.
1582 Nominated to represent Utrecht in the Council 
of State.
1583 Nominated to represent Utrecht in the 
Landraad.
1585 Utrecht's deputy in the negotiations with France.
1588 Represented Utrecht in the Estates-General.
1598 Member of the Admiralty of Friesland.
Willem van Cuylenborch van Vianen van Rijsenburg, lord of Rijsenburg 
7-1596.
Member of the Ridderschap. Attended the Estates regularly 1577-1587 and 
1588-1590.
1587 Represented Utrecht in the Estates-General.
A member of the exiled Woerden faction of the 
Ridderschap 1587-1588.
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Fernand de Lannoy, count of La Roche 1520-1579
Stadholder of Utrecht 1574. Military commander in army of Charles V and
Philip II.
1574 Ineffective as Stadholder; e.g. April, unrest
caused by troops passing through Utrecht. Anxious 
to give up the office.
BNB
Ansem Ruysch 71547-1614
Schepen of Amersfoort 1586.
1586 Appointed steward of ecclesiastical property
under the Redressement.
Unpopular with the city and the towns.
Frederick Schenck van Toutenberg 1503-1580
Archbishop of Utrecht 1561-1580.
1565 Summoned council of the Archbishopric to put
the Tridentine decrees into effect, but unsuccessful.
1576 Forced to lend money to the Estates against his will.
1580 His funeral was the last public expression
of Catholic worship in the city.
NNBW, II, 1280.
Nicolaes Sopingius 7-1592
Minister of the Reformed Church.
1579 Called to the consistorial congregation of
Utrecht. In dispute with Hubert Duifhuis.
1588 A member of the delegation sent by the
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predikanten to Elizabeth.
1589 Dismissed from his post in Utrecht.
1590 Left for Breda where he died.
NNBW, V, 778.
Thomas Sosius 7-1598
Procurator-general of the Hof of Utrecht.
1572 Appointed to the Hof.
1578 Acting steward of the domains.
1579 Involved in controversy over the stewardship.
Lost to Willem van Lamsweerde.
1583 At the instigation of Paulus Buys, appointed 
as professor at the University of Leiden.
1584 Left Utrecht for Leiden.
NNBW, III, 1520.
Johan Strick
Secretary of the Estates.
1582 (January) Appointed secretary to succeed Lamsweerde.
1586-88 Took over much of Thin's work while he 
was in exile.
1588 Dismissed because of his collaboration with
Prouninck. Replaced by Ledenberg.
Taco Sybrandsz 7-1615 
Minister of St. Jacob church 
1581 Called to St. Jacob in Utrecht.
1586 Resigned because he could not sign the
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confession of faith, an4 so could not agree to the amalgamation with the 
consistorial congregation.
1589 Became the minister at Mederablik.
NNBW, V, 868.
Floris Thin 7-1590
Advocate of the Estates of Utrecht. Began his career as the secretary of 
the chapter of Oudmunster. Acted more and more for the Estates.
1567 Appeared before the Council of Troubles' 
commissioners.
1574-75 Two unsuccessful attempts to secure a 
permanent salaried appointment.
1577 A frequent delegate to the Estates-General,
onwards and other governmental bodies. |
1577 Appointed advocate. Negotiated the Satisfaction. I
1578-79 Instrumental in bringing about the Union 
of Utrecht.
1583 Drew up the new instruction for the Hof.
1585 Unpopular with the citizenry, who accused him
of delaying Nieuwenaar's appointment as Stadholder.
1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht. Took refuge in 
Holland. Removed important documents.
(August) Appealed to the Estates-General for help.
Kept in touch with events in Utrecht.





Schout of Utrecht 1586-1588. Military commander in Orange's service
1573-1583. Adherent of Leicester.
1586 (October) Appointed Schout of Utrecht,
after city council had rejected him in August.
1587 Arrested six nobles, who then went into
exile in Woerden.
1588 (October) Dismissed from his post, and 
imprisoned. Released after trial.
1598 Secured an allowance from the Estates-General,
despite opposition from Utrecht's delegate, Heermale.
NNBW, I, 1503,
Gebhard Truchsess von Waldburg 1547-1601
Elector-Archbishop of Cologne 1577-1583.
1584 Went into exile in the Netherlands after
unsuccessful war against Imperial Catholic forces.
1586 Close associate of Leicester. Received
financial help from Utrecht.
1587 (May) Helped to avert a massacre after a
mutiny in Utrecht.
ADB, VIII, 457-470.
Gerrit van Zoudenbalch, lord of Urk 7-1599
Member of the Ridderschap. Attended the Estates regularly 1581-1587 and
1588-1590.
1583 involved in controversy about his
collation to the parish of Maarssen.
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1587-88 A member of the exiled Woerden Ridderschap.
Frederick Uten Eng, lord of den Engh 7-1582 
Member of the Ridderschap. Marshal of the Nederkwartier.
1577 Represented Utrecht in the Estates-General.
One of Utrecht's deputies at the St. Geertruidenberg negotiations. Negotiatec
the Satisfaction with Orange.
1579 Signed the Union of Utrecht on behalf of 
the Ridderschap.
1581 Requested permission from Orange to resign 
from his post as Marshal.
NNBW, II, 438.
Johan Uyttenbogaert 1557-1644 
Minister of the Reformed Church
1578 Secretary to Count John of Nassau.
1580-84 Studied theology at the city of Utrecht's
expense.
1584 Called to Utrecht to be minister to the 
consistorial congregation.
1589 Dismissed from his post.
1591 Became court preacher in the Hague.
1610 Led the Remonstrance.
1619 Founded the Remonstrant Brotherhood, f
in Antwerp.
1621-26 Lived in France.
NNBW, II, 1469.
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Willem Veusels 7-1614 
Dean of St Pieter 1569-1580 
1570-76 On a mission to Madrid on behalf of the
the Utrecht chapters, to protest to Philip II about the Tenth, Twentieth 
and Hundredth Penny taxes.
1578 (April) Expelled from Utrecht.
Joost de Zoete, lord of Villers 7-1589 
Stadholder of Utrecht 1584-1585.
A member of the Confederation of the Nobility. Military commander - 
'Field Marshal' - in Anjou's army and later in Orange's service.
1584 Appointed Stadholder of Utrecht.
1585 (June) Captured at the Battle of Amerongen.
1587 Released after ransom.
Willem de Wael van Vronesteyn 7-1596 or 1597
Member of the Ridderschap. Schepen of Utrecht 1578-1579. Attended
the Estates regularly 1578-1584, on behalf of his nephew, Frederick, son
of Adriaan de Wael van Vronesteyn.
Johan van Renesse, lord of Wulven and Wilp 71537-71584
Member of the Ridderschap. Attended the Estates regularly 1578-1583.
1566 Requested Orange and Margaret of Parma
for a church in Utrecht to house Reformed services.
1579 Commissioner-general for munitions, for
the Union of Utrecht.
1584 Nominated to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General.
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Adriaan van Zuylen 7-1599
Dean of St. Jan 1565-1599. Member of the Geeligeerden. Attended the 
Estates regularly 1577-1590.
1577 (March) Delegated to negotiate with Buys 
about the Satisfaction.
1579 Signed the Union of Utrecht for his chapter.
Represented Utrecht on the first commission of
the Province of the Closer Union 
1581 Willing to accept reduced ecclesiastical 
representation on the Standing Committee.
1586-88 Continued as a member of the Geeligeerden 
throughout the crisis.
Niclaes van Zuylen van Drakenburg, lord of Zevender and Drakesteyn 
Schout of Utrecht. Member of the Ridderschap. Attended the 
Estates for both the Ridderschap and the city.
1579 Signed the Union of Utrecht.
1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht. Took refuge
in Holland.
(August) Appealed to the Estates-General for help.
1587-88 Associated with the Woerden Ridderschap.
1588 (September) Reinstated in office.
Frederick van Zuylen van Nyevelt, lord of Hindersteyn 7-1597
Member of the Ridderschap. Marshal of the Overkwartier 1595-1597.
Attended the Estates regularly for the Ridderschap 1577-1587 and
1588-1590.
1587-88 Member of the exiled Woerden Ridderschap
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group.
William, Prince of Orange 1533-1584
Leader of the Revolt. Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht. 
1559 Appointed Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland and 
Utrecht.
1567 Went into exile after the failure of the first revolt.
1572 led the revolt in Holland and Zeeland.
Recognised as their Stadholder.
1577 (August) Visited Utrecht.
(October) By the Satisfaction, became Stadholder 
of Utrecht.




GAA: Gemeentearchief Amersfoort 
GAU: Gemeentearchief Utrecht 
GAU Stad; Stadsarchief
GAWbD: Gemeentearchief Wijk-bij-Duurstede 
RAU: Rijksarchief Utrecht
AKD; Archief van het Domkapittel
AKJ; Archief van het Kapittel van St. Jan
AKM: Archief van het Kapittel van Ste. Marie
AKP: Archief van het Kapittel van St. Pieter
Staten; Archief van de Staten van Utrecht 
RA: Rechterlijke Archieven
AAU; Archief Aartsbisdom Utrecht
AGN; Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden (12 vols., Utrecht, 
1949-58).
BGN: Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 
BMGN: Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der 
Nederlanden
BMHG: Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 
BNB; Biographie Nationale de Belgique (27 vols., Brussels, 1886-1938). 
Bor: P.G.Bor, Nederlantsche oorloghen beroerten ende borgerlijke 
oneenicheyden (5 vols., Leiden and Amsterdam, 1621-1630).
Brandt: G. Brandt, The history of the Reformation and other
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ecclesiastical transactions in and about
the Low Countries (4 vols., London, 1720-1723).
BVGO: Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde
BWPG: J.P. de Bie and J. Loosjes, eds., Biographisch Woordenboek
van Protestantsche Godgeleerden in Nederland (the Hague, 1919)
CSP Foreign: Calendar of State Papers Foreign 1585-1588.
Dodt van Flensburg: J.J. Dodt van Flensburg, ed., Archief voor 
kerkelijke en wereldsche geschiedenissen, 
inzonderheid van Utrecht (7 vols., Utrecht, 1839-1848).
HMC: Historical Manuscript Commission Reports
Hora Siccama: D.G. Rengers Hora Siccama, De geestelijke en kerkelijke 
goederen onder het canonieke, het gereformeerde en het 
neutrale recht: historisch-juridische verhandeling, 
voornamelijk uit Utrechtsche gegevens samengesteld, I 
(Utrecht, 1905).
KHG: Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap
Kossmann and Mellink, Texts : E.H. Kossmann and A. F. Mellink, Texts 
concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands (Cambridge, 1974).
NAK: Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis
NNBW: Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek (10 vols., Leiden, 
1911-1937).
RSG: N. Japikse and H.H.P. Rijperman, eds., Resolutien der
Staten-Generaal 1576-1609 (14 vols., the Hague, 1915-1970).
Tegenwoordige Staat: Tegenwoordige Staat der Vereenigde Nederlanden, 
vols. XI and XII (Amsterdam, 1758 and 1772). Also published as 
Nederland in vroeger tijd, vols. VIII to XI (Zaltbommel, 1965).
TvG: Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis
van de Water; J. van de Water, ed., Groot placaetboek, vervattende
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(3 vols., Utrecht, 1729).
WMV; Werken der Marnix-Vereenlging
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Since the rural population appears to have been increasing in the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, especially in the north-west peat-digging areas and along the Rivers Vecht and Ijssel, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that the figure for the 1580s must have 
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multiplied by a coefficient of 4.5, produces the following table:






This estimate may err on the high side, however, particularly for 
the city with its large clerical population. In any case, the Estates 
did not consider these figures satisfactory for their purposes, but 
unfortunately they did not record the results of any recount (RAU 
Staten 231:1, 23 May 1577).
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ARCHIVAL SOURCES
This thesis is based principally on sources in the Rijksarchief 
Utrecht (which houses the archives of the Estates, the Hof and the 
five chapter churches); the Gemeentearchief Utrecht, where the records 
of the city are to be found, and the Gemeentearchief Amersfoort. The 
most important of these sources were the records and resolutions of 
the various institutions discussed in the text: the Estates 
themselves, their Standing Committee, the city council, the five 
churches and the town council of Amersfoort. In addition, the 
accounts of several receivers of tax, and several collections of 
correspondence were consulted. The latter included letters to and 
from central bodies such as the Estates-General, and some 
correspondence of the Estates' advocate, Floris Thin.
The references for these principal collections are as follows:
A.: S. Muller, Catalogus van het archief der Staten van Utrecht,
1375-1813 (Utrecht, 1915):
231 (nos. 1-4,6); Resolutions of the Estates 1577-1590, 1598.
261: Resolutions of the Gedeputeerde Staten 1576-1582.
264 (nos. 1-8): Resolutions of the Gedeputeerde Staten 1583-1590.
285: Letters from the Council of State, the Governors-General, the 
Landraad, etc., 1576-1685 (N.B. there are no letters between December
1581 and March 1586.)
1035 and 1036: Incoming letters (including those to Thin) and minutes
of outgoing letters.
B.: S. Muller, Catalogus van het archief [van de stad Utrecht]:
Section I
13: Proceedings of the city council 1569-1577.
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Section II
1: Collection of numbered documents, including material on the 
exercise of Roman Catholic and Reformed worship, and on disputes 
between the city and the chapters.
3: Collection of documents on the crisis of 1585-1588.
121: Proceedings of the city council 1577-1590, 1598.
3599: Accounts of the receivers of the Estates' imposts 1580-1581, 
1583-1584.
3602: Accounts of the receivers of the generale midd^len 1585-1586, 
1589-1590.
3603: Accounts of the receivers of the double oudschildgeld 1585-1586, 1589-1590.
3574: Accounts of the receivers of the Archbishop's tithes 1585 and 
1586.
C.: K. Heeringa, Inventaris van het archief van het kapittel ten Dorn 
(Utrecht, 1929):
1:20,21: Proceedings of the chapter 1574 1587 (including the joint deliberations of the five chapters).
D.: B.M. de Jonge van Ellemeet, Inventaris van het archief van het kapittel van St. Jan:
1:4: Proceedings of the chapter 1577-1585.
E.; [Reynders], Inventaris van het archief van het geraeente Amersfoort 
(Amersfoort, 1903):
38: Dagelixboek, I: Proceedings of the town council 1544-1577.
Dagelixboek, III (2): Proceedings of the town council 1577-1583.
Dagelixboek no. 3: Proceedings of the town council 1580-1586.
Dagelixboek no. 4: Proceedings of the town council 1586-1589.
Dagelixboek no. 5: Proceedings of the town council 1589-1594.
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